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Abstract 
Ernst Cassirer's task was to set up an account of perception as objective 
judgement. We can trace Cassirer's view of perception through three different 
accounts each of which aimed to give an answer of how perceptual judgements 
can be possible. These three accounts started from (1900-1923) where he 
presented his view depending on Functional- Relational analysis of perceptual 
experience. The second account started from ( 1923-193 3) where he presented his 
view of perception depending on symbolic analysis of perceptual experience, and 
finally the third account started from (1933-1945) where the analysis of 
perceptual phenomena has been made depending on his apprehension of Group 
Theory. 
The main target of Cassirer in the third account was to show that there is 
similarity between geometry and perception with respect to the ways both of 
these two disciplines build up their objects. Having the same logical base, 
Cassirer claimed that there is similarity between geometrical determination of the 
object and perceptual determination of the experienced object. For Cassirer, this 
similarity is what allows an application of "group theory" to perception. As a 
result of that claim, Cassirer shifted mathematical terms such as "invariance", 
"frame of reference" and "transformation" from the province of geometry and re-
used them in the field of perception for setting up what he called psychology of 
thought. 
This thesis discusses Cassirer's first two accounts and focuses on the third 
account by giving examples of how the mathematical concept of "group" can be 
used as an analogy to provide an intrinsic explanation of the nature of the objects 
and their characteristics one experiences during the perceptual situati~n. The 
explanations of the perceptual phenomena represented in the perceptual 
experience, as given by Cassirer, based on Gestalt psychology, reflected this 
II 
understanding. The ample examples created by the Gestalt psychologists and 
used by Cassirer indicated how both understood the object of perceptual 
experience as constructed and not as a thing or hie et nunc. 
I will show that in these three accounts, there are non-physical elements, which 
defined here as structural elements, involved in the perceptual experience. By the 
virtue of these non-physical elements, perceptual judgements are possible. Cassirer 
and the Gestalt psychologists emphasized that these structural elements are 
presupposed in every perceptual experience and this understanding will lead to the 
claim that both Cassirer and the Gestaltists presupposed the constructive unity of 
mind based on a transcendental analysis of the nature of mind and its cognitive 
processes. 
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The Epistemological and the Metaphysical Developments of Perception: 
A Historical Review of some Philosophical Accounts of Perception 
1.1 Introduction 
Perception is one of the most important concepts in philosophy of mind. Therefore, it is 
necessary to discuss this concept from a historical point of view, to show its development 
and to illustrate the epistemological and metaphysical issues it raises. To study 
perception one needs to answer how it is possible for perception to provide us with 
knowledge about the external world. That is why it is fruitless to discuss perception 
without discussing the general frameworks within which philosophers have just their 
epistemological and metaphysical accounts of perception that philosophers have given. 
My aim in this chapter is to introduce the different views of perception provided by 
major philosophers and to critically discuss and analyze the epistemological and 
metaphysical claims upon which they based their theses. 
We also need to address whether the questions philosophers ask about perception are 
entirely different from those raised by psychologists. Although philosophers have 
discussed perception from different perspectives, the most common fault has been the 
failure to differentiate between their epistemological doctrines and psychology as an 
independent field of empirical study. Aristotle, for example, presented his 
epistemological doctrines and gave them a psychological dress without making clear the 
differences between epistemology, which is concerned with the nature and possibility of 
knowledge, and psychology which is concerned with the mechanism of perception. 
The question that needs to be addressed is how we can define perception. This is a 
difficult question as there is no absolute and final definition of perception. This can be 
easily seen by looking at different analyses of perception. The difficulty here, it seems to 
me, does not concern the concept of perception in itself. Rather, it emerges from the 
variety of epistemological and metaphysical concerns and backgrounds of philosophers. 
Although there are different definitions of perception, there is a comprehensive and 
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general view of perception is presented by R.J. Hirst. He presents perception as the 
awareness of the objects of external world, in order to distinguish it from imagination and 
illusion: 
Perception is the awareness of the external world - of material objects, to use a technical term for 
physical objects in general, animals, plants and human beings insofar as they are perceptible (their 
bodies, in fact). The main characteristics of such objects are that they are external, independent of the 
percipient, and public, meaning that many people can perceive them at once. Perception, in being the 
awareness of such objects, may be contrasted with imagery, bodily sensation, or having dreams. 
(Hirst, 1967: 79). 
That account of perception seems to approach realism, by confirming the independence 
of the external objects from the perceiver himself. However, my general theme 
throughout my arguments in the next chapters is that a philosophical understanding of 
perception should not be based on realism but on constructivism. The central claim of 
constructivism is that the external object is not given to the perceiver in a simple way. 
Rather, it must be constructed. Therefore in order to distinguish my understanding from 
the realistic account of perception, it is necessary to present a new definition of 
perception that will be reflected throughout the coming next chapter. I understand 
perception as the ability to organize the relations between the elements of perception and 
group them in a constructed frame or pattern. The importance of this definition is that it 
shows the tremendous ability of the mind to create new orders and to arrange the 
relations of the perceptual elements differently in a way that allows the perceiver to 
perceive various representations of the same object. For example, an object can acquire 
new perceptual characteristics even though the new characteristics are not part of the 
perceptual elements forming the object. This shows that the objects we perceive are not 
an outcome of simple aggregation of perceptual elements. Rather, it presupposes a 
structure within which different perceptual form is given to perceivers. We can perceive 
that an object moves if we display photos of it very quickly at interval is of less 0.5 
seconds. We cease to perceive the same object as moving if the time between each photo 
is more than two seconds. Therefore, the object as we perceive it seems to move even 
though mption_is not .a characteristic implied by relations between perceptual, elements. 
To perceive a different object out of the same perceptual elements depends primarily on 
the structure or the order that we create, not on the elements themselves. Therefore it 
2 
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seems to me, as I will argue throughout my thesis, that perception is determined by the 
various ways of re-arranging the elements of perception and fitting them into a 
convenient structure. Therefore I claim that it is a mistake to consider that the nature of 
the objects we perceive depends on the perceptual elements themselves considered 
unchangeable and fixed and not re-orderable in different ways. 
In this chapter, we shall examine some famous epistemological views of perception. In 
addition, I will try to reveal the logical structure of perception: whether it is the 
awareness of a mere collection of sensations or whether perception transcends that 
logical ground and can be considered as a constructed principle that organizes the 
relations among particulars. 
1.2 Aristotle's Concept of Perception 
Although Aristotle's account of perception was not adequate to reveal the complicated 
issues included within perception, he did give a definition of perception and presented 
criticisms to distinguish his own view from that of his predecessors. My goal is to discuss 
Aristotle's view of perception and to show how successfully he managed to cover its 
aspects. Moreover I aim to realize the relationship between his epistemology and his 
theory of perception and whether there is a relationship between his metaphysics and his 
view of perception. If the answer is yes, then the next question should be how 
significantly his metaphysics is reflected in his analysis of perception. Finally we try to 
find a connection between his De Anima and De Sensus where they considered two bases 
for his theory of perception. 
To capture Aristotle's view on perception, I argue that metaphysics and physics are the 
two main grounds on which he based his view of perception. Aristotle has a realist view 
of perception. This can be shown by his definition and analyses of the nature of 
perception. To give a definition of perception, he depends on his primary distinction 
between matter and form. This distinction can be shown in the three definitions that he 
gave of perception. Perception takes place when the perceiver becomes like the object 
( ori the soul417 A 18) when the perceiver acquires the form, but not the matter of the 
object (424A18-24) and finally when the perceiver that was potential becomes actual 
(418A3) (Irwin 1998, 425) 
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In fact, all the above-mentioned definitions of perception imply a certain type of 
alteration. In other words, perception occurs by the perceiver being changed and acted 
upon by the sense organs. Aristotle's main interest in De Anima was to clarify all the 
different ways in which something can be affected and altered. As evidence of that, 
Aristotle gives more references to the notion of alteration when he discussed perception. 
He explains what kind of change is involved in perception. The first kind of alteration or 
change is that of becoming like, or similar to the object of perception. Aristotle states in 
his De Anima that: 
As we have said, what has the capacity for perception is potentially such as the object of perception is 
already in actuality. For when it is affected it is not similar, but once it has been affected, it is 
assimilated to it and such as it is. (Aristotle, 418A3 -6). 
To have the capacity to perceive something, the sense organ must be capable of being 
affected by an object of perception in such a way that it becomes like that object. 
The second kind of alteration is when the sense organs take on the perceptible form of its 
sensible object. It was the perceptible form and the matter that Aristotle was concerned 
with when he discusses how perception works. Aristotle again reports in his De Anima as 
follows: 
In general, with regard to all perception, we must take it that the sense is that which can receive 
perceptible forms without their matter, as wax receives the imprint of the ring without the iron or gold, 
and takes the imprint which is of gold or bronze, but not qua gold or bronze. (Aristotle, 424Al7-
21). 
According to Aristotle, the sense is receptive of the perceptible forms without the matter, 
and to receive the perceptible forms, it needs to have the capacity that allows it to 
perform its function as we shall explain when we discuss how the sense organs receive 
the external object. These are the two meanings of alteration implied in Aristotle's 
definition of perception. There is another meaning that is implied in the second meaning 
that we discussed above. This meaning is the potentiality and actuality. For a sense organ 
has the potential to receive until the external object activates it. According to Aristotle, 
there are two levels of actuality for any sense. The first actuality is when the sense 
possesses the capacity to receive; the second actuality is achieved when the capacity is 
activated and something is actually received. (Aristotle, DAII.I, 412B20-2). 
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For example, what makes an aye an eye, is that it possesses the capacity for sight. This is 
the first actuality of an eye. The second actuality is achieved when the capacity is 
activated and the eye actually sees. Therefore when the eye loses its capacity of sight it 
ceases to exist. When the eye achieves its second actuality it becomes similar to the 
object of perception. In other words, when the external object acts on a sense organ 
generally, then it will produce an alteration in the eye which will be assimilated to the 
object and become like the object. Here we can see that the three senses of perception 
show the fact that perception implies an alteration. However, the next question is what is 
the nature of that alteration? 
Before answering that question, the different ways in which something can be affected 
and altered need to be explained. Aristotle understood the object of perception in only 
three possible ways. By the object of perception, either a proper object of one sense 
organ or a common object which are perceived by virtue of different sense organs from 
one side, or he means by object of perception an object that is perceived accidentally 
from the other side. If an object stimulates a certain sense and only that sense, then 
Aristotle calls it a proper object. For example, Colour is a proper object for the sight and 
tone is the proper object ofhearing. 
In dealing with each of the senses we shall have first to speak of the objects which are perceptible by 
each. The term 'object ofperception' is spoken of in three ways, of which two we say are perceived in 
virtue of themselves and one is perceived accidentally. Of the first two, one is proper to a single sense 
and the other is common to all the senses. I call a 'proper object' [sc.of a sense] that which cannot be 
perceived by any other sense and in respect of which no error is possible; in this sense colour is the 
special object of sight, sound of hearing, flavour of taste .... Such objects are what we call the proper 
objects of this or that sense. (Aristotle, De Anima 418A 7-17). 
In addition, Aristotle indicates that there are objects that can be perceived by any sense 
and of these, some are actually common to the senses such as motion, number and rest. 
Such sensibles are not proper to any sense, but rather are common to all. Finally Aristotle 
indicates a third type of object of perception which he calls an accidental object of 
perception. The accidental object of perception is not strictly shown by perception itself, 
~ut is something we take to, be associ~ted with it on the basis of earlier experiences .. 
Aristotle calls it "perceptible by association" aistheton kata symbebekos (See Brentano 
1978, 26). Aristotle explains the accidental object with the example of the son of Diares. 
He explains that if the white thing was the son of Diares, then one perceives it 
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accidentally because it is an accident of the white thing one perceives. In other words, the 
son of Diares is seen, not because he is the son of Diares, he is seen because he is also a 
white object and in virtue of this, is able to act on the eye. 
Common sensibles are movement, rest, number, figure, magnitude; these are not proper to any one 
sense, but are common to all. There are at any rate certain kinds of movement which are perceptible 
both by touch and sight. Something is said to be an accidental object of perception, e.g. if the white 
thing were the son of Diares. One perceives this accidentally because it is an accident of the white 
thing which one perceives-hence one is not affected by the object of perception as such. 
(Aristotle, De Anima, 418A 17 -25). 
Among these three types of perceptible objects, Aristotle gives much attention to the 
proper objects of perception as they seemed to him more reliable than the other two 
objects of perception. These are the objects of perception that bring about alteration to 
the senses. Now I answer the earlier question: what is the nature of that alteration that is 
caused by perceptible objects on sense organs? It is a physical alteration caused by 
external objects and takes place in the senses. For Aristotle to explain that physical 
alteration, he needed to clarify how it is possible for the perceptible objects to stimulate 
and act upon our senses. He assumes a medium between the external object and the sense 
organs. The nature of the medium is matched with the physical nature of the sense organ. 
For example, the organ of sight must be able to take on the colours of its objects and this 
means that it must be made of something transparent such as water. The reason the 
medium must be transparent in the case of sight is that colour produces an effect in the 
eyes and this would not be possible if the medium was not transparent. In other words, 
the medium needs to be transparent because it is receptive of colour. Aristotle states: 
It is true that the eye is composed of water, yet seeing occurs not because it is water but because it is 
transparent-something common to both water and air. But water is more easily confined and condensed 
than air and this is why the pupil, i.e., the eye proper, consists of water. 
(Aristotle, Sense2, 438A12-16). This physical alteration occurs also m the other 
senses, sound, taste and smell. 
The mate~ial expl_anation of Aristotle's accountof perception findsgreatsupport among 
those scholars who are generally interested in Aristotle's epistemology. For instance, 
Everson discusses Aristotle's theory of perception in the light of material interpretation 
and Modrak, in his 1987 Aristotle the Power of Perception supports the material 
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explanation of Aristotle's theory of perception as opposed to the 'spiritualist' account 
claimed by Myles Burnyeat. On the spiritualist interpretation, the change brought about 
by the proper object of a sense can be understood as a cognitive change, or a change 
which can only be undergone by a sense. In other words to the spiritualist, in contrast to 
the materialist, the perceptible form cannot be described other than as the capacity for 
being perceived, and the change in the organ only explains the perception in virtue of its 
instantiating that form (See Everson, 1997: 57-60, also Everson, 1995: 179-183 ). 
In his reading of De Anima II.5, Burnyeat argues that the physical material of which 
Aristotelian sense organs are made, does not need to undergo any ordinary physical 
change to become aware of a smell or colour. However, he claims that the physical 
material of animal bodies in Aristotle's world is already pregnant with consciousness 
needing only to be awakened to the sensation of red or warmth. (See Burnyeat, 1992: 19-
20). 
Aristotle in his view stressed the material alteration as an alternative way to express his 
view of perception. Aristotle did not have any problem applying his view of soul or 
psuche to his view of perception. In addition he used his explanation of soul to bring 
more clarification to his theory of perception. This can be seen in his definitions of the 
soul and in his discussion of its capacities in respect of the sense organs. In De Anima II, 
Aristotle provides three characterizations of the soul. It is described at 412A 16 as "the 
soul is a substance qua a form of a natural body"; at ( 412A27 -28) as "the first actuality of 
a natural body which has life potentially" and finally at 412B5-6 as "the first actuality of 
a body which has organs". The same thought here is also applicable to the soul. There are 
two levels of actuality. When the organ possesses the capacity this is what Aristotle calls 
the first actuality, and when the capacity is practiced or exercised, this is the second 
actuality. If the soul is considered to be the form of all natural bodies and if any sense 
organ ceased to perform its function because there is no life in that sense organ, then 
perception is no longer possible because a natural body cannot perceive either, because it 
is no longer alive. No dead sense organ can perform its function because it has lost its 
capacity to perceive. 
This understanding can be revealed in his third characterization of the soul when he 
describes it as a first actuality of a body that has organs. It seems to me that it is the soul 
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that is considered the first cause presupposed before we even ask whether or not sense 
organs have the capacity to perceive their proper objects. The soul activates the sense 
organs because the sense organ cannot have the capacity to perceive if the natural body is 
dead. Even though the soul as a cause of perception is not perceived, we can deduce its 
existence from the physical effect on the sense organs activated by it. It is the soul that 
justifies the changes that take place in all living bodies. Therefore, Aristotle considers 
soul not only as the cause of a living body but also as the principle of the changes that 
occur in the living body. 
The psuche is also the primary source of change of position but this capacity is not found in all living 
things. But alteration and growth are also due to the Psuche. For perception seems to be a kind of 
alteration and nothing perceives which does not share in psuche. (Aristotle, De Anima: II.4, 
415B21-26). 
According to Aristotle, the soul is the cause of perception in the sense that it brings about 
the changes to living bodies because it is considered the first actuality of the physical 
body. Even if we accept this view, we need not to deny that Aristotle gave much 
attention to the external objects that activate our sense organs. Now let us discuss the 
importance of perception and the role it plays within Aristotle's epistemology 
1.2.1 Perception and Aristotle's Epistemology 
In his metaphysics, Aristotle shows the importance of the senses as a source of 
knowledge. He refers to this idea in his metaphysics by claiming that: 
All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even 
apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For 
not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer sight to 
almost every thing else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to 
light many differences between things. (Robinson, 1986: 80 From Aristotle's metaphysics A 
980A 21-7). 
This demonstrates Aristotle's view of how perception is important for both human beings 
and animals by leading them to distinguish between external objects. In fact, Aristotle 
was an empiricist in that he confirmed the importance of perception to kiiowledge. V/e- -
can see this view at work in a number of different places in his works. It is an 
Aristotelian commonplace that if we perceived nothing, we would know nothing 
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(Aristotle, De Anima: 432A3-10 also Posterior Analytics: 81A37-B6). If perception is so 
important for Aristotle's epistemology, our next inquiry is whether or not the content of 
our concepts is derived from our perceptions. In addition, we will be concerned with 
whether or not perception plays a role in Aristotle's logic which provides the foundation 
for his systematic knowledge. 
When Aristotle discusses abstract objects, he points to his belief that concepts are derived 
from perception. For instance in his Metaphysics XIII, Aristotle discusses the 
ontological status of mathematical objects. In contrast to Plato, he argues that 
mathematical objects are not separate substances. Instead, a mathematical object is an 
abstract representation of a property of a sensible particular. As an example of that view, 
Aristotle argues that geometry treats concrete particulars qua lengths and it investigates 
the attributes that belong to objects qua planes, and qua lengths. A line is an abstract 
representation of the straight edge of some arbitrarily selected material object. (Aristotle, 
Metaphysics: 1078A2-31). 
This view can be traced also in the Metaphysics when he discusses the relationship 
between species, genus and higher order universals, which consists in the degree of 
abstractness with which the features of the particular are conceptualized. All levels of 
abstraction in geometry and physics begin from external objects that we perceive by the 
senses. Now we shall turn to provide an answer to the question of whether or not 
perception plays a role in Aristotle's logic and his systematic knowledge. Here we find it 
is important to discuss Aristotelian logic, his theory of categories. 
In his early work, Aristotle focuses on two tasks, firstly marking a limit of the role of 
particulars and universals in answering "what is it"? Secondly to inquire about things, 
and to defend the central role of natural- kind concepts in answering questions of both 
change and identity. The famous ten categories or predications are an attempt to 
enumerate the different ways we might characterize a particular in our experience: we 
might speak about its substantial nature, its quality, its quantity, its place, time, position, 
its relation, state, activity and inactivity. Aristotle's main point was that we do noLpick 
things out and trace them as unclassified matter. For example, when we point to Socrates 
and say "what is it"? We are asking about a particular and it is that particular object that 
exists. That is why we identify and classify Socrates under the concept of "human 
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being". To explain and classify a certain particular is to say to what kind the thing 
belongs. The abstraction from similar particulars is the ground that forms Aristotle's 
view on induction. Aristotle clearly argues in his Posterior Analytics for some sort of 
empiricist thesis when he discusses the problem of induction. It is a logical inquiry of 
how to derive a general concept out of similar individuals. Aristotle's argument is clear 
enough to show how perception is important for induction. We can sum up his argument 
up in the following statement: there is no knowledge without induction, and no induction 
without perception, so no knowledge without perception: 
Demonstration is from universals, and induction is from particulars, and it is impossible to contemplate 
universals except through induction ... and induction is impossible for one not having perception. For 
perception is of individuals; for it is not possible to have knowledge of these, nor from universals 
without induction, nor through induction without perception. (Aristotle, Posterior 
Analytics: 181A40-B9). 
In this paragraph Aristotle makes perception the basis for the inductions that produce the 
universal concepts and propositions that are the proper objects of science. Therefore for 
Aristotle, induction is an instrument to link particulars and universals, or perception and a 
higher order of knowledge. It is true, according to Aristotle, that the external world acts 
on us through perception and afterwards the inductive process begins in perception to 
reach an abstract concept. For Aristotle, all universal knowledge comes about through 
perception, or a series of perceptions, through induction. 
1.3 Empiricism and the Theory of Perception 
In the following pages, I will present another account of perception associated with 
British Empiricism. My main interest in discussing British Empiricism is to give an 
insight of why Cassirer chose British empiricists as an example of showing the 
inseparable relation between them and Aristotle regarding the problem of perception. 
This will be demonstrated through our discussion of the two figures that represent 
empirical th0ught.. 
Empiricism is an original approach in the theory of knowledge. It identifies on 
experience as a source of knowledge and belief to explain facts regarding the external 
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world and its objects. This is clearly elucidated in Locke's famous statement in his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding: 
Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; 
how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy 
of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and 
knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, From experience: in that all our knowledge is founded, and 
from that it ultimately derives itself (Locke, 1867: Book 11, Ch 159). 
Locke argued that experience is the ultimate source of all of our knowledge. He claimed 
that all our ideas; the immediate objects of perception, thought or understanding, spring 
from experience. (Locke, Essay II viii8). 
For Locke, observation applies to perception of external and sensible objects, but also to 
the observation of the internal operation of our minds. 
According to empiricists, the mind does not merely copy ideas of particulars, but applies 
internal mental capacities to abstract, associate ... etc. The mind is concerned not only 
with explaining the relationship between what is seen and what really exists, but is also 
concerned with the complex operation and the laws that combine the different ideas or 
sensations together. 
Actually, even the British empiricists, the philosophers historically most identified with the copy 
theory of mind, recognized that the mind does not simply mirror nature. (Flanagan, 1992:xxx). 
The mind has a positive role to play in the theory of representation. Therefore we are going here to discuss 
two different figures who presented different accounts concerning the above questions. 
1.3.1Berkeley's view of perception 
To understand Berkeley's view of perception, we have to understand two important and 
general schemes on which he formulated this account. The first scheme is the empiricist 
base, which deals with the sensory experience. The second base is the metaphysical one, 
which provides him with the ultimate framework for understanding and explanation. Like 
other empiricists in the eighteenth century, Berkeley used the term."idea" mostly to refer 
to the immediate object of perception. Philosophers in the eighteenth century used the 
term "idea" to point out the immediate perception that takes place without inference. 
Berkeley's main argument against Locke's theory of abstracted ideas rests on the premise 
II 
Chapter One: The Epistemological and the Metaphysical Developments of 
Perception 
that we cannot conceive of the impossible (Berkeley, 1950: works vol2, 28). Berkeley 
argued that perceptual situations do not involve any kind of abstracted ideas and also that 
the doctrine of abstracted ideas is a false view that led individuals to suppose that there is 
matter or material substance. As a result, Berkeley presented his view on perception 
through his principle "Esse est percipe" that rejected the false claim of material 
substance. 
Berkeley reduces the thing to its component elements, and shows that each and all of these consist in 
being perceived. A thing is nothing but an aggregate of sensible qualities, and, if we can show that 
none of these can exist apart from perception, we shall have proved that the existence of the thing itself 
consists in being perceived. (Johnston, 1965: 179). 
Berkeley distinguished two v1ews m respect of the immediate perception; the 
philosophers' view and the vulgar view. The vulgar view considers the things that they 
immediately perceive to be the real things. However the philosophers consider that the 
things they immediately perceive are mere ideas that exist only in the mind. In addition, 
Berkeley rejected the philosophers' views that what we immediately perceive is just an 
idea existing only in the mind. Therefore, Berkeley presented his analysis of the nature of 
idea t to go beyond both vulgar and philosophers' views about the external objects. 
Berkeley used the term "idea" to refer to immediate objects that can be considered the 
foundation of our knowledge. He divided "idea" into three kinds of ideas; sense-idea, 
ideas of reflection and finally the ideas of memory or imagination. Sense-ideas are 
apprehended by sense, ideas of reflection are those ideas which we are conscious of in 
our thoughts, desires, feeling and volition. Finally the ideas of memory or imagination 
are representations of both those kinds of ideas in either memory or imagination. 
Berkeley sought to ascribe an active role to an agent that contributes positively to the 
theory of knowledge. What is the active agent implied in Berkeley's theory of 
knowledge? 
Berkeley argues that there is something that knows or perceives ideas. He claims that the 
" . . .. . -" . . . . - . . 
- . - . 
sense-idea is perceived by an active being which he describes as the mind or spirit. 
Berkeley ascribes an active role to the mind or spirit in perception. According to 
Berkeley, one needs to distinguish between two modes of being; the mode of being of 
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what is perceived is distinct from the mode of being of the perceiver. In other words, 
what is perceived is the sense-phenomena and it is a passive object. Meanwhile, the 
perceiver is an active subject that perceives. In the light of that distinction, Berkeley's 
meaning of existence is derived. For Berkeley, the existence of the passive is to be 
perceived (esse est percipi), and the existence of minds or active things is to perceive 
(esse est percipere) and therefore existence in general, whether of passive things or 
active things, is necessarily related to the mind or the spirit (Luce, 1945: 58). 
In regard to Berkeley's view of the external world, Luce claimed that the main point in 
Berkeley is that he was not skeptical about the existence of the external objects, but he 
was a realist and paid attention to the objectivity of the external world: 
It is significant that he puts the object before the subject. The object is his first interest, his opening 
theme. Objectivity is the key-note of the Principles. He is not solipsist, nor subjectivist, nor subjective 
idealist; his starting-point is not the self, but the "it". Descartes begins with the cogito ergo sum, 
Berkeley begins with the cogitatur ergo est,. He believed in the sensible world, as you and I do. He 
looked out on the Dublin mountains, and so do I as I write these words. (Luce, 1945:46-4 7). 
In contrast to Luce's claim, George Pitcher argues that Berkeley is an idealist and 
believes existence of the object is in the mind: 
We never perceive so-called physical objects-e.g. never see such things as tulips or rocks; we perceive 
only things that exist in our own mind. (Pitcher, 1977: 144 ). 
I agree with Luce that Berkeley was not a solipsist even though it could be deduced from 
some of his texts that he is a skeptic. How could one be sure that the data of immediate 
and mediate perception is reflecting the existence of the external objects? Berkeley 
argued that neither sense ideas nor idea of memory and imagination is responsible of 
having a belief of the existence of external objects like the sound of a coach we imagine 
that there is a coach approaching. We construct our idea of a coach from the perceptual 
data of immediate perception. Berkeley's concern was devoted to sense-ideas and how 
they represent the objects of the external world. He indicated that when someone is in his 
study, looking at his study table, he is not skeptical about the existence of the table. 
However, the question concerning the existence of the.study table is provokedowhen our 
immediate perception of it ceases. For example, when I am away from my studying room 
would the study table be there and exist even though I do not immediately perceive it? 
(Berkeley, 1942: 28-29). 
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Berkeley therefore argues that what is unperceived exists even though it is not an object 
of our immediate perception. As a result, Berkeley presupposes that there must be some 
external cause for our sense-ideas or sensation. This external cause is nothing more than 
God as being an immaterial substance. Berkeley sought to present a form of the causal 
theory of perception that may be described as "spiritual causation". Hence, Berkeley 
claimed that this cause must be the substance that is independent of the objects we 
perceive where the objects of perception are dependent upon that substance. This 
substance, according to Berkeley, is not a material one, but a spiritual substance. 
Berkeley argued that no finite human mind could be responsible for my perceptual ideas. 
Only an infinite spirit could do the job: 
Among spirits there is one infinite spirit, God; and there are many finite spirits, non of them .... finite 
minds have small power to cause ideas; but when we observe the world around us, we are for ever 
being affected with the ideas that God's mind perceives, and which by God's will finite spirits also 
perceive. (Berkeley, 1957: 39). 
Berkeley claimed that the mind does not produce and imprint sense-ideas because it is 
finite and also the individuals always make different and subjective judgments on what 
they perceive. Therefore Berkeley explained that God or spiritual substance, produces the 
ideas of sense for us and imprints them on us. The ideas imprinted on the senses are not 
creatures of my will. There is some other spirit that produces them (Berkeley, 1957: 39). 
In other words, since no two persons perceive the same thing, it is God who causes the 
individual percipients to be affected by similar but not identical sensory phenomena. 
God, for Berkeley is the guarantor of what we perceive, and even if he is not immediately 
perceived by us at the moment, still exists in the external world (Hergenhahn, 1997: 199). 
As a matter of fact, Berkeley did not claim that the object does not exist at all at the 
moment I am not seeing it. However, he argued that the object that I am not seeing 
subsists in the mind of an external spirit. Berkeley based his theory of perception on the 
assumption that what creates external reality is God's perception. It is the fact that 
external reality is God's perception that makes- it stable over time and the same for 
everyone. 
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The tree is a collection of ideas and every collection of ideas must exist in some mind, the tree must 
exist in an infinite mind or spirit. Berkeley concluded that the persistence of the tree gives us a good 
reason to conclude that there exists an infinite spirit, God. The tree continues to exist even at times 
when no finite spirit or ordinary person perceives the tree. Since the tree I presently see is a collection 
of ideas and is independent of finite spirit, it follows that there must be an infinite spirit (mind) upon 
which the tree depends for its continued existence. (Warnock, 1969: 89-90). 
1.3.2 Hume's View of Perception 
Hume differentiated himself from traditional empmc1sm by drawing a distinction 
between epistemological views which would reflect his view on perception. Like Locke 
and Berkeley, Hume confirmed the importance of experience in the problem of 
knowledge. Hume's aim was to comprehend human mind and its cognitive operations 
and to avoid all those questions which transcend human understanding. Hume insisted on 
not going beyond the experience because it is considered the only reliable source for our 
knowledge: 
We must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments 
to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, tis still certain we cannot 
go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of 
human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical. (Hume, 1960: xxi). 
He also adds in his Enquiry: 
It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to 
infer the existence of one object from that of another. Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, which 
forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of all human action and behaviour. 
(Hume,1975: 164). 
Hume could push the empirical approach a step further than Locke and Berkeley by 
transcending all notions which transcend our experience. Therefore He objected both 
Locke's idea of substance and Berkeley's idea of the spiritual substance. In addition, he 
also objected these ideas raised by rationalists and found its place within empiricism, like 
· the concepts of space and causality; 
It seems ... not impossible to avoid these absurdities and contradictions, if it be admitted, that there is 
no such thing as abstract or general ideas, properly speaking; but that all general ideas are, in reality, 
particular ones, attached to a general term, which recalls, upon occasion, other particular ones, that 
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resemble, in certain circumstances, the idea, present to the mind .... If this be admitted (as seems 
reasonable) it follows that all the ideas of quantity, upon which mathematicians reason, are nothing but 
particular, and such as are suggested by the senses and imagination, and consequently, cannot be 
infinitely divisible. (Hume, Enquiry Quoted Wilbanks, 1968: 111 ). 
Hume was concerned with the question of whether the nature and the essence of 
metaphysical concepts like God or the external world could be known. Is there any 
faculty that allows to grasp knowledge of objects going beyond experience? Could our 
understanding provide us with proper answers based on our own experience of these 
objects? Once he put these two questions in his account, therefore we can claim that his 
system includes two different methodological approaches. The first one is the destructive 
approach, which tries to criticize and to remove all kind of metaphysical thought, and the 
second approach is the constructive one that seeks to discover the faculties of human 
understanding and their roles of knowledge. 
Hume can be seen as a positive philosopher who introduced fresh analysis to some 
philosophical problems such as his analysis of causality and his attempt to construct a 
theory of the mind. He could also be seen as a negative philosopher because of his 
skepticism about the reason and the method of composing abstract ideas along with his 
theory of imagination, as we shall discuss later. As a result, Hume's philosophy could be 
analyzed in the light of these two approaches. Most of philosophers read Hume as being 
a negative and a destructive philosopher, while a few like Norman Kemp Smith read him 
as a positive and a constructive philosopher (Smith, 1964). 
1.3.3 The problem of Perception 
Hume indicated that perception could be understood through impressions and ideas, 
which are the only possible sources for us to obtain knowledge. He distinguishes between 
impressions and ideas with the claim that the former have a greater degree of force and 
liveliness than the latter. In addition to that difference, ideas, as a mental content of our 
mind, are considered simpler than impressions: 
All the perceptions of the human- mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call 
Impression and Ideas. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness with 
which they strike upon the mind and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those 
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perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions .... By ideas I mean 
the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning. (Hume, 1960: 1 ). 
Hume argued that ideas are weak and feeble perceptions because they are derived from 
impressions. Moreover, we can claim as Hume did, that ideas are mere copies of 
impressions (Hume, 1975: 19 also Flew, 1986: 23-24). Here we can find out the first 
assumption of Hume's theory of perception which can be summarized as follows; 
nothing can be perceived unless we experience it. Hume asked how we could apprehend 
something which goes beyond our experience. 
Therefore I claim that it was Hume who successfully closed the gap which was found in 
Berkeley's theory by going beyond the idea of spiritual substance and maintaining 
Berkeley's principle ESSI IS PERCIPPI not as a metaphysical principle. This understanding 
explains why Hume rejected the idea of miracles and super-powers existing within 
religion. For maintaining his theory of perception away from any metaphysical claims, 
Hume formulated a proper definition of the mind by which he closed the door to any 
view that could define it in terms of substance. Hume defines the human mind as a 
collection or bundle of perceptions. We do not have any knowledge of the mind and its 
nature except what we know about it, as a group of ideas, which are related to each other. 
(Broaches, 2002: 200-201 ). 
Hume did not need any additional principles to explain perception. Here I agree with 
Ayer that to explain perception in the light of these two sources: impression and ideas, it 
was necessary for Hume to consider impressions as a primary and a primitive source for 
his theory (Ayer, 1989: 40). The next question is how these separated impressions could 
be related in order to represent an object, and whether these impressions relate 
haphazardly or according to laws. 
1.3.4 The Associative laws of Perception and the Problem of the 
External World 
The role of the mind is to relate the contents of experience. Therefore the mind needs 
certain laws of association and to relate all those different ideas under one object. Unlike 
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Kant, Hume did not attempt to explain how association arises. Rather, Hume accepts 
association as an observed fact grasped in experience. Hume asked what the principles of 
this association are and he found that all our ideas stand in three relations; resemblance, 
contiguity and cause and effect. For instance, mind finds it is easier to associate ideas that 
are contiguous in time or place together: 
Tis plain, that in the course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination 
runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a 
sufficient bond and association. Tis likewise evident, that as the senses, in changing their objects, are 
necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie contiguous to each other, the 
imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the parts of 
space and time in conceiving its objects (II). (Hume, 1975: Quoted from Laird, 1932:43). 
These are the associative ideas that relate our impressions or ideas of perceived objects. 
The importance of Hume's theory of perception was that he went one step further than 
Locke and Berkeley by setting up a causal explanation of perception by showing the 
internal workings of the mind. The principle of causality will cause him serious trouble. 
It does not deal with perceptions, which can be either seen or felt but with perceptions 
which would be inferred from other perceptions which are not under our sensory 
experience: the problem of how we infer from perceived objects to the existence of some 
objects which are not seen by our immediate sensory observation. 
Hume explains his theory of the external world and its relation to perception in his 
Treatise in book I part IV section II, "Of scepticism with regard to the sense", and in 
section IV "Of the modern of philosophy" and in section V "Of the immateriality of the 
soul". He indicates that every impression and every idea, which we have either in our 
mind or memory, does not include any mark of existence. The idea of existence neither 
increases nor diminishes the idea. According to Hume, if we take the example of my own 
body, it is nothing more than a group of sensible percepts that are related together. My 
experience shows me that my body is those percepts which I have about it. Therefore it 
was interesting to ask questions about its nature and whether it has an existence 
independent of those percepts. For Hume, attempting to answer these questions would 
_lead us beyond experience. 
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Hume's aim, throughout his discussion of the external world, is to transcend the 
ontological problem implied in perception that leads individuals to ascribe a 
continuous, distinct and an independent existence of objects that we no longer perceive 
or cease to perceive. To solve this ontological problem, it was necessary, according to 
Hume, to differentiate between two different views of our perception of external 
objects; the philosophers' view and the vulgar view. According to the vulgar view the 
objects and our perception of them are the same. However, philosophers distinguish 
between objects that are directly perceived and ascribed a continued and distinct 
existence to our sensible perception of objects that cease to be perceived. 
Regarding this distinction between Vulgar and Philosophers on perception, Hume 
asked two important questions. Firstly, why do we attribute a continued existence to 
objects we have perceived, even when they are not present to the senses? Secondly, 
why do we suppose them to have an existence distinct and independent from 
perception? Therefore Hume examined the faculties of our mind which are responsible 
for ascribing continued and independent existence to perceived objects. He investigates 
the senses, reason and imagination to show which faculty is in charge for carrying out 
the belief of the existence of external objects. 
For senses, Hume argues that senses are not responsible for the belief of continued 
existence of objects. Hume summarized that conclusion as follows: 
Thus I resume what I have said concerning the senses; they give us no notion of continued existence, 
because they cannot operate beyond the extent in which they really operate. They as little produce the 
opinion of a distinct existence, because they neither can offer it to the mind as represented, nor as 
original. To offer it as represented, they must present both an object and an image. To make it appear 
as original, they must convey a falsehood; and this falsehood must lie in the relations and situation: in 
order to which, they must be able to compare the object with ourselves; and even in that case they do 
not, nor is it possible they should, deceive us. We may therefore conclude with certainty that the 
opinion of a continued and of a distinct existence never arises from the senses.(Hume, 1960: 191-
192). 
We could see here that the senses ~re not the faculty t~at, can justify tbe idea ,of a 
distinct existence of an object apart from perception. Therefore Hume examined 
another faculty reason and came to the conclusion that reason can not justify our belief 
in a distinct existence of an unperceived object. 
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Hence, the belief must be caused by the imagination. (Buchdahl, 1969:349 -350). 
Hume developed two notions that explain the belief of the external existence of our 
perceptible objects: constancy and coherence. Constancy can be defined as an idea that 
results in our belief in a certain object, which we directly perceive, even if that object is 
not being instantly perceived by us: 
All those objects, to which we attribute a continu'd existence, have a peculiar constancy, which 
distinguish them from the impressions, whose existence depends upon our perception. Those 
mountains, and houses, and trees, which lie at present under my eye, have always appeared to me in 
the same order; and when I lose sight of them by shutting my eyes or turning my head, I soon after find 
them return upon me without the least alteration. My bed and table, my books and papers, present 
themselves in the same uniform manner, and change not upon account of any interruption in my seeing 
or perceiving them. (Hume, 1960:194 -195). 
Along with constancy, Hume used another idea that was coherence: the perception of 
something we have perceived for a long time remains unchanged even though slight 
changes have taken place but we do not recognize them and maintain the previous 
images that we perceived. For example being away from an object that has not been 
perceived by me for a long time, I believe that the object still exists during my absence: 
Bodies often change their positions and qualities, and after a little absence or interruption may become 
hardly knowable. But here' 'tis observable, that even in these changes they preserve a coherence, and 
have a regular dependence on each other .... When I return to my chamber after an hour's absence, I 
find not my fire in the same situation, in which I left it: But then I am accustomed in other instances to 
see a like alteration produced in a like time, whether I am present or absent, near or remote. This 
coherence, therefore, in their changes is one of the characteristics of external objects, as well as their 
constancy. (Hume, 1960: 195). 
Hume's theory of imagination was the tool to answer the question of what causes us to 
believe in the existence of the body. According to Hume, the faculty of imagination 
explains, but does not justify our belief in the distinct and independent existence of 
external objects. Therefore, I consider Hume's theory of imagination as a premature tool 
to justify the belief in the external_existe~Ee of the obj~~ts wh~re h~ roadce use. of his 
doctrine of the association of ideas. For example, he referred to the lively impressions of 
the memory where one still believes the objects that are no longer perceived still exist 
independently in the external world. 
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In fact, the term imagination is the keyword in Burne's whole theory of perception. He 
could not realize the cognitive power of imagination and could not reach its high levels 
by distinguishing, like Kant, between the transcendental imagination and the empirical 
imagination. Hume did not recognize the synthetic activities of the imagination. Hume 
was satisfied to analyze perception in the light of the limited role of imagination where 
the role is to associate between sense impressions and the ideas of memory. The role of 
imagination here is limited comparing to the role given to it in Kant's theory of 
imagination as we shall discuss later. 
1.4 Kant and the Transcendental Perspective of Perception 
Kant's goal in the Critique was to show how the content of our experience must exhibit a 
definite connectedness and relational structure. Therefore, he argued that objects of 
thought are nothing more than centers of such connectedness and structures. Kant 
claimed that these kinds of relations and forms of connection are not inherent in reality, 
but these relations rest on the synthesizing activity of the transcendental subject which 
organizes our experience using certain a priori categories. Kant brought about the idea of 
the transcendental perspective that studies the structure of the mind showing how its 
faculties play a systematic role in the elements of experience. The importance of the 
transcendental view was to confirm the active and systematic role of the mind which had 
been ignored by the empiricists. The mind is not a passive agent for collecting and 
joining various impressions as the empiricists claimed. Kant would argue that the mind 
has the principles and structures which provide the basis for arranging and ordering the 
elements of experience: 
Kant agreed with the British empiricists that sensations precede knowledge. However as soon as we 
have sensations, they are modeled by the mind's structure, which is a priori, that is before the 
sensations. The mind for Kant was not a passive entity shaped by experience. Rather, the mind is an 
active agent, coordinating sensations into perceptions and perceptions into knowledge, changing 
manifold experiences into the unity of thought. (Thorne & Henely, 1979: 1 06). 
We are going to argue in the following pages that Kant's contribution to perception was 
to demonstrate the systematic unity of the mind and how the mind provides perceptual 
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experience with the principles needed to organize its objects. Therefore I will discuss 
Kant's theory of perception clarifying the components of his theory and the validity. 
1.4. 1 Kant's Theory of Perception 
Kant's view on perception has been illustrated throughout the Transcendental Aesthetic 
in which he constructed the formal framework of sensible manifolds. Kant sought to 
represent a different answer to Hume's problem of how we justify the existence of 
unperceived objects through a critical analysis of the faculties of the mind. Before I 
discuss his theory of perception, I would like to emphasize two points that played a 
significant role in forming his account of perception. The first point was his disagreement 
with Hume's view regarding the causal principle. Kant believed that the principle of 
causality has a universal validity and not a matter of habit. The second point was derived 
from his metaphysical situation: there was agreement between Kant and Hume on the 
impossibility of knowing ideas such as God and the soul since they are not presupposed 
. . 
m expenence. 
To perceive an object, Kant claimed that two faculties of the mind are required. These 
two faculties are sensibility and understanding. Sensibility, according to Kant, is the 
passive part of the mind and its function lies in receiving intuition. Understanding is an 
active faculty of the mind, the function of which is to bring order to intuition and 
perceptual experience. 
Let us give the name of sensibility to our mind's receptivity, [i.e., to its ability] to receive presentations 
insofar as it is affected in some manner. Understanding, on the other hand, is our ability to produce 
presentations ourselves, i.e., our spontaneity of cognition. Our intuition, by our very nature, can never 
be other than sensible intuition; i.e., it contains only the way in which we are affected by objects. 
Understanding, on the other hand, is our ability to think the object of sensible intuition. 
(Kant, 1996: A51 ). 
Kant argued that sensibility and understanding are necessary conditions for each other 
to· the extent that intuitions, considered to be the matter of knowledge, are blind without 
concepts, and concepts, the forms of knowledge, are empty without intuitions. 
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For Kant, the object of perception is not a mere association of some properties that we 
abstracted from similar objects, rather it presupposes some rules or forms that give it its 
unity and coherence. To combine quality into a unity is an act ofthe understanding or a 
synthesis. To perceive an object, according to Kant, there are three basic processes of 
synthesis that are necessary conditions, although perception must not be viewed as a 
process that takes place in three separate stages. Rather, they are considered to be three 
constructive aspects of a single active process of the mind. In fact, Kant sought to 
simplify the active process of the mind by dividing it into three constructive aspects as 
follows; the synthesis of apprehension, the synthesis of reproduction and finally the 
synthesis of recognition. These three kinds of synthesis concern intuition, imagination 
and concept respectively. Let us now discuss, according to Kant, what exactly occurs in 
our mind when we perceive an object. 
1.4.2 The Synthesis of Apprehension 
In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant argued that sensibility should be considered as 
the faculty of receptivity that receives the empirical intuitions. However, Kant found 
that the empirical intuitions received by sensibility are not ordered. He claimed that the 
act of ordering the empirical intuitions requires a priori forms. The question Kant asked 
was how can sensibility supply us with a priori forms? Kant gave his answer that there 
are two pure forms of sensible intuition: space and time, in which our actual sensations 
occur. Space and time are presupposed before experience itself. 
Time and space are, accordingly, two sources of cognition. From these sources we can draw a priori 
different synthetic cognition .... For time and space, taken together, are pure forms of all sensible 
intuition, and thereby make synthetic propositions possible a priori. But precisely thereby (i.e., by 
being merely conditions of sensibility), these a priori sources of cognition determine their own bounds; 
viz., they determine that they apply to objects merely insofar as these are regarded as appearances, but 
do not exhibit things in themselves. Appearances are the sole realm where these a priori sources of 
cognition are valid; if we go outside that realm, there is no further objective use that can be made of 
them. (Kant, 1996:A39). 
For Kant, space is a neces~ary a priori presentation that underlies all outerjntuitions. It 
always precedes our perception of external objects because we cannot perceive an 
object if it is not ordered in space. In fact being a necessary a priori form of 
presentations does not allow Kant to consider it as a universal concept of things. He 
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considers space only as a priori form for the outer sense or presentations. From that 
epistemological situation, Kant could go beyond the debate between Newton and 
Leibniz on the origin of space. Space, according to Kant, is neither a preexisting 
container in which objects are placed, nor is it a pure system of relationships among 
objects. But it is a priori form of human perception 
Space is nothing but the mere form of all appearances of outer senses; i.e., it is the subjective condition 
of sensibility under which alone outer intuition is possible for us. Now, the subject's receptivity for 
being affected by objects precedes necessarily all intuitions of these objects. Thus we can understand 
how the form of all appearances can be given in the mind prior to all actual perceptions, and hence 
given a priori; and we can understand how this form, as a pure intuition in which all objects must be 
determined, can contain, prior to all experience, principles for the relations among the objects. 
(Kant, 1996: B42). 
The same understanding is also applicable to time. For Kant, the concept of time cannot 
be developed directly from experience of events taking place simultaneously or 
successively because these two notions of simultaneity and succession presuppose time. 
We cannot refer to simultaneous events or successive events unless we have the 
concept of time that implies these two notions. Therefore, Kant considered time as a 
necessary condition that underlies all intuitions. Space and time are to be considered as 
two subjective conditions of intuitions which cannot be detached from each other when 
we perceive two external objects sequentially following each other. The mind has to 
arrange the empirical intuitions in spatial and temporal orders. 
Kant calls the act of gathering the manifold under space and time "the synthesis of 
apprehension". This kind of synthesis is important for knowledge, but alone is not 
enough to let the mind acquire knowledge about the objects perceived. 
1.4.3The Synthesis of Reproduction 
Kant in this section begins to take his analysis further to reflect the constructive and 
active function of the mind. Kant aimed to show the structuralism of the mind by 
showing the synthesis of reproduction is not detached from the synthesis of 
apprehension. The -synthesis of reproduction tal<:es place in the mind through the 
imagination 
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Hence the synthesis of apprehension is linked inseparably with the synthesis of reproduction. And 
since the synthesis of apprehension constitutes the transcendental basis for the possibility of all 
cognitions as such (not merely of the empirical but also of the pure a priori ones), the reproductive 
synthesis of the imagination belongs to the transcendental acts of the mind; and, on account of this 
involvement of the imagination, let us call this power the transcendental power of imagination. (Kant, 
1996: A102). 
Kant felt that there is a gap between sensibility and understanding and that is why he 
wanted to bridge that gap by presupposing the faculty of imagination. The role of 
imagination can be seen clearly in his theory of perception where Kant claimed that 
perception requires the synthesis of productive imagination. Kant used to call this sort 
of synthesis the pure transcendental synthesis of imagination, and considered it as 
conditioning the very possibility of experience. However, Kant later reconsidered the 
synthesis of imagination and called it the "synthesis of productive imagination" instead 
of the transcendental synthesis of imagination (Gibbons, 1994: 24). This transition 
makes one of the most significant differences between Kant and Hume on imagination. 
In his early thought, Kant agreed with Hume on the function the imagination performs 
in the mind. Hume and the early Kant gave an inactive role to the imagination: its role 
was to combine and bind sense data into a single concept. It followed that the role of 
imagination was to associate the past representations with the present representations as 
in Burne's concept of coherence. However, in his later work Kant transcended that 
passive role played by the imagination and ascribed to it an active role through his 
synthesis of imagination by considering that imagination implies a rule that unifies the 
representations and gives the imagination a more active role to represent the perceived 
objects. Kant believed that representations have to be related according to certain rules 
that make the reproduction of representation possible. Therefore, he indicated that this 
rule is the a priori basis of a necessary synthetic unity. (Kant, 1996: A 1 01 ). 
The phrase "reproductive synthesis of imagination" means that imagination does not 
produce what it associated together before as mere aggregation but re-associates the 
presentations in the light of rules. Therefore Kant distinguishes between image ana 
schema in imagination. An image means presenting an object exactly as we perceive it. 
The imagination here just produces what it perceived before. In contrast, a schema is a 
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reproduction of what is perceived according to a rule. In this case, we do not need the 
immediate presence of the direct object to perceive it, but the mind still can present the 
object under a general rule. I will refer to one Kantian example to emphasize the 
difference between an image and a schema in the Critique of Pure Reason: 
Thus if I put five dots after one another, like this, ..... ,then this result is an image of the number five. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that I only think a number as such, which might then be five or a hundred. 
Then my thought is more the presentation of a method for presenting- in accordance with a certain 
concept- a multitude (e.g., a thousand) in an image, than this image itself. Indeed, in the case of a 
thousand I could hardly survey that image and compare it with the concept. Now, this presentation of a 
universal procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image I call the schema for the 
concept. In fact, it is schemata, not images of objects, that lie at the basis of our sensible concepts .... 
The concept of dog signifies a rule whereby my imagination can trace the shape of such a four- footed 
animal in a general way, i.e., without being limited to any single and particular shape offered to me by 
experience, or even to all possible images that I can exhibit. (Kant, 1996: A 141 ). 
Some commentators have emphasized the importance of the synthesis of imagination as 
a necessary part of perception. In his Imagination and Perception Strawson re-used 
Kant's example of the dog to confirm the difference between image and concept. He 
claimed that the perception of a dog implies that we see the dog as a dog, but there is 
another alternative that involves having the thought of other possible perceptions 
related to our actual perception as perceptions of the same object. To see it as a dog, 
silent and stationary, is to see it as a possible mover or barker. (Strawson, 1982: 82-99). 
We could see to that extent how Kant distinguished his account of perception from 
Hume's account. No doubt that active role of imagination will reflect positively on the 
faculty of understanding. Therefore the imagination with its active role bridges the 
faculty of sensibility and the faculty of understanding. 
1.4.4 The Synthesis of Recognition 
The synthesis of recognition represents the third aspect of Kant's structuralism 
concerning perception. Along with imagination, it represents the positive aspect of the 
mind. In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant defines understanding as the following: 
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The unity of apperception [considered] in reference to the synthesis of imagination is the 
understanding, and the same unity as referred to the transcendental synthesis of imagination is pure 
understanding (Kant, 1996:A119). 
Kant claimed that the representations must be capable of being recognized in light of the 
priori rules of the understanding. The concepts of understanding must give unity to the 
representations. The object we perceive is not a mere sum of presentations: the object as 
a subject of our knowledge presupposes the unity of consciousness: 
We are, however, dealing only with the manifold of our presentations. And since that x (the object) 
which corresponds to them is to be something distinct from all of our presentations, this object is 
nothing for us. Clearly, therefore, the unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing other than 
the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the presentations. When we have 
brought about synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition- this is when we say that we cognize the 
object. This unity is impossible, however, unless the intuition can be produced according to a rule a 
[certain] function of synthesis, viz., a function of synthesis that makes the reproduction of the manifold 
necessary a priori and makes possible a concept in which this manifold is united. Thus when we think 
of a triangle as an object, we do so by being conscious of the assembly of three straight lines according 
to a rule whereby such an intuition can always be exhibited. Now the unity of the rule determines all 
that is manifold, and limits it to conditions that make possible the unity of appearances all that is 
manifold, and limits it to conditions that make possible the unity of apperception. 
(Kant, 1996:Al 05). 
In perception the mind presupposes a rule and, according to it, the representations must 
be ordered. For instance, Kant gave an example of the ways that the mind orders the 
representations as in the case of perceiving a house as one case and a ship floating down 
to the river as another case. We can perceive it through different possible orders since I 
can perceive it from the right or from the left. In addition, the mind can apprehend our 
perception of the house by apprehending the manifold of the empirical intuitions by 
stat1ing from top to the end or the bottom as another way of apprehending the perception 
of the house. On the contrary, the mind cannot apprehend our perception of a ship sailing 
down to the river in more than one way. For our apprehension of the ship in motion is 
determined by an order of succession. I mean that perceiving the ship is submitted to 
apriori order that is succession. This order forces the perceivers to perceive the top of the 
ship before the bottom. (Kant, 1996: Al92). 
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Kant explains the differences between the last two examples, by distinguishing subjective 
succession as in the case of the house, and objective succession as in the case of the ship. 
According to Kant, subjective succession does not follow a particular order and cannot 
distinguish one appearance from another. However, objective succession means that the 
appearances are ordered. In other words, among the representations of what we perceive, 
the appearance of the one item succeeds the apprehension of the other in respect to a rule 
(Kant, 1996: Al93). 
Kant claimed that the possibility of experience presupposes a transcendental unity of 
consciousness. In other words, cognition itself is impossible without presupposing the 
unity of consciousness that precedes all data of intuition (Kant, 1996: Al 07). Kant 
distinguished between this transcendental unity of consciousness and the empirical unity 
of consciousness that takes place in sensibility. Kant calls the transcendental unity of 
consciousness the transcendental apperception and the empirical unity of consciousness 
the empirical apperception. Kant indicates that this transcendental unity of consciousness 
lies a priori at the basis of all concepts. This distinction was a result of the Kantian 
distinction between an "empirical object" and a "non-empirical" object. The former 
refers to an object that we can directly perceive in a perceptual situation. Non-empirical 
objects are those that are theoretically developed or cannot be perceived directly. For 
example, x as an object of knowledge does not refer to a particular object. These kinds of 
objects are the objects of cognition and are those objects that Kant calls "the 
transcendental objects". 
These transcendental objects depend on the transcendental laws ofthe understanding and 
hence it is a decisive step toward the objectivity of reality. The mind depends not on the 
objects of intuition, but on transcendental objects: 
The pure concept ofthis transcendental object (which object is actually always the same,=x, in all our 
cognitions) is what is able to provide all our empirical concepts in general with reference to an object, 
i.e., with objective reality. Now this concept cannot contain any determinate intuition whatever, and 
hence presumably pertains to nothing but that unity which must be encountered in any manifold of 
cognition insofar as this manifold has reference to an object. This reference, however, is nothing but 
. "the necessary unity of consciousness, and hence also of the synthesis of the·manifold brought about 
through the mind's concerted function of combing this manifold in one presentation. Now this unity 
must be regarded as necessary a priori (because otherwise cognition would be without an object); and 
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hence the reference to a transcendental object, i.e., the objective reality of our empirical cognition, 
presumably rests on a transcendental law. (Kant, 1996: A109). 
Moreover, Kant claimed that the transcendental unity of consciousness is impossible if 
there is no subject that is aware of that unity. In other words, Kant aimed to show that, in 
order to recognize representations as synthesized according to a concept, the subject must 
be able to recognize itself as combining these representations in a single consciousness. 
Kant in (A 1 08) claims that knowing an object by conceiving it as falling under an a priori 
rule involves the original and necessary condition of the identity of the self. Kant was 
concerned to emphasize the importance of unity over variety, and the function the latter 
performs in ordering and arranging the various elements of perception into different 
unitary forms. Therefore I consider the unity of consciousness as another attempt by Kant 
to confirm his view that the mind implies unitary and universal orders to arrange our 
perceptual experiences. We can see, from this discussion, how the faculty of 
understanding plays an important role in Kant's theory of perception, constituting an 
objective explanation of physical reality and its objects. 
To sum up, Kant developed an account of perception emphasizing the active role of the 
mind and the way in which the mind constructs its objects. He could link the passive 
function of receptivity, or "sensibility", and the active function, or the "understanding" 
by bridging them using the "imagination" confirming the active and structural role it 
performs in perception. Kant could present a more positive view than Hume concerning 
imagination. In addition, Kant presented an account of perception giving an important 
concern to the structural aspect needed to formulate a view of perception where the 
importance is given to rules and orders that organize the representations. 
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2-1 Introduction 
In the first chapter we attempted to discuss various views of perception. However, in order 
to have a complete view of the theory of perception we need to discuss a different view 
based on another logical perspective: Cassirer's view of functional-relational thought. This 
chapter will focus on determining the basic process of how, in Cassirer's view, scientific 
concepts are formed and the contrast between what Cassirer calls "substantial thought" and 
"functional-relational thought" and finally the symbolic realms of experience. The steps we 
have chosen seem very important, since they reveal Cassirer's view of the real nature of 
scientific concepts. The problem of scientific concept formation requires a plausible 
solution in respect to logic and the critique of knowledge. In this analysis, we shall discuss 
the different aspects of functional-relational thought that determine the structure of 
scientific concepts, and reconstruct the relation between object and scientific law. In 
addition, we shall argue that Cassirer's s theoretical perspective passed through three main 
stages; Berlin, Hamburg and Immigrations where an epistemological break took place in 
the end of Berlin stage between Cassirer and the idealistic instructions of the Marburg 
School. 
2-2 Cassirer and The Marburg School 
Cassirer is considered to be one of the younger members of the so-called Marburg School 
that includes both Hermann Cohen (1842- 1918) and Paul Natorp (1854-1924). This school 
was one of various Neo-Kantian schools that worked under the influence of Kant. Recently, 
researchers have expressed different views concerning "NeQ-Kantianism", for example T.K 
- ' . . ·- - . - --' . - - -
Oesterreich in his article Neo-Kantianism distinguishes seven different approaches to Neo-
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Kantianism; physiological, metaphysical, realistic, logicist, an approach based on values 
Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) & Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936), a relativist approach 
(George Simmel) and a psychological approach (Leonhard Nelson). (Bochenski 1957, 88-
89). 
Some researchers like Hans Ludwig Ollig reject these classifications because they contain 
some ambiguities. He therefore divides Neo-Kantianism into two basic schools; the 
Marburg School (Hermann Cohen) and the Southwest German School (Wilhelm 
Windelband) and claims that these two schools are based on systematically oriented works 
on Kant (OIIig, 1998: 776). The Neo- Kantian schools came into existence as a school of 
thought as a result of both Edward Zeller ( 1814-1909) and Otto Libeman ( 1842- 1918) who 
in 1865 argued "Kunt und die epigonen" or "Back to Kant" in an attempt to capture the real 
meaning of transcendental philosophy and at the same time to stop the spread of the 
German idealism that emerged after the death of Kant and which misinterpreted the 
Kantian notion of the thing in itself. In addition, Neo-Kantians hoped to find a key in the 
Kantian philosophical spirit to lead them towards a new understanding of the developments 
of modern sciences. In Edward Zeller's I 862 lecture in Heidelberg "uber Bedeutung 
Aufgabe der Erkenninishthorie" or "On the Significance and Task of Theory of 
Knowledge" he called for a return to epistemology. Zeller accused German idealists like 
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel of distorting the Kantian instructions by applying 
transcendental ideas which go beyond the faculties of our reason and demanded that these 
philosophers should return to Kant. The major aim of Neo-Kantians is to understand the 
different aspects of our experience in the light of Kantian transcendental philosophy. 
Although the Neo- Kantians are influenced by the Kantian spirit, they found it necessary to 
go beyond Kantianism in addressing some ofthe philosophical problems. 
This philosophical situation has been indicated by the famous dictum of Windelband when 
he stated: "to understand Kant is to go beyond him". (Pulkkinen, 2001: 1 00). The Neo-
Kantians aimed to present new solutions to some philosophical problems raised by Kant. 
Therefore their interest focused on presenting the realm "Of phenomena by finding valid 
constructive forms to set up the judgments. Here I claim that the real meaning of the 
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"Critique of Knowledge" for them was to find comprehensive forms that organize 
experience. Therefore, we can find some common characteristics that connect the Neo-
Kantian different views. The first characteristic is their objection to any form of 
metaphysics, particularly the "Ding an sich" or "thing in itself'. They consider the ultimate 
aim of philosophy is to deny its explanatory role. (Saltzman, 1981: 25). Moreover, they 
were opposed to post-Kantian thinkers like Hegel and Fichte, who presented their 
understanding of objects and reality in a very restricted form of absolute idealism. They 
claimed that the world could only be understood through realizing that the world is the 
concrete actualization of concepts that are in mind. This idea in fact connects them with 
Kant, but they go beyond Kant. They sought to explain variety through one general 
principle, in other words they wanted to reduce the plurality of objects to a unifying 
universal principle. 
They argued that the world is the construction of one universal mind or reason. The 
absolute idealists sought to go even beyond the Kantian dualism between sensibility and 
understanding, between matter and form by claiming instead a developmental monism. As a 
result, developmental monism is considered to be nothing more than a unifying principle 
that has different names, like ego, reason and absolute. Reality for them becomes a 
developing and organic whole whose principle can be grasped and whose unity could be 
articulated in philosophical systems. For example, Fichte considers the world and its 
objects to be a construction of the Ego or a product of I. (Fichte, see Breazeale 1992: 228). 
Therefore, we have two different accounts of Fichte's idealism: it can be ascribed to 
absolute idealism where reality will be understood as existing only for an absolute ego. 
Alternatively, Fichte's account can be ascribed to subjective idealism where reality will 
exist only for some finite ego or for an individual. (Beiser, 1902: 61, also Martin, 1997: 
40). 
Fichte wanted to develop Kant's critical philosophy into a system of his own which he 
named "theory of science". The task of philosophy, according to Fichte, is to provide a 
transcendental illustration of ordinary consciousness and every day experience (Pippin, 
1989: 42-59 also Kneller, 2003: 35:..38). 
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Hegel defended the idea of a unified theory of reality but not by Kantian principle. He was 
convinced rather that there is another single principle that can systematically explain all 
forms of reality, not only physical forms but also organic life and all social and political 
forms, along with cultural and artistic achievements. In addition, Hegel considered that the 
fundamental principle that explains all reality is reason. Indeed, Hegel does not understand 
reason as a single entity, or a quality that is attributed to some human subject. Rather it is 
the sum of all reality. Hegel went a step further by claiming that reason and reality are 
strictly identical. This means for Hegel, that only reason is real and the only reality is 
reasonable (Pinkard, 1994: 46-48 also Mure, 1965: 91-99). Let us discuss the Marburg 
School view as apposed to the German idealists. 
Although the Marburg School rejected the German idealists' developmental monism as a 
way of interpreting the world, the members of Marburg School believed that the world can 
be explained through the laws of thought. They took thought as their starting point and 
considered that thought has no origin outside itself. Their logical monism refers to the view 
that they, in contrast to idealists, do not represent the absolute beyond the logical forms of 
knowledge but all objects are represented through laws. Another difference between the 
Marburg School and the idealists is that, even though they agreed with the idealists in 
extending the Kantian Critique to include some other aspects of culture and civilization, 
they did not restrict themselves to the problems of exact sciences like Kant, but slowly 
applied the Critique project to domains of culture. This qualitative step taken by Natorp 
and Cassirer will be discussed through this chapter. 
However, the Marburg School rejected the idealists' solution to explain the different 
aspects of culture by reducing it to an explanatory principle. This cannot be justified as it 
lies in the circle of metaphysics. The Marburg School rejected the idealist's view that 
philosophy can present reasonable answers about the physical world and can rationally 
explain truth about an essentially spiritual world. 
The Neo-Kantians believed that the future of philosophy lies in implementing the 
transcendental method and the critique of-kn6wledge to every possible form of human 
experience. They extended the critical question of how synthetic a priori judgments are 
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possible, to include the question of how syntheses of ethical, religious and scientific 
judgments are possible. Having that understanding, they argued that knowledge is possible 
only through systematic methods based on constructive laws. The task of philosophical 
thought is to present the unique laws that can organize the chaos of phenomena. In other 
words, it is a presentation of the relation between form and matter, the universal and 
particulars. 
The object of knowledge is now dissolved in a network of relations submitted to rules. The 
logical determination of the object of knowledge leads always to an original relation that is 
comprehended in a specific formula that is the formal relationship between contents and 
normative validity. Therefore Cohen and the other members of The Marburg School 
claimed that the rules supposed are universal rules supported by the judgments of logic and 
reason. Now we are going to discuss the philosophical background of The Marburg School 
in which Cassirer's views formulated. 
The work of Cohen, Natorp and Cassirer was a logical extension of the Kantian Critique 
because like Kant, they sought to trace the a priori moments which make our experience 
possible. Therefore, they developed a theory of experience that can be seen in Cohen's 
1871 Kant "Theorie der Erfahrung" or "Kant's Theory of Experience" and in Cassirer's 
contribution in the field in which he established his view on experience as an "invariance 
theory of experience". Cohen sought to trace those a priori moments not only in scientific 
experience but also in both ethics and aesthetics. The same view has been developed by 
both Natorp and Cassirer when they aimed to reveal those a priori elements in religion and 
the various domains of culture. This comprehension of Kantian spirit maintained by 
Cassirer is also applied in his talk in 1929 at Dovas, when the controversial debate took 
place between Cassirer and Heidegger concerning the whole aim of Kant's critique. 
Cassirer found that Heidegger's interpretation of Kant was expressly directed against a 
Neo-Kantian interpretation. Heidegger explained that Neo-Kantianism is the view that 
identifies philosophy with theory of knowledge. However Heidegger rejected a Neo-
Kantian approach, regarding their ·interpretation- of Kantian Critique,- because Heiefegger 
claimed that the Critique of pure reason is a major work, it is an enterprise for exploring 
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Being and metaphysics, not only an enterprise for exploring scientific knowledge as 
claimed by the Marburg School. (Gomer, 2000:95-96). 
Both Cassirer and Heidegger gave concern to the problem of Man considered by them as 
the main issue of the Kantian Critique. Heidegger was concerned with being and the core of 
his being and time consists of an inquiry that starts out by examining our own concrete 
existentiel ways of being at the current moment. Heidegger sought to give an account of 
human existence. For Heidegger, to be a human is to be initiated into the practices and 
conventions of the society into which we are thrown. Similarly, Cassirer sought to give an 
explanation of the human from a Neo-Kantian background, which depended on giving a 
definition of Man. Cassirer's concern about man can be traced in his 1944 An Essay on 
Man, similarly to Heidegger's 1927 Being and Time. 
Cassirer emphasized the spiritual law, the form, by means of which man liberates himself from his 
immediacy and his anxiety. This is the way in which the finite mind participates in the infinite. Whereas 
Heidegger expounded his book on Kant and the problem of metaphysics, which had just been published. 
He expressed the opinion that Kant's central problem was not at all that of scientific knowledge, but 
rather the problem of the metaphysical comprehension of being. Kant's philosophy he declared to be a 
philosophy of finite man, whose access to the infinite is denied, but whose orientation toward the 
transcendent confirms his very finitude. (Pas, 1949: 67). 
Heidegger was not right in his claim that the whole aim of Kantian Critique was to support 
ontology. On the contrary, it was a philosophical enterprise against metaphysical thought. It 
was a kind of de-ontologization that refers here in that context that knowledge is possible in 
the light of reason and within its limits, only not beyond its limits. In other words, de-
ontologization was an attempt to free thought from the dogma of the absolute that believes 
the truth can be attributed to things that transcend reason. De-ontologization is an attempt 
to eliminate the metaphysical concepts in favour of acceptable concepts which express 
functional connections between the given. 
For The Marburg School, the value of Kant's philosophy comes through the method he 
used to investigate some issues in philosophy and his aim of finding new answers to them. 
They regard the Critique of Pure Reason and the transcendental deduction- in particular as 
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the decisive part of Kant's work. They believe that the transcendental perspective is a valid 
method for discovering the constructive nature of the world. 
The Neo Kantians availed themselves of what they called "the transcendental method" in conscious 
opposition to psychology or empirical methods. Knowledge in order to be truly objective, must rest upon 
secure foundations that are necessary, universal, and apodictically true. (Pisher, 1988: 9). 
Neo-Kantians use the transcendental method to investigate problems implied in Kant either 
by presenting new solutions to problems in the light of new developments in modern 
sciences or by applying it to new domains of knowledge. For the Marburg School, the 
transcendental method became unavoidable for scientific philosophy. They were interested 
in the question of how we can understand the progress of modern sciences in the light of 
Kantian principles. In addition they were interested in how the Kantian account is 
applicable to the domains of ethics and aesthetics experience particularly and experiences 
related to culture; religion, myth, art and language generally. When they wrote about logic 
they refer neither to formal logic nor to modern logic but to transcendental logic where it 
implies a formal function or an intellectual meaning attached to objects. The transcendental 
logic is used by them to show the active state of reason that can be noticed through all 
productive achievements of consciousness. As evidence of that we can see clearly how 
logic had a significant place in their writings. 
For example in Cohen's 1902 book Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, "Logic of Pure 
Knowledge", his (1904) Ethik des reinen Willens "Ethics of Pure Will" and his (1912) 
Asthetik des reinen Gefuthls "Aesthetics of Pure feeling", he attempted to show the activity 
of reason and its pure generation of meanings. In addition, there is Natorp' s 1910 book, Del 
Logischen Grundlagen Der Exacten Wissenshafien. In Cassirer's 1910 book Substance and 
Function he discussed the different logical perspectives of science and replaced them by 
functional-relational thought. Although the members of the Marburg School shared the 
view on the pure activity of reason, there is an epistemological break that occurred between 
Cassirer and the rest of the Marburg teachings as we shall see later. 
There was agreement between them on some issues that characterize their particular style 
of thought concerning some Kantian notions and also on some other issues derived from 
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recent developments in modern sciences. Cassirer's philosophical development was a broad 
project, since he applies the transcendental method to different kinds of human experience. 
With that understood, I determine three principal problems that developed through his 
intellectual development that differentiate him from the Marburg School. These three 
problems are the problem of scientific concept formation, the problem of the symbolic form 
of experience and finally the problem of Man. Following that determination, my main 
concern is to distinguish three main stages in Cassirer's intellectual development that had a 
significant influence on his thought. These stages are: the Berlin stage from 1900-1923, the 
Hamburg stage from 1923-1933, and lastly the emigration stage, from 1933- 1945. 
These new developments of Cassirer's philosophical view brought about a significant 
departure from Cohen, the founder of the Marburg school. Although these three stages are 
considered to be my framework for discussing Cassirer's intellectual development, I am not 
going to follow a chronicle order, rather I will trace the developments that took place with 
to these three mentioned problems by breaking sometimes this chronicle order for the sake 
of bringing the differences between Cassirer and the Marburg School and then display 
another issue that may strength on the differences between Cassirer and the Marburg 
School. 
The most significant element characterizing the Berlin period (1900- 1923) is the 
agreement between Cassirer, Cohen and Natorp. However, by the end of the Berlin period a 
disagreement had emerged between them. It is first important to show the common 
philosophical features shared by the Marburg school and Cassirer. The general view of the 
Marburg School was that true knowledge is grounded in mathematical thought. The apriori 
elements are the real products not of experience but of pure thought. For instance, Cohen's 
concept of generation is one of these a priori elements. He believed that the concept of 
generation is a suitable one because it leads one to interpret Kantian works systematically. 
In his view, science is the best evidence for the fact that reality has been created by us, 
since we are only capable of knowing that which we have put into things (Zank, 1998: 399 
Also Ollig, 1998: 780). The Marburg School agreed that such knowledge is only relevant-to 
the logic of cognition. Therefore, both Natorp and Cassirer extended Cohen's concept of 
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generation from the field of exact sciences and applied it to morality, religion and art. This 
meant that the generative activities of reason extend to include the whole creative work of 
culture. The Marburg School's aim was to understand objects through a web of relations 
that can only be organized within a logical system: 
The goal of cognition, is the universal and complete determination of the "object" of cognition which 
leaves nothing undetermined in the original X. The method by means of which alone this can be achieved 
is, according to Natorp, the method of establishing functional relations which are integrated into a 
contextual system of experience. Upon such integration depends the very meaning of our term "nature" 
the possibility of conceiving "nature" as a system of laws or dynamic interrelations. (Werkmeister, 
1949: 766). 
The Marburg School insisted on the importance of system and they also insisted that 
knowledge can only be accessible through systematic perspectives constituted by laws. 
They consider the laws that organize our objects are not mutually independent, but are 
related to each other in one comprehensive network. We can find an answer here to the 
question of why the Marburg School confirms the scientific value of systematic thought. 
The answer seems to be because they seek to achieve the objectivity of knowledge. They 
aimed to have a systematic discipline where priority will be given to laws over the 
elements. This process of organization presupposes a unitary origin that explains the 
relation between the object and the logical determination. In fact that presupposed unitary 
origin is neither a psychological nor a metaphysical entity whose existence would have to 
be assumed. It is rather the logical ideal of the whole comprehensive context of experience 
that arranges the elements of that context. One peculiar aspect of the Marburg School is that 
they sought to lead thought toward systematic unity. They believe that objects must be 
constructed through the generic laws of reason. This understanding brings us to a 
discussion of the concept of reality from the Marburg School's perspective and Cassirer's 
view of it. According to the Marburg school, the "object" neither means something that 
exists in itself, nor something that goes beyond us and has an external existence apart from 
thought. On the contrary, they indicated that an object becomes an element ordered within 
certain context. It is now a pure possibility of arrangement accord~ng to Ia\\'._ 
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As in the case of mathematical equations the unknown variables x,y,z have meaning for the equation and 
within the equation only by virtue of the meaning of the equation itself, i.e., in relation to the 
"invariables" the assumed "variables" and the "roots" of the equation, just so, and only so, is the great X 
of cognition, the "object" meaningful and understandable only as an element within the context of 
cognition .... There is no longer any need for the assumption that "objects" exist in and by themselves. All 
we need to accept now is the possibility of an orderly progress of cognition, the possibility of establishing 
an all-comprehensive context according to law, the method of securing scientific cognition. 
(Werkmeister, 1949: 764-765). 
They unify thought and object and argued that thought precedes objects. According to 
them, it is meaningless to ascribe an independent existence of objects apart from thought 
and its comprehensive laws. Indeed Natorp explains the relation between object and 
thought as follows: 
For thought, all "being" exists only in and through thought itself. Logically there is nothing prior to 
thinking. The X of cognition may be determined as an A or a 8 or a C; but as X it is only the "pure 
expression" and not an entity, psychological, metaphysical, or otherwise. (Werkmeister, 1949: 765). 
For them the objects are knowable only through the process of logical construction m 
which we give structure to the manifolds of experience. According to the Marburg School, 
reality and its objects have to be underlined in the light of structures. As a result, reality can 
be defined as a permanent creation and a continuous activity of thought through our reason 
which gives a structure to different aspects of our world. 
We can also see the same conception of reality implemented within Cassirer's writings in 
the 'Berlin period'. For instance, in his Problem of Knowledge (1906) Cassirer maintains 
the same meaning of reality which ascribes a creative and genetic activity to thought in 
which there is no independent existence of objects apart from thought itself (Gawronsky, 
1949: 17& Hmdden, 1960: 349). According to Cassirer, reason builds up a new ideal world 
to discover the unity of the objects. This chapter claims that the general aim of Cassirer's 
earlier philosophy was to understand the relation between objects and thought from 
transcendental idealism. Therefore reality, according to Cassirer, is displayed through 
thought and is only accessiblethrough .the logic(ll determination of thought. 
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The entirety of Cassirer's earlier philosophy was designed to show that reality does not somehow exist 
"outside" of our forms of knowledge, and that any "copy" theory of knowledge is fraught with 
contradictions. (Moynahan, 1999: 565). 
The Marburg School members believed that the object is not given nor is it ready- made 
and complete in itself. Rather the object, as they comprehend it, is attainable only at the end 
of the cognitive process, not at its beginning. In contrast to realistic interpretations of 
reality, Cassirer's view of object and reality, in his Berlin stage, argues that we do not grasp 
objects by a process of abstraction. Rather, objects are the products of a dynamic and 
creative process of reason. Objects do not exist prior to and external to the laws of reason, 
but are constituted through the laws. Our understanding of the world is not a purely passive 
process but it is a free and constructive activity of the mind. 
This idealistic perspective extended to the exact sciences. lfthe Marburg School account of 
the origin of object is right, then there are crucial difficulties that Cassirer must face and to 
which he must find solutions. These difficulties are logical ones, because some of these 
difficulties came from the traditional understanding of both the formal logic of Aristotle 
and the empiricists' views regarding the origin of concepts. Another kind of difficulty 
comes from the challenges that Kantian transcendental philosophy faced in light of the 
development of the modern sciences. The question now is how the Marburg School and 
Cassirer could successfully address these difficulties. The answer to the first half of the 
question lies in the problem of abstraction as Cassirer discussed it. His solution will be 
discussed fully in the next section on scientific concepts. 
According to their idealism, objects are generated by laws. An object is not something 
discovered, but something created by thought. Despite this fact, in his transcendental 
deduction Kant claimed that our elementary acts of consciousness of the world involved a 
combination of both intuitions and concepts. He went further by arguing that prior to that 
combination, there is no consciousness at all. In contrast, the Marburg School members 
went beyond Kantian dualism between empirical intuitions and concepts. They rejected the 
Kantian theory of sensibility and accepted his theory of understanding. They took thought 
as their starting point and rejected the idea that thought has an origin outside itself in the 
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external world. The refutation of the Kantian theory of the dual origin of knowledge 
(intuition and concepts) led them not only to abandon the transcendental Aesthetics as a 
doctrine of the sensibility, but also the transcendental Deduction (Malter, 1981: 538-539). 
In comparison to Kant, the Marburg School reduced the importance of intuition and at the 
same time extended the role of understanding in their philosophy. It seems that their reason 
for going beyond the Kantian notion of empirical intuitions was their comprehension of the 
development of the exact sciences and developments particularly in the concepts of space 
and time. The Marburg School established a very important principle: that the activity of 
thought creates the content of thought. Like Kant, they give an important role to thought 
within exact science. The ultimate task of reason is to construct a coherent whole, and to 
give experience a structure and coherence. Therefore Cassirer shares the neo- Kantian view 
of the priority of laws over objects. When Cassirer was talking about reality and objects, he 
does not in fact mean any external world separated and completed in itself standing apart 
from thought. Cassirer supports the claim that reality and objects have to be developed 
through structural forms that give experience its constructive unity. The reason to reject 
sensibility is the Marburg School's aim to transcend the passive or negative element 
implied in the Kantian theory of knowledge. 
The second challenge was that Kant built up his view on the assumption that Newtonian 
science is the ultimate criterion of exact science. But Newtonian physics could not provide 
modem science with plausible answers to the numerous questions that it raised concerning 
reality, physical objects and the nature ofthe microscopic universe. When Kant established 
his views on space and physics, he depended on the Newtonian mechanical laws. But as 
exact science progressed further scientists developed other ways of explanation and various 
philosophical schools rebuilt their views in the light of the new scientific discoveries. 
In the Marburg writings the entire a priori structure used to root Newtonianism in a permanent theory of 
reason, was sheared away. (ltzkoff, 1997: 62-63). 
Therefore it was necessary for the Marburg School to go beyond the Kantian conception of 
science, and to occupy themselves with the more recent problems of the exact sciences. It 
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was not unusual to see in their writings discussions of modern scientific issues. For 
example, in 1907 Cassirer discussed in detail some problems of modern mathematics in his 
book Kant Und Die Moderne Mathematik. In that book, Cassirer discussed the Kantian 
understanding of mathematics in the light of the logical developments of modern theories 
of mathematics. In addition, in 1910 Cassirer wrote his Substance and Function where he 
discussed the logical foundations of the exact sciences from a historical and logical point of 
view. Cassirer claims that the beginning of knowledge must not be from the senses and 
the a priori forms of sensibility space and time in their simple forms but grounded in 
mathematical principles. Only such knowledge is relevant for the logic of cognition. This 
understanding reflects Cassirer's thoughts on physical reality. Cassirer took a distinct turn 
away from the Marburg School when he explains the spatial and temporal determinations 
of physical objects. 
Cassirer's argument starts from his objection to the Kantian view that states that both space 
and time are pure forms of intuitions. Kant claimed that any object of which we could be 
conscious had to be an object in space and time. Kant believed that we are aware of an 
independently existing world in space and time that is composed of substances interacting 
causally with each other. The reason for Kant to state that was his understanding of 
Newton's three laws of motion, which give a specific account of classical mechanics. 
Following Newton, Kant assumed that the three laws of motion presuppose absolute space 
and absolute time. Cassirer could make use of the ideas raised in Einstein's general theory 
of relativity to develop his own account of physical reality. In contrast to Natorp's view of 
classical mechanics, Cassirer explains physical reality from the perspective of the 
development of quantum mechanics in his emigration period after 1933. Cassirer explains 
that there are objects like "uncertainty relations" in quantum mechanics which involve 
problems that cannot be solved within the framework of classical mechanics. For example, 
"Fields of forces" are not entities in the classical sense of material or rigid bodies. In 
addition, the concept of "mass" can no longer be regarded as ponderable reality but must be 
resolved into electric charges. It was Cassirer who supported the claim that the whole 
conception of a physical body must be redefined in a way that goes 'beyond Classical 
mechanics definition of physical body. Therefore, according to Cassirer's comprehension 
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of quantum mechanics, the "field" is not a "thing" but it is a "system of effects". Cassirer 
contrasts his own position with that of Natorp who defends in his 1910 the idea that 
"existence" means the complete and absolute determination of an "object" with respect to 
space and time (Werkmeister, 1949: 774). 
The difference between Cassirer and the Marburg School members was that the latter 
developed their account of physical reality in respect to classical mechanics simply because 
they did not follow Einstein's general theory of relativity; this could be because either 
Cohen passed away 1918, or because Natorp published his 1910 Die Logischen 
Grundlagen Der Exacten Wissenshafien before the publication of Einstein's general theory. 
Although Natorp passed away in 1924 we did not find any response from Natorp to 
Einstien's general theory of Relativity. But we find Cassirer's responses to Einstein's 
theory in his 1920 article Philosophische Probleme Der Relativitatstheorie and his 1921 
essay Zur Einsteinschen Relativitatstheorie. These two articles formed the background of 
Cassirer 1923 supplement Einstein's Theory of Relativity Considered From the 
Epistemological Standpoint that has been added to his Substance and Function. Reading 
Einstein's theory of Relativity in that stage led Cassirer to develop his own view of 
physical reality that took him slowly from the Cohen's and Natorp's analysis of reality of 
physical objects. 
To sum up, in his Berlin stage Cassirer began to go slowly beyond the Marburg School's 
analysis of physical object that they had developed in respect to classical mechanics. 
Cassirer presented his analysis of physical object in light of new developments in physical 
theories. In other words, classical mechanics assumed that the state of a "thing" in space 
could be completely determined at any given moment and in every respect. Such 
determination became the ground for the definition of "reality" of a thing. Only an object 
that can be determined completely in space-time was called "real". 
In contrast, Cassirer defends the view that the individuality of an electron can no longer be 
defined or determined sufficiently to be considered "as a thing in· space and ·time. The 
individuality of an electron, for example, is not something given but only constitutes 
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specific points of possible relations with other electrons within a system. Regarding the 
electron, physical reality is now concerned with the functional dependencies of relations 
and not concerned with individual things called "electrons". The development that took 
place in physics and quantum mechanics led Cassirer to depart the Marburg School's 
interpretation of science and the understanding given to scientific concepts. Cassirer 
himself admits that departure in his 1936 Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern 
Physics twenty six years after he published Substance and Function was published. 
So also the ties which connect me with the founders of the Marburg School are not loosened and my debt 
of gratitude to them is not diminished when in the following investigations it turns out that the 
epistemological examination of the principles of science leads me to results different from those set forth 
in Cohen's Logik der Reinen Erkenntnis (1902) or in Natorp 's Die Logischen Grundlagen Der Exacten 
Wissenshaften (1910) (Cassirer, 1956: XXIV). 
An example of that departure can be traced from Cassirer's view of physics. Cassirer 
explained that field theories and the uncertainty relations of quantum mechanics cannot be 
explained in the framework of classical mechanics. He pointed to the concept of "atom" 
and argued that we cannot go beyond the problems implied in our understanding of new 
developments unless we ask and decide the question what is the meaning of the reality of 
atoms. The atom accordingly can no longer be conceived as a thing, but it must be 
understood as a system of dynamic relations and have to be described only through the laws 
which express its effects. The same understanding is also applied to the concepts of 
electrons, orbits and mass. These concepts are no longer things in themselves or pre- exist 
and given to us before experience but they are determined within the process of cognition. 
Cassirer in his 1936 pointed out the invalidity of the concept of reality grasped in classical 
mechanics as supported by Kant's epistemology. Cassirer quoted from Kant's Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft a paragraph that shows how the Kantian interpretation of science based on 
the fact that reality is given to us through experience and is matched with the empirical 
laws: 
"The objects of experience, then, are never given in themselves, but only in experience, and have no 
existence outside it. That there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one has ever perceived them, 
must certainly be admitt_ed. This, however, only means that in the possible advance of experience'we inay · 
encounter them. For every thing is real which stands in connection with a perception in accordance with 
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the laws of empirical science if therefore the uncertainty relations shows us that we can no longer hope to 
"encounter" an electron at a certain point in space with a sharply determined momentum, then the 
assertion of empirical reality for this state of affairs loses its basis; it has passed out of "the context of 
experience". All those peculiar problems that have troubled atomic physics from time to time now 
automatically disappear. (Cassirer, 1956: 179). 
Cassirer found that we have to give up asking questions such as where the individual 
electron is at a given instant of time, how it is transformed from one state to another state, 
and why it performs such a transition. All these kinds of questions seem to be inadequate to 
be asked now (Cassirer, 1956: 179). Cassirer refers again to Natorp's view that mentioned 
in his Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten wissenschaften to show that it is a mistake to 
follow Natorp's analysis of the existence of the object. Natorp declares in his 1910 that 
view: 
Existence has no other meaning for Criticism (Kritizismus) than a thoroughgoing, in no respect 
incomplete, determinateness of being with respect to space and time. Space and time are the condition of 
judgment of existence- that is, of the complete determination of objects in experience .... To every point 
of space, ... that· is to be given existentially, there must correspond a point or absolute element of what 
exists, namely each must correspond to an identical point in existence ,i.e., time. 
Cassirer did not only criticize Natorp but also criticized Kant and others like Schlick for 
their explanations of reality. He states: 
If one uses these explanations as a basis for objective reality, it will at once be seen what far-reaching 
changes in our empirical world picture are demanded by quantum mechanics by virtue of the uncertainty 
relations. For now we can no longer define existence as something completely and thoroughly 
determined. The "state" of a physical system no longer exhibits, according to the language of quantum 
theory, the same form of spatiotemporal connection which it possessed in classical mechanics. In the 
latter, all the individual elements of being could be isolated from each other; each particular entity was, in 
a given instant of time, referred to a quite definite point of space, and "adhered" to it exclusively. 
Quantum mechanics, on the other hand, demands that we abandon this conception. (Cassirer, 1956: 
190-191 ). 
Cassirer developed his philosophical account to find a place to include these scientific 
developments within his philosophiCar interpretations in respect to his Neo-Kantia~ spiriC 
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This spirit understands the "field" not as a "thing", but as a "system" of effects. 
In his Berlin stage another difference between Cassirer and Cohen emerged over the 
concept of relation. Cassirer understood the concept of relation differently from Cohen. 
This difference in their interpretations ofthe concept of relation led Cohen himselfto reveal 
in one of his letters to Cassirer in 1910 that the unity of thought of the Marburg School was 
broken as a result of Cassirer' s view of relation. 
Our Unity was jeopardized. (Cohen, Letter to Cassirer quoted in Gawronsky 1949: 20). 
Like Natorp, Cohen was influenced by Newtonian mechanics and he defended the idea of 
absolute space and time. In 1910 when Cassirer gave a draft of his Substance and Function 
to Cohen to read before publishing it, there was a paragraph in Cassirer's book that seemed 
to Cohen to be quite inconsistent with the teachings ofthe Marburg School. Although all of 
Cohen's closest disciples were convinced that Cohen was mistaken, Cassirer decide to re-
write the whole page to show his respect to Cohen (Gawronsky, 1949: 21 ). But the break 
has to come when Cohen wrote a letter in 1910 to Cassirer to congratulate him on his book 
and he ended his letter with that significant remark that show how Cassirer started 
distinguishing himself from the Marburg School: 
Yet, after my first reading of your book I still cannot discard as wrong what I told you in Marburg: you 
put the center of gravity upon the concept of relation and you believe that you accomplished with the help 
of this concept of idealization of all materiality. The expression even escaped you, that the concept of 
relation is a category; yet it is a category only insofar as it is function, and function unavoidably demands 
the infinitesimal element in which alone the root of the ideal reality can be found. (Cohen, letter to 
Cassirer quoted in Gawronsky 1949: 21 ). 
Cassirer considered that the infinitesimal is not a thing "Ding" but a condition, not of any 
sort of reality, but an instrument of thought for the discovery of the construction of true 
being. It seems clear that Cohen also sought to apply the idea of the absolute in 
mathematics by arguing that to establish the infinitesimal numbers as an absolute element, 
to put this absolute element before the whole number and to derive the latter from the 
fanner. But Cassirer arg~ed that it is impossible to reach the absolute ~lement becaus~ the 
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act of enumeration is only directed to finite numbers; from the other side it is impossibile to 
reach the absolute element because the psychological synthesis of the act of enumeration 
would exclude the actual infinite (Cassirer, 1923: 64-65). 
According to Cassirer's general thesis shown in his Substance and Function there is no 
place for absoluteness in our understanding concerning science and its laws. When we 
bring that understanding to the numbers it shows that it is a mistake to try to connect 
between infinity and reality as Cohen sought to show when he claimed that the number can 
be derived from that absolute element and obtain its value from that element. However 
Cassirer shows that number acquires its value not as being an entity or referring to 
something that exists, rather number acquires its value from the place it occupies in the 
series and with its relation to other number. Cassirer explained that numbers acquire their 
value according to a function that sets up the relationships between numbers in a series. It is 
an endless process which never implies in itself an absolute element: 
For mathematical thought, the fundamental relation, that includes within itself all the members that 
proceed from it, becomes itself a new element, a kind of fundamental unity, from which a new form of 
number-construction takes its start. The whole endless totality of natural numbers, in so far as it is 
"given" by a law," i.e., in so far as it is to be treated as a unity, becomes the starting-point for a new 
construction. From the first order there arise other and more complex orders, which use the former as 
material base. (Cassirer, 1923: 66). 
It follows from that view that he refutated Cohen's infinitesimal element and replaced 
Cohen's idea with Felix Klein's idea of "group" that presupposes an invariant element that 
remains unchanged during geometrical transformations. This theme will be explained in 
Chapter Three. Like the Marburg School members, Cassirer agreed with them on the 
priority of laws over objects, they along with Cassirer went a step further towards setting up 
what can be referred to as "logical monism". Then the question is how could Cassirer apply 
the principle of "logical monism" to his study of scientific concepts? In addition to that, are 
there some radical changes within Cassirer's system, in the "Hamburg" period that would 
increase the gap between his view and the Marburg School's teachings? 
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To answer these questions, we need first to discuss Cassirer' s theory of scientific concept 
formation. 
2-3 Cassirer and the Reconstruction of Scientific Concepts 
This section will discuss Cassirer's theory of formation of scientific concepts. Our aim here 
is to discuss first his criticisms of the theory of abstraction and the theory of representation 
which have been taken by different philosophers as logical grounds on which they 
presented their views of forming scientific concepts. Secondly we will address the 
constructive and positive part of his theory, which includes an original contribution from 
Cassirer to the understanding of the construction of scientific concepts. 
2-3-1 Scientific Concepts and Substantial Thought 
Cassirer was concerned with understanding the foundations of the sctences. Therefore, 
Cassirer paid more attention to substituting the ontological perspective of science with a 
new epistemological perspective that may help in understanding the new developments in 
the sciences. He believed that any particular science, including its theories, concepts and 
laws, has to be understood from the viewpoint of logic. Cassirer presents his systematic 
work Substance and Function in which he discusses the formation of scientific concepts 
from the logical point of view. It seems clear that Cassirer' s aim throughout that work, is to 
build up a unified method for investigating the structures of exact sciences. Being a 
philosopher of science, Cassirer's central question was the nature of scientific concepts and 
the role they play in the structure of science. 
Before discussing his theory of scientific concept formation, the main argument presented 
through his Substance and Function that is considered to be the peculiar aspect of his 
Berlin period will be summarized. Cassirer's argument consists of two parts; a destructive 
part where he criticizes the Aristotelian and Empiricist's accounts of scientific concepts 
formation. He refers to these traditional accounts of formation of the concepts by using the 
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term "substance". The constructive part was he replaced the traditional v1ews of the 
formation of scientific concepts with a constructive procedure and gives it the name of 
"function". Cassirer was guided by the idea that the structure and laws of thought could be 
most clearly displayed in mathematics and physics, where knowledge had reached its 
highest level. Therefore it will be plausible to express the difference between these two 
different accounts using the "concept of thing" to refer to ontological grounds of the 
concepts and to use the "concept of law" to refer to the functional grounds. 
Throughout his argument, Cassirer used the term Substance as synonymous with the 
concept of thing. Cassirer criticized the analyses presented to scientific concepts that based 
on the substantial thought. The reason to criticize that account was that he found that the 
main activity of the mind lies in determining and isolating common qualitative elements 
within the wide variety of existing things and uniting them into classes and repeating this 
procedure as long as possible. In light of that traditional view, Cassirer found that scientific 
concepts could be random aggregates of qualities. For example, we do not form a class of 
yellowish, juicy, edible things under which lemon and mango might be subsumed because 
such an idea is not relevant for theoretical and practical ends. 
The selection of what is common remains an empty play of ideas if it is not assumed that what is thus 
gained is, at the same time, the real form which guarantees the causal and teleological connection of 
particular things. The real and ultimate similarities of things are also the creative forces from which they 
spring and according to which they are formed. The process of comparing things and of grouping them 
together, according to similar properties, as it is expressed first of all in language, does not lead to what is 
indefinite, but if rightly conducted, ends in the discovery of the real essence of 
things.(Cassirer, 1923 :7). 
Cassirer criticized the traditional view of Aristotle and the empiricists concerning the 
formation of scientific concepts because he found that scientific concepts could not be 
based on qualitative similarities. He concluded that mental activity no longer depends on 
recognizing the qualitative similarities or differences and selecting on this basis. Rather, 
Cassirer argued that mental activity of reason has to occupy itself with another task more 
complicated than the classification and selection and subsumption ·under universal 
concepts. 
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Cassirer showed the constructive aspect of his argument by replacing the term "Substance" 
with term "Relation". In Relational thought, the mind has an active role to play, that is, to 
arrange objects in respect to laws or general orders. What we need is a relation to ordering, 
we do not need to dispose of the qualities of the objects concerned, but rather we replace 
fixed qualities with general rules, which enable us to grasp a total series of possible 
qualitative determinations. The main idea that Cassirer is interested in here is that the object 
does not have independent characteristics, but these characteristics are changeable 
depending on the rule or order of arrangement, as we shall explain later. Now Cassirer 
gives examples from the history of science of how scientific concepts shifted from thing-
concepts to relation-concepts. He applies this understanding to the concept of law as an 
example of how the formation of scientific concepts takes place in functional-relational 
thought: 
The concept of law is now regarded as prior to that of object, whereas it used to be subordinate to it. In 
the substantialistic conception there used to be a definitely determined entity, which bore certain 
attributes and which entered, with other entities, into definite relations expressible by laws of nature. In 
the functional view-point, by contrast, this entity constitutes no longer the self-evident starting point but 
the final goal and end of the consideration: we no longer have absolute, completely determined entities, 
from which we can immediately read off the laws and to which we can attach them as their attributes 
.(Cassirer, 1956: 131-132). 
Cassirer supported his argument by giving evidence from exact sciences, mathematics and 
physics, of how thought gradually replaced the concept of thing by the concept of relation. 
As evidence for his claim, he indicates how thought tran~mits from Aristotle's physics to 
Galileo's and from Newton's physics to quantum mechanics. During these developments, a 
significant change took place in the conceptual framework of science by shifting from 
substance to function. Cassirer's purpose was to confirm that the advancement of sciences 
is marked by a progressive shift from nai"ve realism that starts from a conception of things 
in themselves and interprets knowledge as the conformity of our thoughts with those pre-
established objects. 
50 
Chapter Two: Cassirer and Functional-Relational Thought 
Scientific experience is not a mere aggregate of perception, it has a complex structure 
which constitutes its unity. Distinguishing between two aspects of Cassirer's argument in 
his Substance and Function, I will discuss now the first part of his argument that I call the 
destructive aspect in which Cassirer criticizes both dogmatic realism and sensationalism. 
The problem of scientific concepts acqmres its significance when the philosopher of 
science involves himself with studying the relation between thought and existence and 
when he seeks an understanding of reality. In fact the philosopher of science cannot 
examine that relation without implying certain logical presuppositions that form his own 
understanding of the nature of concept and judgment. According to that illumination, 
Cassirer's first step was to show the invalidity of both Aristotle's and the empiricist 
conception of scientific concepts. The question now is, how did Aristotle present his view 
of concepts based on his theory of formal logic? In addition, what is the ontological aspect 
of Aristotle's theory of abstraction on which he based his theory of concepts? 
From the critical point of view, the general aim of Aristotle through his writings was the 
issue of Being. Aristotle's logic was written to maintain a secure path for his metaphysics. 
Clear evidence of that is his theory of category which aimed to reveal the different aspects 
of existence. Aristotle gave all his concern to the category of substance over the other 
categories. Therefore substance can be defined as substrate. There are two alternative 
meanings of the term "substrate" which could be used in this context. Substrate can be 
understood as the [carrier of the objects, but substance will not be an object for other 
predict.]. The other meaning of substrate is the unchangeable element during the continuous 
changes in objects. Here we will depend on the second meaning to explain Cassirer's view 
on substantial thought. There is a result can be deduced from this discussion clearly. There 
is a fixed element supposed in existence and the task of philosophical investigation, 
according to Aristotle, is to determine that unchangeable element within the process of 
change. Aristotle's task was to find the proper forms of physical matter. The aim of his 
logic was to give unity to the diversity or chaos of matter. 
In respect to Aristotle's substantialism, we can now analyze, according to Cassitet's 
account, Aristotle's theory of concepts and reveal its ontological and its substantial aspects. 
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Nothing is presupposed save the existence of things in their inexhaustible multiplicity, and the power of 
the mind to select from this wealth of particular existence those features that are common to several of 
them. When we thus collect objects characterized by possession of some common property into classes, 
and when we repeat this process upon higher levels, there gradually arises an ever firmer order and 
division of being, according to the series of factual similarities running through the particular 
things .... The concept does not appear as something foreign to sensuous reality, but forms a part of this 
reality; it is a selection from what is immediately contained in it. (Cassirer, 1923: 4-5). 
To have a concept of an object, we need to define that object by its relation to similar 
species that have the same characteristics: John, Richard, and Jasmine, for example, can be 
subsumed under the genus "Mankind". To have a concept, it is necessary to ascend upward 
towards general and abstract concepts or to descend downward toward the variety of 
individuals. Generally, a concept can be defined by referring either to its nearest genus or to 
its nearest species. In other words, concepts can be grasped only through the essential 
relation, subsumption and subordination of species and genus: 
Every series of comparable objects has a supreme generic concept, which comprehends within itself all 
the determinations in which these objects agree, while on the other hand, within this supreme genus, the 
sub-species at various levels are defined by properties belonging only to a part of the elements. In the 
same way a certain characteristic, thereby drawing a larger range of objects into the circle, so by a reverse 
process, the specification of the genus takes place through the progressive addition of new elements of 
contents. Hence, if we call the number of properties of a concept the magnitude of its content, this 
magnitude as we descend from the higher concepts to the lower, and thus diminishes the number of 
species subordinate to the concept; while, when we ascend to the higher genus, this content will diminish 
as the number of species is increased. (Cassirer, 1923: 5-6). 
Here the thought has two functions, firstly to isolate the objects with similar characteristics 
from the other objects that have different features and secondly to unify and to subsume 
these similar objects under a certain concept. Therefore the formation of concepts depends 
on these two cognitive processes; isolation and unification. In this way, the unity of thought 
is reduced to similar physical objects. Although similar objects can be subsumed under a 
certain concept, an object does not lose its identity and its individuality. Throughout its 
development, the concept must come from a circle of Being either in its primary forms as 
particulars or in its abstracted form. The object does not lose its identity when it is 
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subsumed under a general concept. For example John is a man and despite the fact that 
others share with him the qualities of being a man, he keeps his identity as an independent 
entity distinct from them. Similarly, we can see the notion of Being is also implemented in 
the field of science where concepts, as was claimed by Aristotle, are the free creation of 
thought. 
This is the dilemma that was created by Aristotle and grasped by his followers. This 
dilemma can be summarized as the following: Aristotle and his followers thought that 
concepts are universal rules of ordering, and these concepts have the capacity to order the 
particulars because they are created by thought. However, in fact they are just mere 
generalizations of particular examples and from the similar qualities we generalize them 
and unify them under certain concepts. The perception of generalization from similar 
particulars is what Aristotle calls abstraction. For instance, the geometrical figure of a 
triangle is considered to be a universal concept that subsumes different kinds of triangle; 
scalene, equilateral, isosceles and right-angled. 
It seems that Aristotle's account of the formation of concepts was based on the first law of 
thought, that is the law of identity that states A will remain A regardless of accidental 
changes that may take place over A that we discussed it in Chapter One. How does the law 
of identity provide an explanation for Aristotle's account of concepts? 
According to Aristotle, the form is unchanged while the matter ceases to exist. For example 
a brown table will have the form of table even if we paint it red or blue. A triangle could be 
broken into small pieces, but the form of triangle will never change but remain unchanged. 
In these two cases, the matter vanishes, but the form remains unchanged. The same thought 
is applicable here, the object will remain the same object regardless of the accidental 
changes. For instance, John will remain John if he wears a jacket or a t-shirt, whether he 
dyes his hair red or blue he will retain the same identity. Cassirer rejected this version of 
realism about physical and geometrical objects. He considered that the concept is not apart 
from sensuous reality but constitutes part of physical and external reality. Therefore 
· Cassirer considered that concept ha:s ai1 identical unity based·on a naiVe realism.tha:t starts· 
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from a conception of things and an understanding of concepts in light of pre-established 
objects. 
This is the epistemological ground on which Aristotelian logic depended and as was 
pointed out, metaphysics plays an important role in the formation of his scientific concept. 
Therefore Cassirer's Substance and Function attempts the very complicated task of 
explaining the defects of earlier views of concept formation. Cassirer critically identifies 
these defects from the view point of modem logic. 
According to Cassirer's view, we do not need to reduce a group of similar objects having 
common characteristics to a general concept abstracted from an aggregation of similar 
particulars. On the contrary, the concept should be presupposed and created through the 
dynamic process of reason before ordering the particulars. Hence Cassirer reverses the 
priority between individual and concept. In Substantial Thought, the individual comes first 
and then concepts are general ideas abstracted from similar individuals. Functional-
Relational thought, in contrast, comprehends the concept as being a rule constructed and 
logically precedes individuals themselves. 
The concept, however, is not deduced thereby, but presupposed; for, when we ascribe to a manifold an 
order and connection of elements, we have already presupposed the concept, if not in its complete form, 
yet in its fundamental function. (Cassirer, 1923: 17). 
Another defect of Aristotle's theory of concepts is that it does not guarantee that objects 
with properties in common, can be subsumed under one general concept because we could 
have objects with similar properties but it is not reasonable for one general concept to 
imply them. Here Cassirer uses an example that was used by Lotze to show that the rule, 
offered by traditional logic, is not adequate in giving an account of the formation of 
scientific concepts: 
The traditional rule, however, for the formation of the generic concept contains in itself no guarantee that 
this end will be actually achieved. In fact, there is nothing to assure that the common properties, which 
we select from any arbitrary collection of objects, include the truly typical features, which characterize 
and determine the total structures of the members of the collection. We may borrow a drastic example 
from Lotze: if we group. cherries and meat together under the attributes red, juicy and edible,- we do not 
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thereby attain a valid logical concept but a meaningless combination of words, quite useless for the 
comprehension of the particular cases. (Cassirer, 1923:7). 
Although a piece of meat and one piece of cherry have some properties in common such as 
the colour, state and purpose, we cannot subsume these two objects under one general 
concept. This example indicates the fact that the formation of any concept requires 
something else, transcending the similarities and dissimilarities between things. 
Being aware of these epistemological defects in Aristotle's logic, Cassirer found that the 
Aristotelian account of concept formation is not reliable. As a result, Cassirer investigates 
the Empiricist's view as it had been represented by G. Berkeley, D. Hume and J.S Mill. 
The empiricist's account represents part of Cassirer's destructive argument against the 
traditional view. In fact Cassirer paid scant attention to the psychological account, another 
attempt to form the concepts of the sciences. The main reason for this was Cassirer's belief 
that the formal and empiricist views are two sides of the same coin. Cassirer claims that the 
ontological themes included within formal logic could also be applied to the psychological 
perspective of forming concepts. For an empiricist, the existence that he investigates is the 
inner existence of consciousness depending on psychological laws; resemblance, causality, 
and contiguity of stimulations. Thus the whole process of scientific concept formation is 
now transformed into the realm of presentations: 
In fact, in the psychological deduction of the concept, the traditional schema is not so much changed as 
carried over to another field. While formerly it had been outer things that were compared and out of 
which a common element was selected, here the same process is merely transformed to presentations as 
psychical correlates of things. The process is only, as it were, removed to another dimension, in that it is 
taken out of the field of the physical into that of the psychical, while its general course and structure 
remain the same. (Cassirer, 1923: 10-11 ). 
The empiricist, according to Cassirer, aims to establish knowledge of the world with 
reference to sensations. Therefore, the question for him is how we construct concepts 
through what is given through experience. The world for him is a group of impressions or, 
more accurately, a group of representative images derived as copies of objects. It· is a 
specific realm of ideas and images, "past" "memory" and "present" sensations", which is 
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constantly contended in an endless flux of experiences. The supreme function of the mind, 
in this view, is to copy, classify and represent external objects under general names. In 
respect of the function of mind, according to the psychological account of the empiricist, 
sensations have an important role in the empiricist account of concepts. Although 
sensations are detached from external objects, they still have an existential power that 
impacts on our thought. The existential power of sensation can be defined as the influence 
of external objects on our sensations regardless of whether this influence is strong or weak. 
In brief, images, memory or sensations still remain subliminally present and are ready to be 
called up by some stimulus. The mutual co-operation between sensation and thought is the 
unique feature of empiricist thought. The logical system of Mill gives a clear example as he 
relies particularly on psychology and its principles for one side and, more generally on 
empiricism from another. 
We claim that the whole goal of the psychological empiricism of Mill was to reveal how 
the activity of thought builds up our knowledge from our sensations. Throughout the 
System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, Mill sought to give an account of how mind 
acquires knowledge. One of these issues discussed in his System was the concept of reality. 
The reality that Mill refers to here is that of the phenomena as states of external or internal 
consciousness as considered the subject of logic (Mill, vol.2: 139-140). 
Being an empiricist, Mill considered that the concepts are merely copies of certain factual 
properties of the given reality of things as we produce them in representations. Mill was 
loyal to that belief; the importance of existence in our epistemology and it will be clearly 
shown in his formation of scientific concepts. 
The points, lines, circles, and squares which any one has in his mind, are (I apprehend) simply copies of 
the points, lines, circles, and squares which he has known in his experience. Our idea of a point I 
apprehend to be simply our idea of the minimum visible the smallest portion of surface which we can see. 
A line as defined by geometers is wholly inconceivable. We can reason about a line as if it had no 
breadth; because we of all the control we can exercise over power, when a perception is present to our 
senses or a conception to our intellects, of attending to a part only of that perception or a conception 
instead of the whole. But we cannot conceive a line without breadth ; we can form no mental picture of 
such a line; all the lines which we have in our minds are lines possessing breadth. If any one doubts this, 
we may refer him to his own experience. (Mill, 1884: 148). 
56 
Chapter Two: Cassirer and Functional-Relational Thought 
The clear example of that assumption can be derived from his view on the concept of 
number. Mill understands number not as a mere member in a numerical series with its 
essence drawn in its relative position in that series. On the contrary, Mill understands 
number with respect to the arrangements of things in reality as we experience them. For 
instance, the proposition 2+3=5 does not describe mere numbers that have specific relative 
relation in a numerical series. Rather, it describes an experience, which has been forced 
upon us by the process of joining things together. For example, when we put one billiard-
ball to another, we add names of things which could be two balls or two pens and so on. 
Mill considered this addition they are not names of certain objects, rather they are names of 
a certain process. Every number must therefore point out to physical phenomena and refers 
to physical properties of those phenomena. Mill indicates that comprehension of the 
function of number in his system of logic when he says: 
When we call a collection of objects two, three or four, they are not two, three, or four in the abstract; 
they are two, three, or four things of some particular kind; Pebbles, horses, inches, pounds weight. What 
the name of number connotes is, a manner in which single objects ofthe given kind must be put together, 
in order to produce that particular aggregate. If the aggregate be of pebbles, and we call it two, the name 
implies that, to compose the aggregate, one pebble must be joined to one pebble. (Mill, 1967: 91-92). 
This comprehension leads to the claim that all arithmetical operations, like addition, 
subtraction, division and multiplication depend on physical objects. Our mind understands 
the calculus systems as mere statements concerning groups of presentations. It is 
experience that provides us with the general base of arithmetic and geometry. For example, 
a "round square" is not a valid concept because experience shows us that a thing loses the 
property of having four corners the moment it assumes the property of roundness. 
Therefore the beginning of one impression is inseparably connected with the cessation of 
the other (Cassirer, 1923:13). Mill's system of logic was an attempt to substitute the 
concrete for the abstract, and the realm of material entities for the realm of mathematical 
signs. Therefore I disagree with the claim which has been raised by Brain in his comments 
on Mill's book Analysis of The Phenomena Of The Human Mind numbers, as they had been 
i.uiderstood by Mill, are not names of objec.ts. Rather, they are names of a certain process 
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like addition (See Brain, 1869: 91). On the contrary, Cassirer believed that Mill's view of 
formation of the concept of number refers to things not only operations as claimed by 
Brain. Cassirer's view was that Mill formed his concept of number in respect of objects 
only and their reflections on our mind. For example we cannot understand the number one 
as an operation but we understand it as a reference to any specific object such as a book, 
disk or door. This understanding leads to the conclusion that reality was the fundamental 
reference upon which Mill constructed his logic and his theory of scientific concepts. It 
seems to me that Vector Brochard was right when he claimed that Mill's logic is a logical 
system which deals with things. All images and sensations are the effects of direct contact 
with external things. (Brochard, 1954: 388). 
It is now important to point out that the psychological perspective of forming concepts 
depends on what called "psychological abstraction". This concept aims to group the objects 
under a common name or more specifically subordinate similar objects under a general 
concept. This remark has been mentioned by Cassirer when he refers to the similarity 
between objects as the core problem of psychological perspective of concept formation. 
2-3-2 Cassirer and the Functional-Relational thought 
Being a historian of the philosophy of science, Cassirer's primary interest was to trace the 
movement of modern scientific revolutions in the field of exact and biological sciences like 
arithmetic, geometry, physics and biology. He paid attention to the common factor that 
explains and justifies the advancement of these sciences. He seeks to find the logical 
structures that paved the way for these revolutions to take place in modern sciences and to 
transcend the substantial thought. Here we will discuss the constructive part of Cassirer's 
argument based on functional-relational thought rather than substantial thought as an 
alternative to form scientific concepts. Cassirer replaced substance with relation and 
reinterpreted the notion of relation. Cassirer confirms that such a relation does not dispose 
of the qualities of the individual objects concerned. Cassirer tries to show that "thing-
concept" was replaced with "relation-concept" and the latter gradually used to explain the 
developments took places in sciei1tes. 
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Here Cassirer not only confirms the role of relation over the concept of substance, but also 
gives the concept of relation another meaning completely different from that of Aristotle. 
For Aristotle, relation is a category formulated to meet his metaphysical doctrine and is 
developed not to be independent of the existence of the particulars. In contrast, Cassirer 
provides a new account in which the concept of relation is devoted to dispose the possible 
relationships of relata and their places in the system. It is a new account that concerns with 
the relationship between the whole and its parts, not the relationship between thing and its 
characteristics. According to Cassirer, relation is an order of arrangement that brings 
systematic order to the particulars within a form. The idea of relation, according to 
Cassirer, departed from the ontological thought to enter logical and functional thought. 
The category of relation especially is forced into a dependent and subordinate by this fundamental 
metaphysical doctrine of Aristotle. Relation is not independent of the concept of real being; it can only 
add supplementary and real external modifications to the latter, such as do not affect its real "nature". In 
this way the Aristotelian doctrine of the formation of the concept came to have a characteristic feature, 
which has remained in spite of all the manifold transformations it has undergone. The fundamental 
categorical relation of the thing to its properties remains henceforth the guiding point of view; while 
relational determinations are only considered in so far as they can be transformed, by some sort of 
mediation, into properties of a subject or of a plurality of subjects. This view is in evidence in the text-
books of formal logic in that relations or connections, as a rule, are considered among the "non-essential" 
properties of a concept. ... Here a methodological distinction of great significance appears. The two chief 
forms of logic, which are especially apposed to each other in the modern scientific development, are 
distinguished-as will become clear-by the different value which is placed upon thing-concepts and 
relation-concept. (Cassirer, 1923: 8). 
The concept of relation determines the relation between a particular and a general rule 
where the elements of any group would be organized and ordered in respect to a certain 
rule. In fact Cassirer uses various terms when he refers to the relation between the universal 
rule and the elements of any given object. He sometimes expresses that relation in terms of 
form and its contents; the context and its element; and finally, in a mathematical fashion, as 
a relation between an invariant and its variables. In all these different terms, the universal 
can be understood as a rule that generates possible connections between particulars arid 
orders them under a general formula. Cassirer claims that the function ofthe organizational 
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rule is to unify the members under a higher form of logical synthesis. Therefore the object 
is only comprehensible as an element of the structure or a member in the series: 
Context, as here understood, must mean and imply the preservation of the logical significance of each 
individual element and, at the same time, the unification of elements in a higher logical unity .... The 
particulars must be preserved within the context, and the context must be maintained despite all the 
differentiations. (Werkmeister, 1949: 764). 
It seems clear that the importance of Cassirer's notion of structure or the system comes 
from the Kantian idea of schematism, which states that to have a mind is not to be made of 
any kind of particulars, but rather, is to be able to perform certain kinds of activities that 
involve rules. Even calculations of mathematics and geometry, although founded in the 
pure intuitions of space and time, themselves require schemata. A schema is thus just a rule 
or a set of rules that specifies how to construct a concept and therefore a judgment. The 
logical forms of judgment actually become the categories of experience only when they are 
rendered into temporalized form or what Kant calls their "schema" which mean nothing 
except they provide us with the rules to construct them in terms of how they actually apply 
to experience. Cassirer in his Kants Leben und Lehre of 1918 refers to Kant's view of 
constructing concepts. He mentioned Kant as an example of how the relationship between 
the universal and the particular is formed: 
Geometrical construction is "prior" to the individual geometrical form, because the meaning of the 
individual form is established only via the construction, not the other way around- the meaning of the 
construction through the individual form. All the necessity belonging to geometrical judgments rests on 
this fact. In geometry the cases do not exist apart from the law, as things detached and independent; they 
basically issue from consciousness of the law. In geometry the particular does not constitute the 
presupposition of the universal; rather it is thought only by means of determining and specifYing more 
exactly the universal in general. In this sense geometry and arithmetic furnish the immediate confirmation 
of a principle that Kant now puts forward as the universal norm and the touchstone ofthe "new method of 
thought" "namely", that we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them. (Cassirer, 
1918 trans. 1981: 157-158). 
I strongly believe that Cassirer made use of that idea not only to form his view concerning 
scientific concepts but also to construct his whole philosophical' systern,, specifically ~hat 
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he calls "the philosophy of symbolic forms" as we will see later. The importance of Kantian 
schematism was that it paved the way for Cassirer to understand the relation between 
universal and particular through the different activities of human thought. He claims that 
every particular presupposes a structure or a system that gives it its features. The question 
that should be asked now is what role does of the idea of structure perform in Cassirer's 
theory of scientific concepts? 
The answer to that question depends entirely on the following presupposition that the unity 
of our thought must arise not from objects, but instead from the structure or function that 
gives the objects their characteristics. Cassirer believes that cognition of objects can only 
be gained through the structure that arranges and relates them under certain law. Cassirer 
makes use of modern mathematics to form his epistemological view. Thus with Cassirer, 
the mathematical doctrine of relations found its way into critical philosophy. In 
mathematics we depend on our analysis of mathematical facts that shows that there is an 
ideal meaning that is not derived from any sense datum. The task of mathematics is not to 
describe the chaos of the realm of sense. Rather it is to describe mere relational structures. 
For example, every function has an ideal meaning or relation is prior to the objects they 
relate. 
There is no doubting the great influence of mathematics on Cassirer in leading him to his 
account of scientific concepts. I think there are two reasons why Cassirer uses mathematical 
understanding to form his theory of concepts. Firstly he wants to give scientific concepts an 
accurate language derived from mathematical terms, like function, mvanance, 
transformation .... etc and these terms provide a precise language. Secondly mathematical 
language does not refer to any physical entities, rather it refers to possible values that 
members of any set or class acquire. Using the mathematical language and understanding 
its modern developments helped Cassirer to develop his view of the formation of scientific 
concepts. 
Cassirer considers number as a concept that does not refer to these two states, but refers 
onlyto the pure possibility of arrangement and order-of the members ofa set." 
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In truth, however, the connection ofthe members of a series by the possession of a common "property" is 
only a special example of logically possible connections in general. The connection of the members is in 
every case produced by some general law of arrangement through which a thoroughgoing rule of 
succession is established. That which binds the elements of the series a, b, c .... together is not itself a 
new element, that was factually blended with them, but it is the rule of progression, which remains the 
same, no matter in which member it is represented. The function F (a, b), F (b, c), .... , which determines 
the sort of dependence between the successive members, is obviously not to be pointed out as itself a 
member of the series, which exists and develops according to it ..... The concept, however, is not deduced 
thereby, but presupposed; for when we ascribe to a manifold an order and connection of elements, we 
have already presupposed the concept, if in its complete form yet in its fundamental function. (Cassirer, 
1923: 17). 
Cassirer confirms the idea that our understanding has to overcome all mathematical theories 
that explain number depending on the substantial thought or more specifically on the logic 
ofthe generic concept: 
Thus the conflict of mathematical theories here again combines with the general questions of logical 
principle that were our starting-point. In the different interpretations of the concept of number, there is 
repeated the general conflict between the logic of the generic concept and the logic of the relational 
concept. (Cassirer, 1923: 53). 
It is not necessary to build up a concept to refer to any given or representative object. The 
functional-relational thought transcends the ontological aspect of the formation of concepts 
and is only concerned with the relational aspect where the values ascribed to the members 
are gained from the relative place in the cognitive structure. 
Now we are gomg to discuss another aspect of scientific concepts: "objectivity". 
Objectivity means nothing more than that the objects that form the core meaning of the 
concept are dissolved into a web of relations that are comprehensible in light of certain 
orders or laws. Objectivity, according to Cassirer, refers to the priority of laws over the 
chaos of things. Scientific concepts are no longer copies or representations of impressions 
of substantial objects of the external world. We will discuss the objectivity of concepts 
when we refer to perception. The importance of Cassirer's project toward composing a 
theory of scientific concepts "Yas his intellectual ability to applf mathematical 
understanding of the theory of relations to the physical world. It seems the real reason for 
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Cassirer to do that task was in order to reveal the objective nature of concepts by 
implementing that functional method to different exact sciences. Clear evidence of that 
claim can be captured in his Substance and Function when he submitted physics to the 
functional-relational perspective. 
The field of application of this form of logic is not confined to mathematics alone. On the contrary, it 
extends over into the field of the knowledge of nature; for the concept of function constitutes the general 
schema and model according to which the modern concept of nature has been modeled in its progressive 
historical development.(Cassirer, 1923: 21 ). 
Applying the functional thought to physical sciences, will lead us to interpret the origin of 
essence not as the external objects but as structure itself. Cassirer's way of understanding 
physical nature was to reveal the constructive system of nature itself, and to show physical 
objects are constructed in the light of these intellectual systems (Hamburg, 1949: 85-91 ). 
Reality and its objects are only attainable through pure conditions and structures provided 
by thought. The physical object now no longer refers to an independent entity in itself but 
to a web of relations organized in respect to invariant factors that remain unchanged during 
physical transformations, as we shall explain in the next chapter (Cassirer, 1923: 273). 
The aim of empirical knowledge in Cassirer's view is to identify constructive elements that 
remain constant in contrast to the changing elements of experience. Again here Cassirer 
follows his general philosophical view while he analyzes the concept of nature. What 
remain invariant during physical change are structures themselves. Cassirer's concern was 
to identify the possible structures that can be ascribed to the object. Physical reality is 
attainable now as a reality of relative and possible constructions or forms, rather than of 
independent entities. (Ryckman, 1999: 600-601 ). 
Science advanced greatly when it comprehended scientific concepts not as attached to the 
reality of things, but as a free construction of possible relations. Thought creates structures 
under which individuals are ordered. These logical structures are permanent structures but 
permanence here has nothing to do with any ontological claim regarding th(! permanence of 
the external objects because misunderstanding Cassirer's meaning of permanence would 
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bring us back into the circle of metaphysics. The permanence ascribed to the structures here 
has to be understood logically in the sense that structures will remain unchanged when 
there are no changes in the conditions that determine them (Ferretti, 1989: I 01-1 03). In that 
sense permanent structure, according to Cassirer, is synonymous with the mathematical 
term in variance where both of these concepts refer to the fact that the structure will remain 
unchanged when the conditions determining either physical experience or a mathematical 
series are unchanged. 
The force and conclusiveness of geometrical proof always rests then in the invariants ofthe system, not in 
what is peculiar to the individual members as such. It is this interpretation, which Poncelet characterizes 
philosophically by the expression principle of continuity, and which he formulates more precisely as the 
principle of the permanence of mathematical relations. The only postulate that is involved can be 
formulated by saying that it is possible to maintain the validity of certain relations, defined once for all, in 
spite of a change in the content of the particular terms, i.e., of the particular relata. (Cassirer, 1923:80-
81). 
Cassirer put that comparison between what is empirically constant and what is logically 
constant when he differentiated between empirical cognition and logical knowledge. 
The constancy of the ideal forms has no longer a purely static, but also and especially a dynamic 
meaning; it is not so much constantly in being, as rather constancy in logical use. 
(Cassirer, 1923:323). 
When Cassirer replaces ontological permanence by mathematical permanence, he indeed 
develops what it calls "logical monism". Logical monism means that the entire physical 
reality and its contents are determined by laws. The objects of knowledge are grasped and 
developed only in the light of the dynamic process of thought, where the activities of 
thought are devoted to building up structures and disciplines to arrange and order the 
contents of the objects or the members of mathematical series. 
Therefore Cassirer, by adapting logical monism in his study of scientific concepts, agrees 
with the teachings of the Marburg School. Cassirer, like the Marburg School members, is 
concerned with the logical unity of the structure. Structure has to be understood, according 
-to Cassirer, as the preservation of the logical significance of each individu-al element and, at 
the same time, the unification of elements in a higher logical unity. Logical monism simply 
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means that nothing transcends the laws of thought. There is no longer any need for the 
assumption that objects exist in and by themselves. All that is required is the possibility of 
establishing an all-comprehensive context according to law, and the method of securing 
scientific cognition. That sense of logical monism shows the deep belief of Cassirer and the 
rest of the Marburg School that the unity of context does significantly mean the unity of 
thought itself. Yet Cassirer distinguishes himself from their teachings by extending and 
applying logical monism to new fields. If we consider Cassirer's writings in his Hamburg 
period (1923-1933) we can observe that Cassirer' s thought began to be directed toward 
some areas of research that had never been discussed by the Marburg School. 
During the Hamburg period (1923-1933) Cassirer aimed to find constructive functions in 
various aspects of culture. As a result, he presented to the philosophical community in 
sequence in 1923, the first part of his Philosophie Der Symolischen Formen or The 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms where he addressed the development of language from a 
historical point of view. Cassirer seeks to apply his theory of scientific concept formation to 
language. According to Cassirer, a word might in primitive languages initially be used to 
refer to an external object; however through the development of language, words are now 
implying a meaning that signifies a symbol instead of referring to a particular thing. The 
same thought is also applied to his second part of Philosophie Der Symolischen Formen 
(1925), as an attempt to discover the realm of myths. In fact the second part of his 
philosophy of symbolic forms is a major work whose primary seeds can be found in his Zur 
Philosophie Der Mythologie (1924) in which he discusses the development of mythical 
thought and its relation to religion. The main reason for Cassirer to study these different 
topics was to transcend the univocal perspective of the Marburg School. Cassirer strongly 
believed that the goal of reason is not to understand just the exact sciences but all of reality. 
That is why he extended his philosophical enterprise to cultural realms. Taking forward 
that understanding will open a new horizon to trace the functional thought as applied to 
different realms of culture. Now the question that should be asked is; what epistemic roles 
do symbolic forms perform in experience? 
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2-4 Cassirer and the Symbolic Forms of Experience 
This section will discuss the main philosophical ideas developed by Cassirer during his 
Hamburg period (1923-1933) and see how far these philosophical ideas separated him from 
the Marburg School. In addition, it will be argued that Cassirer's concern shifted from the 
realm of exact sciences to develop a philosophy of Man that we call the anthropology of 
Man where man lives in a constructive world of meanings and symbols. 
2-4-1 The symbolic Construction of experience 
According to Cassirer, the fundamental principle of critical thought is that the function 
precedes the object. Cassirer's aim in his earlier philosophical view was to reveal the 
functional or constructive nature of scientific concepts. In his Hamburg period, Cassirer 
extends his philosophical project to examine the validity of that principle in different 
epistemological contexts. Therefore, Cassirer's central argument was to show that cultural 
forms including language, myth, and art have the same functional nature as scientific 
concepts. The main role that function has to play in the realms of culture is to unify and 
organize our experiences, and this role is only performable through the structures of reason. 
In respect to that understanding, we find ourselves in front of a unique attempt to unify our 
theoretical view of the world. The problem of knowledge is no longer concerned just with 
scientific theories but includes also a comprehensive view of the world. The question now 
is, how successfully did Cassirer achieve that project? The answer lies in his central 
concept of the "symbolic form" that he raised in 1923. What is the importance of the 
"symbolic form" and what is the specific role it plays in his philological enterprise? 
According to Cassirer, a form, considered as a logical structure, includes a rule for 
arranging its contents and elements. As indicated before, any thing might be said to have a 
form that follows a pattern that exhibits order and internal connections. Cassirer's 
Substance and Functiol'} and Philosophy of Symbolic Forms aimed to analyze human 
experience in its broad sense and to separate two moments implied in experience the 
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sensuous and constructive meaning. Cassirer's aim through his series of symbolic forms 
was to discover the constructive meanings that are immanently implied in cultural objects 
which bring unity and coherence to the cultural objects. Cassirer ascribed three constructive 
meaning to arrange the different realm of culture, these meanings are; expression, intuition 
and concept. 
These constructive meanings are functions that order our chaotic experience concerning the 
objects of nature as we will discuss in the next chapter. The symbolic forms are dynamic 
moments of thought by which an intelligible content of meaning is attached to a concrete, 
sensory sign (Koris, 1999: 540). 
The symbolic form has to be grasped through physical objects, but at the same time it has 
to transcend physical objects to capture that ideal or constructive meaning by which we 
organize our experience about physical objects. For example, if we contemplate nature and 
its scenes, it may seem that it is a group of detached scenes with no connection. In this case, 
the physical objects could not be transcended. But those people who could find 
constructive meanings or orders that can organize all these scenes, will find design and 
systematic unity in nature itself. 
Cassirer's central concern was to find the real relationship between man and his world and 
to reveal the secret of reality from Man himself and his instruments of thought. Cassirer 
understood reality as categorized internally in Man's spirit. The supreme aim in his later 
philosophy was to examine the productions of human spirit. It is difficult to imagine any 
form of reality independently of such symbolic forms. 
When Cassirer extends his philosophical project, he no longer talks about scientific reality 
but focuses instead on spiritual reality. Two reasons can be presented now to justify that 
epistemological shift. The first reason was to examine the whole validity of his theory of 
concepts by applying it to another domain drastically different from exact science. The 
second reason was that Cassirer wished to establish a new science of spirit, which I call 
morphology of human spirit, a science that studies different forms of culture as a pure 
production of spirit. The reason I call it the morphology of spirit is Cassirer'·s definition of 
Man as "symbolizing animal". Cassirer believed that what gives Man its unique statue is 
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his ability to create symbols and give the concrete various meanings which are pure 
activities of spirit. Bidney, D in his 1949 article "On the Philosophical Anthropology of Ernest 
Cassirer and its Relation to the History of Anthropological Thought" claimed that Cassirer's aim 
when he started his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms was stress the autonomous creativity of 
the spirit and envisage spirit as a function and energy of construction. He claimed that the 
whole thesis of symbolic forms was an attempt to demonstrate that the whole of human 
culture is understood as an historical expression of the human spirit. He quoted a paragraph 
from Cassirer to defend his claim: 
It tries to understand and demonstrate how all the content of culture-in so far as it is more than merely 
singular content, in so far as it is grounded in a universal formal principle-presumes an original act of 
spirit(Geist). It is in this that the basic tenet of idealism finds its specific and completer validation. 
(Cassirer, 1953, quoted from Bidney, 1949: 500). 
The originality of Cassirer's attempt lies in his belief that the symbolic form is an 
instrument for human kind to construct his world that distinguishes him from all other 
creations. The process of creation forms considered to be as a spontaneous and a 
progressive process where our consciousness continuously provides us with constructive 
forms to organize the flow of impressions. Cassirer could, in his Hamburg period, develop 
and import symbolic forms for the intelligibility of reality. Cassirer's aim, in agreement 
with the Marburg School members, was to explore the structural forms implied in the 
sensible world. Apart from applying his logical monism to different forms of reality, and 
adopting new perspectives raised in the General theory of Relativity concerning space and 
time, Cassirer shares the epistemic view of the Marburg School. 
2-4-2 The Philosophy of Man and Symbolic Pregnancy 
In this section I will discuss the third and the last period of Cassirer's philosophical 
development: the period of emigration (1933-1945). In_" t~is period Cassir~! visited a~d_ 
worked in different countries; England, Sweden and United States of America, particularly 
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after Hitler persecuted the Jews in Germany after 1933. In the emigration period, Cassirer 
resumed his philosophical enterprise begun in Hamburg period. Cassirer published in this 
period Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics in 1936 as an application of his 
Functional-Relational thought to quantum mechanics. He also wrote the fourth volume of 
The Problem of Knowledge in 1941 but published later after he passed away, where he 
discussed the recent development of science. In the emigration period Cassirer became a 
structuralist in his philosophical analyses and he applied his structuralism to three different 
fields; in 1938 he published his article in French "Le Concept de Groupe et Ia Theorie de la 
Perception" translated in 1944 as "The Concept of Group and the Theory of Perception" 
where he applied his understanding of group theory to perception aiming to set up what he 
called "the invariant theory of experience". 
The second application was to the worlds of Man, Cassirer sought to show how Man could 
construct the different domains of civilization and unify them as he expressed that view in 
his An Essay on Man 1944. The third application of his structuralism was to the language in 
his 1942 article "The Influence of Language upon the Development of Scientific Thought" 
and his 1946 article "Structuralism in Modern Linguistics". There are some recent studies 
that interpret Cassirer's works in the light of structuralism, such as Ihmig (1999), Ryckman 
(1999) and French (1999). Structuralism is a philosophical perspective that pays attention 
to the structure or the form confirming its importance over the content or the matter. For 
example French, lhmig and Ryckman set up their arguments on the later developments of 
Cassirer' s scientific view as developed in his Einstein's Theory of Relativity and his 1936 
Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics. For example, according to Ihmig, 
Cassirer is a structuralist because Cassirer understands the unity of objects to depend on the 
unity of law not the unity of simple elements. lhmig, in his reading to Cassirer, explains 
that the unity of the concept of object, from the structuralist perspective, is reinstated on a 
higher level through lawful unity. He indicates that the process of abstraction from a 
substantivalist conception of objects to a structuralist one is furthered by the General 
Theory of Relativity and what is left is an understanding of the objects of a theory as 
defined by Lorentz transfor-mations that leave the relevant physical magnitudes invariant. 
Thus Cassirer saw General Relativity as the natural conclusion of the structuralist tendency. 
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Both Ryckman and French's arguments depend on Cassirer's Determinism and 
Indeterminism, which gave Cassirer's interpretation of quantum mechanics: 
We are concerned not so much with the existence ofthings as with the objective validity of relations; and 
all our knowledge of atoms can be led back to, and depends on, this validity. (Cassirer, 1956: 143). 
In classical mechanics in contrast, objectivity rests on spatio-temporal persistence of 
the objects. In quantum physics we cannot say that the particles possess definite 
properties at all times, even beyond measurement interactions, or that they travel along 
well -defined trajectories. French cites two questions raised by Cassirer in support the 
view that Casssirer was a structuralist: 
' ... what are these electrons whose path we can no longer follow? Is there any sense in ascribing to them 
a definite, strictly determined existence, which, however, is only incompletely accessible to us? 
(Cassirer, 1956: 178). 
French based his interpretation of Cassirer as a structuralist on these two questions. 
Namely that we take the 'conditions of accessibility' as conditions of the objects of 
experience (French, 1999: 2-3). From the structuralist view, the entity constitutes no 
longer the self-evident starting point but the final goal and end of the consideration 
(French, 1999: 4-5). 
Cassirer's structuralism went to the extent that all the phenomena and all observable, 
apparently separate elements are understood only when seen as positions in a structure 
or system of relations. Cassirer's version of structuralism shares the other versions of 
structuralism raised by Piaget, Chomsky, Foucault and Althusser. All of them agreed 
that the elements of the object have to be understood within a system. For them, 
language is like social and cultural phenomena are not physical objects and events but 
objects and events with meaning. 
According to that interpretation, the original division between the intelligible and the 
sensuous vanishes. We still remain in a world of images but these are not images that 
reproduce a self-subsistent world of "things"; they are whole image-worlds whose principle 
and origin are to be formed in an autonomous -~reation _of the spirit. Through them alone we 
see what we call "reality" and in them alone we possess it. For the highest objective truth 
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that is accessible to the spirit is ultimately the form of its own activity in all this the human 
spirit, according to Cassirer, now perceives itself and reality. Cassirer confirms these 
structural or ideal meanings that enable us to grasp reality. 
The same meaning has been confirmed by Cassirer in I 953 where the importance has been 
given to ideal meanings not to existence: 
It is here that we pass beyond passive receptivity to an indeterminate outward material, and begin to place 
upon it our independent imprint which articulates it for us into diverse spheres and forms of reality. Myth 
and art, language and science, are in this sense configurations towards being: they are not simple copies 
of an existing reality but represent the main directions of the spiritual movement, of the ideal process by 
which reality is constituted for us as one and many -as a diversity of forms which are ultimately held 
togetherbyaunityofmeaning. (Cassirer, I953: I07). 
For Cassirer, each one of these forms builds up its own intelligible realm of intrinsic 
meaning. The symbolic forms conceive reality as a real process of embodying relations, not 
as a fixed order of things. For Cassirer, the real concern of symbolic forms is not to raise 
questions about the existence of objects and what they are but to raise questions concerning 
the possible ways we construct them under universal forms. Cassirer's structural realism 
can also be noticed though his concept "Symbolic Pregnancy" discussed in the third volume 
of Philosophy of Symbolic Forms that found another application in Cassirer I 944 An Essay 
On Man. The question that has to be raised now is how the external object acquires a 
symbolic meaning. The answer to this question lies in Cassirer's term "symbolic 
pregnancy". He indicated a sensible object implies a meaning which gives it its unity: 
By symbolic pregnancy we mean the way in which a perception as a sensory experience contains at the 
same time a certain nonintuitive meaning which it immediately and concretely represents. Here we are 
not dealing with bare perceptive data, on which some sort of apperceptive acts are later grafted, through 
which they are interpreted, judged, transformed. Rather, it is the perception itself which by virtue of its 
own immanent organization, takes on a kind of spiritual articulation-which, being ordered in itself, also 
belonging to a determinate order of meaning. In its full actuality, its living totality, it is at the same time a 
life "in" meaning. It is not only subsequently received into this sphere but is, one might say, born into it. 
It is this ideal interwovenness, this relatedness of the total single perceptive phenomenon, given here and 
now, to a characteristic total meaning that the term "pregnance" is meant to designate. (Cassirer, I 957: 
202). 
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The symbolic meaning provides objects with their completeness and unity. For Cassirer, 
the creative activity of mind lies in its ability to discover constructive meanings in the 
world we perceive. Cassirer was keen to show that the world and its objects in different 
domains of civilization can be understood as the product of the creative activity of thought. 
This is the holistic structuralism of Cassirer as we shall explain in the following chapters. 
This structuralism also applied to perception. Cassirer aimed to set up an account of 
perception based on that version of structuralism by applying the functional-relational 
approach to the facts of perception. Cassirer argued that objects as we perceive them are a 
matter of internal organization of thought. 
For Cassirer, the theory of perception has no other role than to transform the chaos of 
particulars into a system and a coherent form submitted to laws. In his I 944 The Concept of 
Group and the Theory of Perception" Cassirer achieved that goal by applying group theory 
to the perceptual world and explaining the new order of the arrangement of the elements. 
Cassirer aimed to show the constructive nature of perception by claiming that there is a 
non-intuitive element implied in perception that gives it constructive unity. In addition, 
Cassirer explained that perceived objects do not have independent and hence fixed 
characteristics but the objects can be transformed and hence phenomenologically 
represented differently in respect to different orders of arrangement. 
This conclusion led Cassirer to argue that the modern theory of perception has to be 
understood under the concept of transformation and invariance as we shall explain in the 
next chapters. Setting up a theory of perception on that understanding led Cassirer to 
discuss the objectivity of perception. The value of objectivity as he applies it to perception 
returns to his earlier view of the Berlin period when he stressed the fact that the flux of 
what are given in experience needs a rule or a principle to connect and organize them. 
The objects of experience depend on a complex of universal concepts that Kant calls concepts of pure 
understanding or categories. When applied to a given manifold, a category is nothing other than a rule of 
connection that has to be added to perception "in order to grant it the value of 'objectivity"; ~Cassirer, 
·I 907: Trans in Ihinig, I 999: 520). 
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The rules, the structures, and symbols are Cassirer's keys for understanding the 
constructive world. Man achieves his essence only when he creates symbols and uses them 
to build up his constructive world. The question now is how could Man constitute his own 
world? The answer will be given in the following pages. 
2-4-3 Cassirer and Philosophy of Man 
The most remarkable -aspect of Cassirer's philosophical development in the emigration 
period was his aim of setting up a new philosophy of Man. If we look at his last writings, 
Cassirer' s concern was to address the following issues; what is the nature of Man? the 
development of the symbol from animal reaction to man responses? and a definition of man 
in the light of the achievements that have been created by man through times and 
civilizations. Cassirer took all the productions achieved by man to be as a sign of the 
richness of his spirit and a mark of his creative power. Cassirer's main concern in the 
emigration period was to investigate the problem of the dependence of relational thought 
upon symbolic thought. 
Cassirer's philosophy of Man was an attempt to bridge between Berlin and Hamburg stages. 
After discussing the logical structures of scientific theories and the structural aspects of 
culture realms he went further by aiming to establish anthropology of man. Cassirer 
confirmed that man in his creations is no longer dependent upon concrete sense data. 
Rather man responds to the structures of arrangement. Cassirer gave Helen Keller as an 
example of man being not dependent on the material things, rather relations and how we 
construct forms: 
The case of Helen Keller, who reached a very high degree of mental development and intellectual culture, 
shows us clearly and irrefutably that a human being in the construction of his human world is not 
dependent upon the quality ofhis sense material. Ifthe theories of sensationalism were right, if every idea 
were nothing but a faint copy of an original sense impression, then the condition of a blind, deaf, and 
dumb child would indeed be desperate. For it would be deprived of the very sources of human 
knowledge; it would be, as it were, an exile from reality. But if we study Helen. Keller'scautobiography 
_ we are at once aware that this is untrue, and at the sa~etime.we understand why it is untrue. Human 
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culture derives its specific character and its intellectual and moral values, not from the material of which 
it consists, but from its form, its architectural structure. And this form may be expressed in any sense 
material.(Cassirer, 1944: 35-36). 
Cassirer argued that man developed his reality in the light of these symbolic forms. Thus 
he claims that these symbols should form the essential principles for a theory of man: 
The principle of symbolism, with its universality, validity, and general applicability, is a magic word, the 
Open Sesame! giving access to the specifically human world, to the world of human culture. Once man is 
in possession of this magic key further progress is assured. (Cassirer, 1944: 35). 
For Cassirer forms are an artificial medium that mediates between human beings and the 
physical world. In respect to that creative and dynamic activity, Cassirer defines Man as a 
symbolic animal: 
Reason is a very inadequate term with which to comprehend the forms of man's cultural life in all their 
richness and variety .... Hence, instead of defining man as an animal rationale, we should define him as an 
animal symbolicum.(Cassirer, 1944: 26). 
It seems that the main reason for Cassirer to define man as a symbolic animal was to show 
the dynamic nature of his spirit in building up his constructive universe in its variety and to 
reflect the enrichment of his spirit. Man in his path toward civilization, transcended the 
sensible signs as the sole source of knowledge and concerned with the ideal forms ascribing 
to sensible signs or objects. The problem that Man had to face, during his intellectual 
development was, how to find universal meanings implied in the particulars, and how to 
give explanation to the objects not as independent entities but as outcome of constructive 
process. 
Cassirer believed that symbolic form was a successful effort and that man had to reach his 
completeness as a symbolic animal who creates symbols and forms the contents of the 
universal in respect to his structures or ideal ideas as Cassirer sometimes calls them 
Without symbolism the life of man would be like that of the prisoners in the cave of Plato's famous 
simile. Man's life would be confined within the limits of his biological needs and his practical interests; it 
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could find no access to the "ideal world" which is opened to him from different sides by religion, art, 
philosophy, science. (Cassirer, 1944: 41 ). 
It seems that Cassirer wanted to claim that Man, during his intellectual development, was 
suffering from what I call "epistemological alienation". He did not state this directly but if 
we follow his view on the development of the mind of Man, then we could find justification 
for my claim. In his 1944 Cassirer went through his discussion to the problem of man to 
show the moments where man was epistemologically alienated. For example, when he 
analyzed the nature of Man as discussed in Greek philosophy. It considered that the true 
nature of man can be grasped if we removed from his being all external and incidental 
characteristics. In that case, man was taken apart from his accidental features that have to 
be taken into consideration when we try to present a view about man nature. Again Cassirer 
follows the issue of man and how he was alienated by the time of Christianity. According 
to Cassirer's view man was alienated because reason could not show him the way to clarity, 
to truth and wisdom. Also when the time of Copernicus man also was no longer the center 
of the universe, however man has placed in an infinite space in which his being seems to be 
a single and vanishing point (Cassirer, 1944: 8-15). 
Cassirer records these moments when man was detached from his universe and its facts 
either by confirming that truth is in an eternal world, or is there in experience alone, or it is 
immanent in his feeling and faith. For Cassirer, all these moments are unable to restore man 
back from his alienation, but it is the historical moment where there was integration 
between sensuous and symbolic. Man could variously represent the material in the light of 
different forms. In this moment when the contents of experience formed through 
constructive meanings, man is no longer alienated. This clue led me to define 
epistemological alienation as follows: 
The consciousness moment when the spirit is captured by the belief that there is something 
that remains isolated and cannot reach a level where the spirit can recognize it. It is when 
the object remains unseen tmtil spirit .gives .it a. meaning. This apprehension is what 
distinguished primitive Man, whose mind worked under the substantial thought, where he 
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considered that both symbol and thing refer to the same object. It took thousands of years 
for Man to transcend that particular moment of consciousness to realize there is a difference 
between the symbol and the thing. At this historical moment of consciousness, Man could 
restore his freedom to construct his own universe not in respect of the limited given but in 
respect of the richness of constructive meanings created by thought. 
Man's outstanding characteristic, his distinguishing mark, is not his metaphysical or physical nature- but 
his work. It is this work, it is the system of human activities, which defines and determines the circle of 
"humanity". Language, myth, religion, art, science, history are the constituents, the various sectors of this 
circle. A "Philosophy of man" would therefore be a philosophy which would give us insight into the 
fundamental structure of each of these human activities, and which at the same time would enable us to 
understand them as an organic whole. Language, art, myth, religion are no isolated, random creations. 
They are held together by a common bond. But this bond is not a vinculum substantiate, as it was 
conceived and described in scholastic thought; it is rather a vinculum functionale. (Cassirer, 1944: 
68). 
Cassirer's aim to establish a philosophy of Man was to show that Man recognises himself 
through his intellectual and form- creating process that takes him away from the flux of 
life: 
Man can do no more than to build up his own universe- a symbolic universe that enables him to 
understand and interpret, to articulate and organize, to synthesize and universalize his human experience. 
(Cassirer.1954:221) 
Lets us discuss how Cassirer made use of this philosophical understanding to apply it to 
perception. This concern will be our main concern in the next chapter. 
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3-1 Introduction 
The main concern of this chapter is to analyze Cassirer's view on perception and the 
developments took place in his theory of perception. Our main claim here is to show that 
Cassirer's account of perception was developed through three stages. The first stage was 
perception as presented in (1923) where perception was an application of Functional-
Relational thought. The second stage was perception as an application of Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms (1923 - 1929). And finally, perception is as an application of group theory 
(1944). In these three stages, Cassirer presented his view of perception in respect to the 
main issue occupied his thought in each stage. In these three stages, Cassirer used different 
terms to point out to the constant element that makes perceptual judgment is possible. This 
constant element presupposed in every perceptual experience and Cassirer used it 
chronically in (191 0) he used "function", "Non-intuitional meaning" in ( 1923-1929) and 
finally "invariant" in (1944). These terms are various but imply the same function and are 
were consistently related to each other. 
3-2 Cassirer's Two Accounts of Perception 
We are going here to discuss two different accounts discussed by Cassirer, symbolic and 
logical accounts. We will begin with the symbolic explanation of perception as discussed in 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Then we will discuss the logical account later. But I would 
like to begin with that assumption that, the attempt to understand these two accounts return 
back to the orders of the mind and its ability to organize and to unify the chaotic elements 
of perceptual experience. Therefore we can see that the assumption based on the idea that 
our reason constructs its objects in respect to structural meanings. Cassirer confirms the 
structural synthesis that takes place in our cognitive processes. As a result, what I mean by 
·structural synthesis is a synonym to Cassirer's own expression "creative process". Iri · 
Cassirer's words he says: 
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We seek not a unity of effects but a unity of action, not a unity of products but a unity of the creative 
process. (Cassirer, 1944: 70). 
What Cassirer calls creative unity, as we will see later, is nothing more than a dynamic 
process of the mind to constructs perceptual experience and fits its elements into new 
forms. Cassirer also ascribes this dynamic process and its function to the symbol- concept. 
I will try to show that perception is considered, along with myth, language and science, a 
step through it, the mind seeks to give them symbolic meanings and hence brings unity to 
these disciplines. According to Cassirer, there are three basic meanings and functions, by 
them mind can construct its realms. These three meanings are the follows; expression, 
representation and significance and their functions are; "expressive" function 
(Ausdrucksfunktion) for the realm of myth and the arts, "representative" function or 
"intuitional" function (Darstellungsfunktion) for the realms of language and perception, and 
"conceptual" function (Bedeutungsfunktion) for the realm of science and pure thought. We 
must pay attention to all these functions in which we have the respective worlds of myth, 
art, common sense and science. Let us discuss Cassirer's view on perception from the 
respective of symbolic philosophy. 
3-2-1 Cassirer and the Symbolic Account of Perception 
To grasp a significant understanding of the symbolic account of perception, it is better to 
mention the various different meanings of "symbolic form" or "meaning" as used by 
Cassirer. Cassirer uses the term "symbol" in three ways. He uses "symbol" to refer to the 
ideal meaning that organizes the particulars in the experience. Secondly, to refer to the 
various worlds of culture that includes myth, art, religion, language, common sense and 
science. Thirdly, he uses "symbol" to refer to space, time, cause and number as particular 
scientific concepts. Although these three meanings have implications within Cassirer's 
- -philosophical system, I find myself obliged- to set aside all these explanations and adopt a 
different meaning which I hope will help in explaining Cassirer's views. The symbolic 
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form is a rule or a principle which indicates the inner and organic connections between the 
particulars that it represents and at the same time the constitutive law which organizes the 
relationships among them and gives them a unitary form. This meaning can be seen in 
Cassirer in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms where he says: 
The symbol contains nothing but the principle of the forms it represents, the constitutive law of their 
structure, the genetic essence of their formations. It thus refers, not to the similarity of the forms, but to 
their inner connective law, which may or may not express itself in similarities ofform.(Cassirer, 1955: 
88). 
The reason to confirm that meaning was its logical use where we can apply it to the chaotic 
world of experience to find out the structural aspect of perceptual experience. I claim that 
the meaning of form as presented here is important because it bridges Cassirer's two 
accounts of perception discussed in 1923-1929 and 1944. Because that meaning of form 
used here implies the same application as it is shown in Cassirer' s account of 1944. 
It is necessary to ask what is the relationship between "self' and "world"? It seems by 
raising that question that we open a door to examine metaphysical claims regarding that 
issue, however we will limit ourselves not to go beyond the circle of epistemology. We 
argue that the philosophy of symbolic forms does not intend to set up an account of the 
essence and the properties of the external objects. Instead it seeks to find out all possible 
connections between the self and experience. It aims to trace the constructive aspects of 
objects and the way these objects are formed. 
Therefore we should discuss three modalities or senses that form our consciousness of the 
realms of culture. Cassirer insists, throughout his analysis presented in 1953 Philosophy of 
Symbolic Forms volume one, that any object perceived, can always be distinguished from 
three different types of modalities; ways of perceiving objects, which are "expression, 
intuition and concept". In other words any object perceived must be determined and 
comprehended in the light of these three modal forms. For example, 
1- If the perceived object is determined by the emotive interests of men, it will make,an 
"expressive sense" ofthe object "sensation". 
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2- If the perceived object is determined by the teleological interests of men, it will make 
"intuitional" or "thing-perceptual sense" "perception". 
3- If the perceived object is determined by the theoretical interests of men, it will make 
"conceptual or scientific sense". 
These three modalities are moments of the consciousness which are not randomly added to 
our consciousness but are three basic moments required for consciousness. These moments 
are hierarchically arranged. Therefore our reason, to grasp knowledge about the external 
objects we perceive, had to pass through those three moments. According to that pyramidal 
order of consciousness, the first moment cannot ascend to the second moment unless we 
change or adopt different perspective or modality, as we will explain. This simply means 
that the second moment of our consciousness includes the first moment and 
correspondingly the last moment includes both the first and the second moments. I mean 
that the conceptual moment includes both the expressive and intuitional moments. 
Therefore, according to Cassirer, the end point of the reason to reach how the symbolic 
experience is constituted under: 
From the sphere of sensation to that of perception, from perception to conceptual thinking, and from that 
again to logical judgement there leads, for critical epistemology, one steady road. Each later moment 
comprises the earlier, each earlier prepares the later. All the elements constituting cognition refer both to 
themselves and the "object". Sensation, perception, are in germ already comprehension, judgement and 
conclusion. (Cassirer, 1955:274 from Hartman, 1949: 313). 
Let us discuss one of the important concepts used by Cassirer in his view of perception 
based on his analysis of symbolic forms. 
3-2-2 Perception and the Notion of Symbolic Pregnance 
The idea of symbolic pregnance has a role to play in Cassirer's philosophical system and his 
account of perception as developed in the light of philosophy of symbolic forms. I claim 
that Cassirer uses the idea of "symbolischer Pragnanz" to emphasis the structural aspect of 
his philosophy as discussed in Chapter Two. Cassirer used that idea to confirm that 
perceived objects include structural meanings in respect of which we can form the sensuous 
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elements and give them an structural order. In every experience what makes the given 
reasonable is the ideal meaning that provides the elements of experience with their unity 
and coherence. Cassirer uses the term ideal meaning to point out also to the orders that 
presupposed in every perceptual experience. Any act of perception involves meaning or 
rule by which we develop our comprehension of the parts of experience and give them their 
unity. 
Cassirer's view of perception involves a symbolic character by which any perceived object 
is not only considered as pure sense datum, but is also a symbol which stands for meanings 
and references that themselves are not objects of sensuous experience. Here Cassirer sought 
to explain that in any perceptual experience there are two elements that are implied; 
sensuous elements and non-physical element that is presupposed and given a priori to 
experience. For Cassirer, our perceptions include two aspects, a constant or static aspect, 
that is the content of the perception and a dynamic aspect that is the form. In every 
perceptual experience that content remains constant, but it is the form that is flexible and 
dynamic. The form has the capacity to reform the content of experience and arranges its 
elements differently. Every time the form changes, the content of experience acquires new 
meaning; that meaning is generated with the form itself. 
An example is that sometimes we perceive the object as a form and sometimes as a 
background depending on the meaning in which we construct the object perceived, as it 
was explained by the Gestalt psychology as we will discuss in the next chapter. In other 
words, in perception the elements of any perceptual experience do not have independent 
characteristics, but these elements can rearranged in different forms and acquire new 
meanings. In every perceptual experience we ascribe a structure to the perceived object, 
new meaning is being born within that structure, and that meaning is the function which 
gives the object its constructive unity. Therefore we can notice that in every object we 
perceive these two elements; sensuous and ideal meaning, are two conditions for the 
possibility of experience. The problem, between particular and the universal is not only 
discussed within exact science but also discussed within the symbolic forms of culture. 
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Cassirer's main theme was that in every realm of culture there is a constructive activity that 
aims to bring unity and order to those realms by supposing comprehensive meanings. 
Cassirer was trying to represent his view of perception using these terms and understanding 
as he applied them to forms of Culture forms. He was concerned to explain that in 
perception, we are no longer concerned with properties as things unchanged, but rather it is 
the meanings that form our view of perception. As we shall soon notice every perceived 
object includes meaning, by virtue of which, its properties will be ordered and arranged 
under that meaning. To make it easier for the sake of understanding, I will discuss the 
problem of language as a model of how Cassirer applies his understanding to language 
which explains how this account can be applied also to perception. The reason for me to 
choose language lies in the fact that both language and common sense, according to 
Cassirer, share the intuitional modality of our thought: 
And yet, fundamentally, language as such does not reach beyond the sphere of intuition. It singles out and 
fixates certain basic factors in intuition, but it does not transcend them. To be sure, "red" or "blue" no 
longer possesses any correlate directly corresponding to it in the world of sensory impression; 
nevertheless, there are infinite number of color impressions which concretely fulfill the meaning of red 
and blue, which can be disclosed as special "cases" of what the universal name signifies. 
(Cassirer, 1957: 427). 
In Chapter VI from his third volume of philosophy of symbolic forms Cassirer argues that 
acquired different meanings during its development. In every stage of the development of 
language, language acquires an ideal meaning that determines its functions and the roles it 
plays during this stage. Language is important for perception because what we perceive is 
usually represented by language. He argued that the method of language proceeds from the 
whole of meaning, as gestalt, to the sentences and words as elements- the parts being 
understood through the whole. (Cassirer, 1955: 119). Let us begin with this question, what 
is the symbolic aspect of language? Whether or not it possible, in the realm of language, to 
conceive the sensory material aspect apart and distinct from the formal or structural aspect? 
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Language has its significance and importance in our consciousness because it is an 
instrument and a means for exchanging thoughts, feelings and desires. Moreover, it is also 
the first step to recognize the world outside us. Language is used among us in our daily 
dialogue. It is also used as an important instrument for different sciences to express their 
facts, concepts and laws. I mean that, language has two standards of understanding; 
language as an instrument for other sciences and language as a conception in itself dealing 
with its own problems and concepts. Therefore Cassirer argues that language can be 
divided into three levels of understanding. This comprehension led him a step forward 
toward establishing a critical view of the real function of language, dealing with these three 
levels of development. For him "the function of language is not to copy reality but to 
symbolize it". I mean that language in its development no longer refers to things but it uses 
symbols to refer to objects. 
In its first stage of development, language was used to refer to particular thing in reality 
where every particular thing has its own word that distinguishes it from other things and the 
only function of language in this early stage was to distinguishing things from each other 
by ascribing to each thing a certain word. But in the later development of language, the 
structure and the function of language changed where its task is now not to point to the 
things of the reality, but rather to symbolize them and signify them by using signs and 
symbols even though we do not directly perceive the thing or it ceases to be perceived but it 
still has a sign distinguishing it from other things. Language has shifted from the realm of 
things to that of meanings as we shall see that language in its development developed from 
copy to symbol (Cassirer, 1955: 132 quoted from Urban, 1949: 416). According to 
Cassirer, language has gone through three stages of development: 
In general, language can be shown to have passed through three stages in maturing to its specific form, in 
achieving its inner freedom. In calling these mimetic, the analogical, and the truly symbolical stage, we 
are for the present merely setting up an abstract schema-but this schema will take a concrete content when 
we see that it represents a functional law of linguistic growth, which has its specific and characteristic 
counterpart in other fields such as art and cognition. (Cassirer, 1953: 190). 
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1- The first stage or level is a copy or mimetic level where the word is used to refer to a 
particular thing. When I use a word I point out to that particular thing and hen I refer to that 
particular thing I use a particular word for that. At this primitive stage consciousness 
unifies the word and the thing, where there is no difference is use between a word and the 
thing. At this level of development the modality of expression expresses the mythical and 
religious thought as expressed by language. At this stage, the role of language was to 
represent the mythical beliefs and religious rituals. Therefore language was an instrument 
to pointing out to these primitive beliefs based on things and their holy sprits. 
Myth and language are inseparable and mutually condition each other. Word and name magic are, like 
image, an integral part of the magical world view. But in all this the basic presupposition is that word and 
name do not merely have a function of describing or portraying but contain within them the object and its 
real powers. Word and name do not designate and signify, they are and act. In the mere sensuous matter 
of language, in the mere sound of the human voice, there resides a peculiar power over things. Primitive 
people "exorcise" threatening events and catastrophe, seek to avert eclipses, storms, etc. by song and loud 
outcry and noise-making. But the mythical- magical power of language is truly manifested in articulated 
sound. The formed word is itself restricted and individual: each word governs a specific realm of being, 
over which it may be said to exert unlimited and sovereign power. And it is the most of all the proper 
name that is bound by mysterious ties to the individuality of an essence. (Cassirer, 1955: 40). 
2- The second stage is the sensuous or analogical stage in which a separation takes place 
between words or verbal signs and the things to which they refer. Sometimes Cassirer calls 
this stage the imitation stage. In this stage, language still uses words to refer to objects, 
however it is not necessary that the word used will refer to an immediate object, but in this 
stage, a word can represent an object without need to its actual and immediate presence. 
Like in abstracted word, like a lion for example, we do not need its real presence to know 
what it is, but it is just sufficient to use a word lion to represent the object. In the mimetic 
stage, to get scared it is not sufficient to use the word lion only but you need the immediate 
presence of the lion. But in the analogical stage, you can only utter the word lion in front of 
a baby to get scared. The difference between these two levels of understanding language is 
that both_ofthese two levels presuppose ameaningthat organizesour perceptual experience 
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differently. Cassirer confirms that in the imitation stage, language although went beyond 
the direct presence of objects, but still did not go beyond the limits of things: 
In imitation the I remains a prisoner of outward impression, excluding all spontaneity of its own, the 
more fully the aim of imitation has been realized. The richest and most highly differentiated sign 
languages, those ofthe primitive peoples, show the strongest bond with outward impression. Along with 
the immediately impression sensuous, imitative signs, the sign languages of civilized peoples tend to 
include an abundance of so-called "symbolic gestures," which do not directly mimic the object or 
activity to be expressed, but designate it only indirectly. However, such language- for example that of the 
Cistercian monks or the Neapolitan sign language described in detail by Jorio are obviously not primitive 
forms but highly complex constructions strongly influenced by the spoken language. But as we go back to 
the true and independent content of the sign language, mere "concept signs" seem to give way to "things 
signs". (Cassirer, 1955: 182). 
3- The third stage is the symbolic stage where our consciousness grasps and creates a 
meaning to the words. In this stage language reaches its peak of development when it can 
find out the relations between linguistic contexts and give them meaning by virtue of which 
we can symbolize our reality not just copy it as a mere datum of things and sensations. 
According to Cassirer, consciousness transcends what is given in experience, it no longer 
needs the real existence of things but uses symbols and ideal meanings to refer to them. 
This creates the objective aspect of language where the main concern of our consciousness 
is not to use words referring to things or entities and their substantial attributes, but rather 
to construct a system of relations and meanings that provide language with its richness. 
Having this symbolic meaning, which is the ultimate target for all cultural realms, language 
reaches its final stage of development. In this stage language is a part of the objective world 
or spiritual world as Cassirer sometimes calls it in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. As 
when science uses pure concepts to express its facts. All scientific concepts use the ideal or 
symbolic meanings not to refer to an individual but to refer to a relation. Like the concept 
of number it does not refer to a particular thing or it does not refer to a group of things 
having similar quantities but rather it refers to a relation that a member occupies in a 
numerical series where its value differs in respect ofthe order of the series.~· · 
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All these phenomena, to which we might easily add others of like nature, make it evident that even where 
language starts as purely imitative or "analogical" expression, it constantly strives to extend and finally to 
surpass its limits. It makes a virtue of necessity, that is, of the ambiguity inevitable in the linguistic sign. 
For this very ambiguity will not permit the sign to remain a mere individual sign; it compels the spirit to 
take the decisive step from the concrete function of designation" to the universal and universally valid 
function of signification." In this function language casts off, as it were, the sensuous covering in which it 
has hitherto appeared: mimetic or analogical expression gives way to purely symbolic expression which 
precisely in and by virtue of its otherness, becomes the vehicle of a new and deeper spiritual content. 
(Cassirer, 1955: 197). 
These three stages and levels of meanings are not distinct. Rather they are logically 
connected to each other in one chain. Every symbolic function includes within it the three 
meanings of expression, intuition and symbol. This understanding led us to an answer of 
the earlier question that the sensuous moment is inseparable from structure moment but 
the latter is generated and to be given to the former. It is important now to discuss 
another example that shows Cassirer's view on perception as he raised it in his 
Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. Our aim will be reveal the constructive aspect of 
perception in Cassirer's view of symbolic forms. Therefore our reference point to 
understand perception will be established on the claim that our consciousness is always 
presenting meanings which are considered references to sensuous elements in respect of 
these references perceived objects is constructed. Now I will choose the concept of space 
and see how Cassirer thought about it from his symbolic account. 
3-2-3 Perceptual Space and Symbolic Function 
According to Cassirer, space presupposes the same levels implied in language in the sense 
that both space and language develop from a primitive stage of consciousness upward to the 
symbolic stage. Therefore we can see that space derives its way to consciousness from the 
mythical stage where the primitive people used their body organs to refer to spatial 
·determinations: In this stage, every spatial determination depended on the things existing in 
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the world and the individuals bodies. For Cassirer, the primitive mind and its mode of space 
experience can be grasped from the language, rituals and arts they created. The primitive 
mind developed the experience of space from his way of living and his own rituals. 
Therefore, there was an unavoidable relation between spatial determinations and the bodily 
signs as Cassirer indicated when he discussed the emotive-expressive space. One can use 
his hands to refer to space. For example, if he opens his hands widely, then he refers to a 
big and wide space. From that understanding of how man can use his body to refer to 
spatial determination, Cassirer studied the simple forms of space that were produced by the 
primitive mind. He showed how spatial determinations are based on the organs ofthe body. 
For Cassirer, bodily organs were the reference point to the primitive people which form 
their experience of space. Cassirer showed how our prepositional concepts concerning 
space based on the parts of human body. He tried to give example from different cultures 
that prove that determination of space based on emotive and expressive function. He 
indicated that in the primitive mind there is tied relation between his language and his view 
of space because both emerged from the existence of physical things as they are in 
themselves: 
The mandingan languages express our prepositional concepts in "a very material way": behind is 
expressed by an independent substantive meaning "back" or "rear end," "in front of' by a word meaning 
"eye," while "on" is designated by "neck" and "in" by "belly," etc. African languages and in the South 
Sea languages, such words as "face" and "back" "head" and "mouth" "lion" and "hip" perform the same 
function. (Cassirer, 1953: 207). 
Cassirer shows the similar levels of construction between language and space in their 
emotive-expressive mode and how in this early stage of their development they depended 
on the parts of human body as a means to allow man to construct his language system and 
his experience of spatial determinations. Cassirer investigated the issue of how ritual 
thought of primitive people led them to space experience. According to the primitive mind, 
spatial determination such as right, left, above and below imply mythical values and 
C-mythica:I significance. There ar~ different classifications of the world depending on the 
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ritual and religious belief of the primitive mind. Cassirer indicated when he discussed the 
religious belief of totems and how the spatial determinations are drawn in the light of 
totem ism: 
In the mythical-sociological world view of the Zunis, for example, which Cushing has described in detail, 
the sevenfold form of the totemic organization, which runs through the whole world, is particularly 
reflected in the conception of space. Space as a whole is divided into seven zones, north and south, east 
and west, the upper and the lower world, and finally the center of the world; and every reality occupies its 
unequivocal position, its definitely prescribed place, within this general classification. The elements of 
nature, the physical substances as well as the separate phases of the world process, are differentiated 
accordingly. To the north belongs the air, to the south fire, to the east earth, to the west water; the north is 
the home of winter, the south of summer, the east of autumn, the west of spring; etc. and the various 
human classes, occupations, and institutions enter into the same basic schema: war and warriors belong to 
the north, the hunt and the hunter to the west, medicine and agriculture to the south, magic and religion 
to the east. (Cassirer, 1955: 88-87). 
According to Cassirer, the mythical world view starts from the sphere of sensuous-spatial 
existence. Cassirer explained that the mythical consciousness of space implies an idea of 
whole or universal scheme in the light of it, the primitive mind organizes the world in the 
image and organization of human body. The objective world becomes intelligible to the 
mythical consciousness and hence divides the world into determinate spheres of existence 
when only it is analogically copied" in terms of human body. Cassirer gives an example to 
show not only the objective world but also the whole cosmology was shaped in respect to 
the human body: 
The world is the Purusha, for it arose when the gods offered him up as a sacrifice and brought forth the 
various creatures from the parts of his body, which was dismembered in accordance with the laws of 
sacrifice. Thus the parts of the world are nothing other than the organs of the human body. The Brahmin 
was his mouth, his arms were made the Rajanya (warrior), his two thighs the Vaisya (trader and 
agriculturist), from his feet the Sudra (servile Class) was born. The moon was born from his spirit 
(manas), from his eye was born the sun, from his mouth Indra and Agni, from his breath Vayu (wind) was 
born. (Cassirer, 1955: 90-91). 
Jviythical thinking, regarding cosmic space, is based on the view that there is an 
unbreakable relation between what a thing is and the place in which it is situated. For 
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primitive mind place is itself a part of the thing's being. Space and all its determinations 
are grounded in a primary identity of nature and its objects. To sum up, mythical space can 
be grasped from that relation between man and his physical and organic parts of his body. 
In mythical space there is no distinction between position and content. With the differences 
between mythical space from one side and perceptual and geometrical space, magical space 
started from the fact that space is experienced as being on the level of an emotive-
expressively experienced world. 
The question now, how our consciousness can go beyond the mythical aspect of space and 
resume its trip to reach to the second stage of space development that is called the 
intuitional space or perceptual space. 
Space of sense perception occupies a kind of middle position between mythical space and 
space of pure cognition that is geometry. It is clear that space of perception does not match 
with space of pure mathematics and the determinations of mathematical space do not 
follow simply from those of sensory space. Space of sense perception involves, as Cassirer 
claims, the intuitional level of symbolic representation. Cassirer explained the intuitional 
mode of the space of sense perception in the third volume of his Philosophy of Symbolic 
Forms. Cassirer's main theme was that in perception, we do not perceive things as 
something permanent, but as changing images depending on the condition of perception. In 
perception, things lose their sensuous contents and became just signs. In other words, as 
Cassirer explains, the phenomenon that we perceive loses its independence and self-
sufficiency and its individual concretion as soon it functions as a sign for a thing. Similar to 
the linguistic sign, we no longer are concerned with its tone or its sound, however, we are 
more concerned with the meaning we capture. We do not experience things in space as 
they immediately give themselves to us but place themselves in certain contexts through 
which they gain their characteristics. The space of sense perception is considered to be as 
the framework in which things have to be realized as an acquisition rather than given. This 
only can take place when a representative value is attributed to our perception. It is not the 
matter of representing all the objects as independent entities, but it is a selective-process by 
which one object is selected to represent the same similar objects. Cassirer refers to 
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William James's view on the idea of selection as an essential condition for the development 
of the idea of space. Cassirer quotes James's The Principle of Psychology to stress the point 
of selection: 
We have native and fixed optical space-sensations; but experience leads us to select certain ones from 
among them to be the exclusive bearers of reality: the rest become mere signs and suggesters of these. 
(James, 1890:237 Quoted from Cassirer, 1957:155). 
Cassirer was convinced with James's idea of selection as a way of determining the 
objects without needing their physical presence, and Cassirer added to that view that in 
perception what gives perceptual experience its significance not the immediate presence 
of the things, but rather the structures that make experience plausible. It is the signs that 
give perceptual experience its importance not the immediate objects. 
In all our perceptions such a selection takes place: in all of them we pick out certain formations which, we 
say, represent the real form of the object, while we regard others as only peripheral or more or less 
accidental manifestations of this object. The shifts and distortions of perspective which the image of an 
object undergoes under certain conditions of vision are in this way corrected. The seeing of an image thus 
always comprises a definite evaluation of it: we do not see it as it immediately gives itself to us but place 
it in the context of the total spatial experience and thus give it its characteristic meaning. (Cassirer, 
1957: 155-156). 
Space of sense perception is about these ideal or symbolic meanings that we gain when we 
perceive spatial objects. The works of the Gestaltists have given much attention to that 
issue. Cassirer considered their works as confirming his view that all the various of spatial 
determinations of depth, distance, form, size and position as they take place on the most 
immediate level of perceptual experience turn out as conditioned by the signs they give. 
they are as representative functions of the sort which characterize all other forms of 
symbolization. Cassirer went further by claiming that the meanings that we grasp when we 
perceive an object in space depend on the perspective in respect of which we perceive the 
object. When the perspective is changed or transformed a new meaning will be ascribed to 
the object and gives it its own characterization. Cassirer discussed differer1t experiments~~ 
regarding the transformations that take place when we perceive an object in spatial 
90 
Chapter Three: Cassirer and Gestalt toward a New Account of Perception 
experience. Cassirer presented Hornbostel's experiments on perceptual space as will be 
explained in Chapter Six. Cassirer indicated that if we perceive an object in space and some 
changes take place regarding the conditions of perceptual experience, then new 
representations of the same object will be perceived due to the changes happened in our 
perceptual perspective. In his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer argues that the new 
structure in which the perceived object has been re-formed implies function as representing 
the parts of the object. The perceived object is not a mere impression but a function as 
representation, it is no longer given in a passive way, but it is symbolically constructed. 
(Cassirer, 1957: 156). 
Cassirer later discussed the idea of invariance as implied in both the pure space of geometry 
and the intuitional space of sense perception. It is not the concern of things as they are in 
real and their independent characteristics, rather the apparent things as we perceive them in 
spatial experience under certain conditions. Therefore, the different perspectives which one 
use to represent an object in space, will allow us to represent sensory objects by ascribing 
different spatial properties on the intuitional level of symbolization. Cassirer admits that 
there is a difference between the space of sense perception and the space of abstract 
geometrical space. However, these two spaces have a common factor that is a definite mode 
and direction of constant-formation. Cassirer was influenced by Klein and his view of 
geometry as we shall discuss in the next chapter. Both perceptual space and geometrical 
space presuppose an invariant element that remains unchanged if the functions or the 
conditions determine them are not changed. Therefore Cassirer presupposed that the space 
of sense experience is like geometrical space in that it implies an invariant factor that 
remains unchanged during the transformations taking place due to the changes in the 
situation. When these kinds of changes happen, the objects we perceive in space acquire an 
intuitive meaning: 
For this space, too, comes into being only when a multiplicity of phenomena, of particular optical images, 
are composed into groups and these groups are taken as representations of one and the same object. From 
this moment on the changillg phenomena only form a periphery;and_every part of this periphery sends _ 
out points, as it were, which guide our sight in a definite direction, which lead it back over and over again 
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to the same thing as a center. And here too- though not to the same extent as in the building of purely 
geometrical, symbolic space- it is possible to situate these centers differently. The point of reference itself 
can be shifted; the mode of relation can be changed; and whenever such a change takes place, the 
phenomenon takes on not only a different abstract signification but also a different concrete-intuitive 
meaning. (Cassirer, 1957: 157 -158). 
The vanous spatial forms as they occur on the most immediate level of perceptual 
experience turn out to be signs or representative functions of the kind that characterize all 
other forms of symbolization. 
To sum up, Cassirer argued that the space of sense-perception has to be realized as a 
constructive process of transformation under certain invariants rather than a given. It comes 
about when a representative value is attributed to our perceptions. When we perceive an 
object in the space of sense-perception, it can be perceived variously in respect to the point 
of reference we choose and around it the spatial orientation may proceed. Every point of 
reference has a meaning that is attributed to the spatial form we perceive and is changeable 
given a different point of reference. Let us now discuss in brief the symbolic representation 
of the pure and conceptual space of geometry. 
Cassirer also argued that pure geometrical space implies an ideal or symbolic form that 
characterizes it. In geometrical space we construct space theoretically on axiomatic rules, 
where space can be constructed variously depending on the geometrical system we adjust. 
Geometrical space can be constructed either in two or three dimensions, also it can be 
constructed using Euclidean or non-Euclidean geometry. In the light of pure theoretical 
space, it seems that pure thought reached its peak by having its characteristic function that 
takes it away from magic and sensory space. Although geometrical systems formulate 
possible orders by which the actual may be ordered, the decision is left to experience to 
decide in which possible order the actual will be submitted. 
The concepts of space, time and number furnish the actual structural elements of objective experience as 
-,-they build themselves up in language. But they can fulfil this task only because, according to their total 
structure, they keep it an ideal medium, precisely because while they keep to the form of sensuous 
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experience, they progressively fill the sensuous with ideal content and make it the symbol of the spiritual. 
(Cassirer, 1955:208 quoted from Urban, 1949: 418). 
Cassirer used the theoretical framework of geometrical knowledge to support his claim 
about the ideal meanings implied in experience. To that extent we can see the connection 
between Substance and Function from one side and the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms as a 
general way to investigate the structural aspects of experience from another side. Cassirer 
sought in these two enterprises a way to show how perception is understandable from a 
structural perspective. Both Substance and Function and Philosophy of Symbolic Forms 
confirmed that it is the function that logically precedes the elements and group them and 
also it is the symbol that precedes the given and provides it with meaning. Confirming the 
structuralism of perception is a genuine contribution of Cassirer's epistemological 
enterprise. 
In his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer's aim was to identify the symbolic meanings 
that represent the different aspects of cultural worlds. The type of this representation as we 
have seen may be of an immediate nature as in the case of the expressive-magical space of 
myth. It may be of an intuitional -practical nature, as in the case of the natural world view. 
Or finally, it may be of a rule determined nature as in geometrical space. Let us now 
discuss the second account of Cassirer on perception and examine his structural view on 
perception as he applied it to perception. 
3-3 Cassirer and the Logical Account of Perception 
We will try here to give an account of Cassirer's views on perception depending on his 
analysis presented in Substance and Function. The main themes are; what is the nature of 
perceived object, is it a simple aggregation of impressions, or an outcome of a structural 
process through which mind constructs the object? In addition, there was another theme 
implied in his Substance and Function that perception is a view on the whole and any 
-reference to- the whole always requires- a pecuiiar functi~n- that is not deduced from 
93 
Chapter Three: Cassirer and Gestalt toward a New Account of Perception 
sensation but presupposed. Cassirer rejected the v1ew that object is given to us m 
experience, which is why he opposed the Associationists. If we considered that his 
Substance and Function was an epistemological enterprise that aimed to introduce a new 
understanding of knowledge based on a new logical base called Functional-Relational 
thought, then it will be our task to investigate how a theory of perception could be 
formulated in respect of that thought. Cassirer started his view on perception by criticizing 
Aristotle and empiricists by arguing that there is a priority of relations over sense data of 
perception: 
The category of relation especially is forced into a dependent and subordinate position by this 
fundamental metaphysical doctrine of Aristotle. Relation is not independent of the concept of real being; 
it can only add supplementary and external modifications to the latter, such as do not affect its real 
"nature". In this way the characteristic feature, which has remained in spite of all the manifold 
transformations it has undergone. The fundamental categorical relation of the thing to its properties 
remains henceforth the guiding point of view; while relational determinations are only considered in so 
far as they can be transformed, by some sort of mediation, into properties of a subject or of a plurality of 
subjects. (Cassirer, 1923: 6). 
In fact Cassirer refused the Aristotelian concept of "relation" which presupposes a 
reference to the existence of the objects. Cassirer characterizes Aristotelian logic and the 
empiricists as their views based on "substantial thought" as we pointed out previously. 
Cassirer argued that both Aristotelian and empiricism had the same approach of explanation 
where both approaches refer to the objects and their characteristics not to relations that are 
presupposed to classify the objects. The only difference that Cassirer found between 
Aristotelian views and empiricism was that there was a transformation that took place 
instead of studying the external world and its objects; the concern of empiricism was the 
internal world of consciousness and the representation of the external world. 
Cassirer extended his criticism to include the empiricists such as Locke, Berkeley, Hume 
and Mill. Cassirer rejected empiricism where the thought is concerned with the collection 
of the properties and gathering them under one general object, as in the case of the gold 
object - - - . -
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The "psychology of abstraction," according to this view, furnishes the real key to the logical meaning of 
every form of concept. This meaning is derived from the simple capacity of reproducing any given 
content of presentation. Abstract objects arise in every perceiving being in whom like determinations of 
the perceived have been given in repeated presentations. For these determinations are not confined to the 
particular moment of perception, but leave behind them certain traces of their existence in the psycho-
physical subject. Since these traces, which must be thought of as unconscious during the time between the 
real perception and the recall, are again aroused by newly occurring stimuli of a similar sort, a firm 
connection is gradually formed between the similar elements of successive perception. (Cassirer, 1923: 
10-11). 
I explained in Chapter Two that, Cassirer opposed any attempt to ascribe any form of 
constancy to the sense data. He indicated to the close relation between the Aristotelian view 
and empiricism of perception: 
The difference between the ontological and psychological views is merely that the "things" of 
scholasticism were the begins copied in thought, while here the objects are meant to be nothing more than 
the contents of perception. (Cassirer, 1923: 10-11 ). 
He also explained the substantial foundation of the empiricists like Locke and Hume 
regarding perception: 
In this polemic against the concept of substance, Locke believes he has struck the real kernel of all 
metaphysics and all scholastic explanation of reality. And after Hume has transferred its result from outer 
to inner experience, the work of criticism seems ended. The substance of the ego seems now explained 
away like the substance of the thing; mere associative connections of presentations take the place of both. 
In spite of all this, the view of physical and psychical reality, that is constructed on these foundations, has 
in it the general category of substantiality in its decisive meanings. Only the applications of this category 
have been changed, while it itself retains its old rank and position unnoticed. The substantiality of the 
"soul" is only apparently done away with; for it lives on in the substantiality of the sensuous 
"impression". After, as before, the conviction prevails, that only that is truly real" and the ground of the 
real, which stands for itself alone and is intelligible purely of itself as an isolated existence. (Cassirer, 
1923: 331). 
Cassirer applied Functional- Relational thought to perception to support his claim that the 
·~~~ns.uous_ elements of any perceived· object are not simply aggregated and·~cnaoficalfy 
combined together without order or reference. Rather, the sensuous elements are ordered in 
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respect of various possible forms and hence phenomenologically represent them differently. 
According to the Functional- Relational view, the peculiar feature of perception is that 
perception is no longer a theory of independent and unchangeable qualities that its 
combination represents one particular and definite object. Rather, perception, in respect of 
Functional-Relational thought becomes an account of representing the parts of the 
perceptual situation differently depending on the form within which mind reconstructs the 
perceptual situation and fits the elements in a new order of arrangement. 
Therefore, we can say that the structural aspect of perception, as discussed on the basis of 
functional thought can be shown in the organization and the arrangement of the elements of 
perceived objects. The relationships between the parts of perceptual situation are 
changeable when the form of arrangement changes. Therefore the representation of an 
object in a perceptual situation can be reformed differently when; 
1- There is a shift in a point of reference. 
2- The mode of relation can be changed. 
It is not the issue that are perceived object is determined as having independent 
characteristics that remain unchanged even when the conditions of perceptual situation 
change. But it is the structures that provide the object with new forms of arranging and 
hence new characteristics will emerge and perceived. Cassirer affirms that meaning by 
referring to the Gestaltists as an answer to the question of how an object can be represented 
differently when we change our point of reference. To show what happens, he uses the 
phenomenon of "optical inversions" when a shift in our point of reference takes place, 
another object can be represented and perceived 
One and the same optical complex can be transformed now into this, now into the spatial object, can be 
"seen" as this or as another object. Such inversions are neither errors of judgment nor mere ideas, but 
genuine perceptive experiences. (Cassirer, 1957: 158). 
Cassirer's account of perception shows that perception no longer deals with objects as 
·given, rather with structure where the objects--and its characteristics are generated through 
the whole system. In fact, Cassirer's view on perception based on functional thought where 
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stress is given to "structure" that presupposes the form of arrangement and it is not a sign of 
what is "given" in experience. 
This logical account of perception sets itself up on the assumption that there is a tension 
between psychology and epistemology. If Functional-Relational thought is applied to 
modern scientific theories, then Cassirer also sought to apply it to psychology. In doing 
that, Cassirer transcended the traditional explanations given to the facts of psychology. 
Cassirer brought psychology to the wide circle of epistemology by examining perception, 
as an example, applying functional-relational thought as a new approach to deal with 
perception. Cassirer calls psychology that uses the functional-relational approach as 
"psychology of thought" as he stated it in his Function and Substance. Cassirer sought to 
make psychology a cognitive discipline concerned not with the facts of sensuous perception 
but as an example to discover the complex and constructive processes of conceptual 
understanding in their fundamental features. Psychology is not a study of sense data given 
to individuals in perceptual experience; rather it is a system of arranging the chaos of 
experience in systematic orders. The representation ofthe objects is a process submitted to 
the structural orders as being independent from the objects given in experience. Cassirer 
aimed here to confirm that a particular perception may assume very different meanings and 
values for the total structure of the objects in reality. Cassirer refers to this idea that the 
psychology of thought is concerned with construction and meaning of perception of 
objects, not the object as simply given in experience. 
It does not study thought where thought merely receptively receives and reproduces the meaning of an 
already finished judgmental connection, but where it creates and constructs a meaningful system of 
propositions. When psychology pursues this line of inquiry and considers thought equally in the concrete 
totality of its productive functions, the initial opposition of methods is more and more resolved into pure 
correlation. Psychology in this sense gives approach to problems, which must seek their solution in logic 
and in their application to science. (Cassirer, 1923: 364). 
Here we can now notice this epistemological approach mainly expresses continuous 
processes of free creation of objeCts. In other words, the theory of perception could achieve 
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meaningful progress when it shifted from emphasizing percepts to concepts. (Cassirer, 
1944: 17). 
Cassirer went a step further in his analysis of the structural processes involved in perception 
by adjusting another modern psychologist's view. In his discussion of Christian Von 
Ehrenfels's essay Uber Gestaltqualitaten 1890, Cassirer picked up the initial thread to 
reinforce his view regarding the structuralism of perception. Ehrenfels's essay achieved 
two goals for Cassirer;. Firstly it gives him a good way of showing that psychology in 
general, and perception in particular, reinforced his view of the possibility of giving a 
critical analysis to perception on structural foundations. Ehrenfels's essay discussed the 
term (form- quality) that reflects the possibility of arranging the perceptual contents in 
respect to a form, a structure or a whole. 
The most famous example is the melody discussed by Ehrenfels. But the significance of 
Ehrenfels's work for Cassirer's structuralism was also that Ehrenfels confirmed that what 
connects the parts of the object into one form or whole is not to be found in these contents 
themselves nor in the coexistence of the qualities as an aggregate. Rather it is a new 
function that is an independent structure that re-arranges the relations between the parts of 
the whole. The importance here is given to the structure to the whole not to the parts. The 
parts of the whole acquire their meaning not independently but through the whole of which 
they are part. Therefore, Cassirer considered the works of Ehrenfels to be a turning point in 
the psychology of perception: 
The elements never "subsist" outside of every from of connection, so that the attempt to deduce the 
possible ways of connection from them moves in a circle. Only the total result itself is "real" in the sense 
of experience and psychological process, while its individual components have only the value of 
hypothetical assumptions. Their value and justification accordingly is to be measured by whether they are 
able to represent and reconstruct in their combination the totally of the phenomena. (Cassirer, 1923: 
335). 
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Secondly, Ehrenfels's investigation opens the door for Cassirer to deeply engage himself 
with the Gestalt School of Psychology, and their application to different psychological 
problems like perception, memory, abstract thinking and learning. Now let us discuss what 
are the epistemological and logical implications that are included in the Gestalt- Qualities? 
3-4 The Epistemological Foundations of the Gestalt School 
I will now discuss the epistemological and logical views of the Gestalt theorists which are 
presented in their discussions of the theory of knowledge and its application to the field of 
psychology. Although it is difficult to trace their epistemological view since they do not 
state them explicitly, it is still possible to extract them from the fragments of their books. It 
is helpful to begin with their criticisms of associationism and behaviorism. 
To understand their core objection against associationism and behaviorism, it is important 
to understand what the Gestaltists meant by Gestalt-qualities. They mean by Gestalt-
qualities that any object we perceived involves holistic structures that are not deduced from 
experience and are not extracted from the parts of the objects. Rather, these holistic 
structures are given suddenly by insight and in the light of these structures, the perceptual 
experience is organized. The main theme of Gestalt school was the priority of holistic 
forms over the parts. This view will reflect their criticism of associationism. 
Associationism can be defined as an attempt to explain mental phenomena through 
relations among mental contents and representation-particularly relations such as contiguity 
and resemblance that cause them to become associated with one another. 
The Associationists argued that behaviour takes place when a physical stimulus hits any 
sense organs and accordingly the sense organs responses to the stimulus. It is an account 
that shows that behaviour is always a reaction to the stimulus and if we want to understand 
the motives of behaviour, we need to understand first the nature of the stimulus. Behaviour 
occurs in the light of that mechanism between stimulus and sense orgaps. As a result, the 
- - -- - - ,. ·. --'-· . . - -· . __ • - '. ~ -·- - - -· - . --. ,-,..-.=·-,-. .• -,..---"'- --··---
sense organ is a response to a part of the field of the experience not a response to the 
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situation as considered as one systematic structure instead. For example, an animal 
behviour, according to the behaviourists is a direct response to the stimulus of the situation. 
The behaviourists presented different researches and studies on human and animal all 
showed in fact that the behviour is a response to the stimulus. These experiments were 
presented by Pavlov and Skinner on animal behviour as we shall discuss later. However, 
the Gestaltists indicated that both human and animal behaviour are a response to the total 
situation of perceptual field. They explained that the human and animal response is 
determined not by one element as a stimulus, but by all the elements involved in the total 
situation. This difference in their approaches led the Gestaltists to present their views on the 
creative thinking and problem solving as ways to show that behviour is always a response 
to the whole perceptual situation. The peculiar epistemological situation of the Gestaltists is 
that they indicated that behaviour is a response to the whole or structure not to parts 
themselves. I can make some general remarks on the Associative approaches in perception 
as the Gestaltists discussed them. 
1- The central idea of Associationism relies on a belief that complex wholes are 
concatenations of units, elements, or atoms combined together in a certain way. The 
Associationists sought to explain mental phenomena through relations among mental 
contents and representation-particularly relations such as contiguity and resemblance that 
cause contents to become associated with one another. Perception takes place when the 
parts of a perceptual situation are combined together in a certain relation to give the whole 
perceptual situation. According to the Associationists, the parts or the elements of 
perceptual experience are prior to the situation as a whole. On the contrary, the Gestalists 
rejected association as the basis of a reliable account of perceptual experience. We can see 
Wertheimer, the real founder of the Gestalt school, uses the phrase "bundle hypothesis" to 
characterize the theory considering experience as a companion of elements. 
2- The second objection was centered on the idea of "the Constancy Hypothesis" which 
-states that the perceived object will have the same qualities and propertieseVeri- under- - -
changes in the perceptual field. According to the Associationists, the object we perceive 
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reflects what exists in the external world without any changes. For example, I perceive a 
friend from a far distance, and the way he is represented to me involved no changes 
similarly as if I perceive him from close distance. Although there are differences in the 
ways of representing him from close and far distances, but still he looks to me the same 
friend without any changes. The Gestaltists rejected the principle of constancy because it 
does not deal with slight changes taking place in perceptual experience and is concerned 
instead with the fixed characteristics. The Gestaltists distinguished between the physical 
object in the external world and the way it appeared to me when I perceive it. For instance, 
in their example of animation movies the pictures in themselves are mere aggregates if I 
add them together nothing happens but these pictures seem to move when I display the 
pictures in a quick succession. The Gestaltists were against the claim that objects have 
unchanged properties and hence will be perceived as they are in reality. However it is 
understood in the light of their distinction between the objects as things and the objects as 
appearance as we will discuss later. (See Chaplin & Krawiec, 1974: 61, also Reed, 1988: 
32). 
3- The third objection raised by the Gestalists against Associationism related to the idea of 
One - to- One correspondence between physical stimuli and the states of sense organs. 
They treated the nervous system as a complicated mechanism of separate conductors. When 
there is a response from sense organs to stimulus, there is a current run from the nervous 
system to the sense organs and then the sense organs respond in respect to the sign sent 
from brain to sense organs. (Heidbreder, 1961:337-342 also Rivera, 1976: 235 Watson, 
1963: 410). 
The behaviourists took this fact as a model of explaining how there is a mechanism 
involved in the way behaviour responses to the stimuli. 
On the contrary, the Gestaltists tried to bring their understanding of physiology and claim 
that there is isomorphism between the processes taking place in the nervous system. For the 
- Gestaltists, isomorphism refers to- a correspondence between -a- stimulus array and the brain 
state created by that stimulus. For example, in the Phi-Phenomenon it is argued that the 
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brain state created by this stimulus matches the brain state created by a patch of light 
moving between the two locations. We shall explain the phi- phenomenon in Chapter Five. 
The Gestaltists took another different model of explaining the facts of behviour 
distinguished from the mechanism model that adjusted by the Associationists. This model 
stresses the priority of the functions performed over the stimuli, and the behaviour is a 
reflection ofthese functions not to stimuli. 
These features of criticism show the holistic view of the Gestaltists's view. They believe 
that any attempt to break the whole down into elements would destroy the essential 
structure of the whole. "The whole is greater than the sum of its parts" is a phrase that 
summarizes this conceptual approach toward the investigation of epistemological claim. 
(Dember & Warm, 1979: 253-254). 
The Gestalt scientists developed their ideas in the light of the new developments of modern 
sciences and implemented those ideas to psychology. In addition, they checked out the 
early writings of the Gestalt pioneers such as Ehrenfels and started to criticize his early 
views in respect of new developments of modern sciences. The question now what were 
the difficulties that they found in Ehrenfels's theory of perception? 
Before answering the previous question, it is important to highlight Ehrenfels's main idea 
of perception. Ehrenfels is an important precursor of the Gestalt school who sought to find 
an answer to that question, how it is possible to recognize the melody, say nine notes, 
played in the key of C, after hearing these played in a different key, let us say F. The 
conclusion according to him was that there was in addition to the nine sensory elements, a 
tenth element which is the Form-Quality or Gestaltqualitat of the nine unit tones. It is 
through that agency that we are able to perceive the resemblance of the two melodies, 
although every note in one series is different from the corresponding one in the other. 
(Roback, 1952: 302-303 also Kanizsa, 1979: 51-52 And Reed, 1988: 33). 
·-- -
The ~~tion of Form-Quality phyed an import~nt- role in formulating' a· d-isfinctlo·n-bet\Veen 
associationists who gave the priority to the elements over the form from one side and that 
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holistic view that gives priority to the structure over the elements. Gestalt theorists like 
Max Wertheimer and K. Koffka criticized Ehrenfels's notion of Form-Quality, however 
they claimed that the idea of high element that we add to experience is not an accurate 
hypothesis in the light of the new evidence emerging in the field of both physics and 
physiology. For example, Koffka distinguished between the notion of Form- Quality and 
the notion of Gestalt since the former idea is ambiguous and it adds a new element to the 
rest of the sensuous elements composing the perceptual experience (Koffka, 1922: 531-537 
From Brennan, 1955: 191-196). 
Although Ehrenfels presented a distinguished view of perception in trying to identify its 
nature, Koffka considered his view as supportive to the Elementalism approach since he 
confirmed the additive super element to the whole elements of experience. Koffka rejected 
Ehrenfels because he saw the relation exhibited in Form-Quality, which ties between the 
contents of experience to the acts or laws that generate them, as not clear. But I do not 
agree with Koffka's view on Ehrenfels because Ehrenfels defended the theme that there 
must be a structure presupposed to our experience not just only an important element 
simply added by chance to experience. Ehrenfels thought that perceptual experience 
presupposes an element that organizes it. This element is not given in experience. However, 
we can set Ehrenfels and his view of Form- Quality in a middle way between sensations 
and judgments. For he was concerned with the elements that compose the perceptual 
experience from one side, and he could not give as clear an account as the other Gestaltists 
who came after him like Wertheimer and Kohler. 
The Gestalt theorists believed that there is a pattern or context that is logically prior and 
precedes the parts that can be organized in the light of that context or whole. There is a 
holistic context in which we understand the elements. For example ifwe see two words; the 
word (Act) and (Cat) although they have the same letters, they have completely different 
meanings because the letters are grouped and ordered in two different contents. (Klein, 
1970: 63-64). The notion of the_ whole presented by the Gestaltists refers to the question or--
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the possibility of arranging the elements of perceptual experience in different wholes or 
systematic orders (Muller-Freienfels, 1935: 113-114 Also Averill, 1976:11). 
It is necessary now to discuss the pure Gestalt account as it is presented by the real 
founders ofthe Gestalt School. 
3-5 The Gestalt and the Structural Foundations of Perception 
I will now discuss the foundation and consequences of the structuralism of the Gestalt 
theory of perception. First I will attempt to define "structure". Structure is a presupposed 
order that is needed to form the experience. It is the presupposed condition that transforms 
perception as mere representation of figures to representation of forms. In other words, it is 
the condition that distinguishes the outcome of the retinal image from the outcome of the 
phenomenological image. The most common feature is that "structure" involves a 
presupposed inner systematic coherence that relates the elements of one form where the 
form logically precedes its parts. 
Jean Piaget provided an attempt to understand structure in respect of the transformations 
that take place between the elements. He also confirms the priority of laws over the 
elements: 
We may say that a structure is a system of transformations in as much as it is a system and not a mere 
collection of elements and their properties, these transformations involve laws. (Piaget, 1971: 5). 
The Gestaltists have their own account of structuralism. Although there are differences in 
their views of structuralism, still their views involve the priority of laws over the elements. 
For example, Wertheimer shows that in his version of structuralism in 1922 where he 
confirms the importance of the laws over the parts: 
Gestalts are not the sums of aggregated contents erected subjectively upon primarily given pieces .... 
Instead, we are dealing with wholes and whole processes possessed of inner intrinsic laws. Elements are 
determined as parts by the intrinsic conditions of their wholes and are to be understood "as parts relative 
to such wholes". This is the central formula of the Gestalt psychology. (Wertheimer, 1922: 43 from 
- Ellis, 1950:- I 4-15). 
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He also gave a similar meaning to that when he explained the nature of the Gestalt as a 
reference to his structuralism. Wertheimer explained the nature of the Gestalt in terms of 
the whole or structure that arranges the relations between the parts: A Gestalt is a whole whose 
characteristics are determined, not by the characteristics of its individual elements, but by the internal nature 
of the whole. (Wertheimer, 1922: 13). 
He was concerned more that the characteristic of the whole is not something that is ascribed 
to the elements of the form, but instead this characteristic is deduced through the internal 
unity and the systematic consistency between the elements as arranged under a form. 
Kohler also presented his view on structuralism which also raised the idea that any kind of 
arrangement of the parts presuppose a functional activity that orders the relations of the 
elements: 
Sometimes the term "structure" is used in a purely geometrical sense. But when I use the term in our 
present connection, it refers to a functional aspect of processes, to the distribution of such processes. A 
distribution which they assume (and may also maintain) as a consequence of the dynamic interrelations or 
interactions among their parts. (Kohler, 1969: 91-92). 
The Gestaltists' idea of "whole" shares the same meaning of structuralism. For them, the 
Gestalt is synonym to "order" and "form". They argued that the whole always precedes its 
parts, and the whole is the form that is recognized first before the contents. From this view, 
we can see that the Gestalt as a view of "Holism" or "Wholism" and "Structuralism" share 
the same idea that relations have priority over elements and both structuralism and 
Wholism considered and emphasized that relata have to be considered as places rather than 
individuals. 
Both Wertheimer and Kohler confirm the notion of the whole and its role in arranging the 
parts in a systematic manner. This arrangement does not come randomly but emerges 
through a logical process. 
The Gestalt approach is based on a general view presented in Max Wertheimer's lecture 
was delivered in 1913 in Fra11kfurt. The central topic of that lecture was about the general 
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themes involved in Gestalt. Wertheimer identified himself as the founder of that new school 
of psychology by presenting new ideas that can be summarized as follows: 
1- The structures that organize the impressions are called "Relational Contexts". These 
Relational contexts are not the outcome of simple aggregations of the parts or sensual 
elements. On the contrary, they are wholes that are generated a priori before the parts. The 
structure of the whole develops and is grasped before the individuals that shape the contents 
of the consciousness. 
2- Wertheimer emphasized the perceptual experience is organized in respect to structures. 
He explained that it is the totality of conditions that determine and affect any individual in 
the perceptual situation not the individual himself. For example, the individuals alone are 
not insufficient to determine the experience. (Ash, 1998: 123-124). 
We conclude from what has been discussed that the notion of "structuralism" is considered 
to be the background of the Gestaltists on which they provided their contributions and 
analyses to form a different account of psychology. 
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4-1 Introduction 
The mam concern of this chapter is to investigate the reasons why Cassirer chose 
mathematics, group theory in particular as a framework to present his view of perception. 
Cassirer's was aware of the modern development of mathematical thought and he applied 
that understanding to perception. Cassirer chose to apply the "Erlanger Programm" of 
Felix Klein to perception. Therefore the main question of this chapter will be: how 
successfully could Cassirer build up a theory of perception based on a mathematical view? 
Therefore our argument will include Cassirer's distinction between two different views of 
perception. According to the first view, what we perceive is an aggregation of different 
qualities of something that exists in the external world that have independent qualities. 
Cassirer calls this view the traditional view of perception. According to the second view, 
what we perceive is perceived with respect to certain a structure. What we perceive will be 
ordered into that structure and its properties are transformable in respect to different frame 
of reference. This second view Cassirer calls 'the invariant account of perception'. Finally 
we will see how his theory of invariant theory of experience is able to give a new account 
of perception. 
Cassirer used the mathematical concept of group in the domain of perception to claim that 
the perceptual experience can be considered as an objective experience distinguishing it 
from dream and hallucination. The application of group theory allowed Cassirer to trace the 
constant elements involved in the contents of object we perceive in visual experience. In 
virtue of these constant elements that remain unaltered during the changes take place in 
perceptual situation, led Cassirer to claim that there are similarities should be taken into 
consideration when we construct bot~ geometrical and perceptual objects. The construction 
of perceptual object presupposes constant elements involved in the contents of the object 
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which orders and groups the contents of object. Setting perception on that understanding of 
group theory will lead to the conclusion that perceptual judgments are possible. 
4-2 Cassirer on the Epistemology of Geometry 
The Euclidean geometrical system attracted different mathematicians, physicists, and 
philosophers to support its validity and show that it does not have internal inconsistency 
within its axioms. Therefore they found that the axiom of parallels is inconsistent with the 
Euclidean axioms. The axiom of parallels states through a given point one and only one 
parallel can be drawn with respect to a given line, that is, there is one and only one line that 
does not intersect with a given line and yet lies in the same plane. The nineteenth century 
witnessed a drastic movement of changing the epistemology of geometry. Gauss, Bolyai, 
Lobachevski, Riemann and Klein made significant contributions in the development of non 
Euclidean geometrical systems. The problem for the philosophers of nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries was that of whether or not the Kantian synthetic a priori judgements are 
valid to explain the nature of non Euclidean geometries. The discovery led to a critical 
change in other fields particularly physics and philosophy. There was continuous debate 
among them to answer, how these new geometrical systems presented physical space, and 
how they could present different accounts transcending Kant's Critique based on the 
trustworthiness of Euclidean geometry. That led philosophers, mathematicians, and 
physicists to direct criticism toward the Kantian philosophical system and his theories 
related to geometrical space and physical space. 
Kant developed his vtew of synthetic a priori knowledge that although knowledge is 
independent of sensible experience, yet still it is applicable to the empirical physics of 
Newton that exemplified such synthetic a priori knowledge through its reliance on 
Euclidean geometry and the fundamental laws of motion. Kant's theory of a priori faculties 
of the mind was aimed to explain the origin of synthetic a priori knowledge and thus make 
Newtonian mathematical physics comprehensible. Kant pointed out that we must have an a 
priori intuition of space because geometry is a science which determines the properties of-
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space synthetically and yet a priori. Let us take some examples of that criticism raised 
against the Kantian view of space. 
Hans Reichenbach is a logical empiricist who supported the role of experience in 
epistemology and even in exact science. He was trying in his earlier works to reconcile 
Kant and Einstein, as is shown in his correspondence with Cassirer, but later he departed 
from the Kantian view of the a priori. In his 1956 The Theory Relativity and A Priori 
Knowledge, Reichenbach distinguished between two meanings of a priori implied in 
Kantian view. A priori refers to a necessary, unrevisable and fixed for all time, on the one 
hand, and constitution ofthe object of knowledge on the other hand: 
Kant's concept of a priori has two different meanings. First, it means necessarily true" or "true for all 
times" and secondly, "constituting the concept of object". The second meaning must be clarified. 
According to Kant, the object of knowledge, the thing of appearance, is not immediately given. 
Perceptions do not give the object, only the material of which it is constructed. Such constructions are 
achieved by an act of judgement. The judgement is the synthesis constructing the object from the 
manifold of the perception. (Reichenbach, 1965: P48). 
Reichenbach argued, on the basis, that the great lesson of the theory of relativity is that the 
former meaning must be dropped while the latter must be retained. Relativity theory that is, 
involves a priori constitutive principles as a necessary presupposition of its properly 
empirical claims, just as much as did Newtonian physics, but these principles have 
essentially changed in the transition from the latter theory to the former. 
He also indicated that there is no role for the synthetic a priori judgements to play in the 
non-Euclidean geometries. 
There is no synthetic a priori of geometry: either geometry is a priori, and then it is mathematical 
geometry and analytic- or geometry is synthetic, and then it is physical geometry and empirical. The 
evolution of geometry culminates in the disintegration of the synthetic a priori. (Reichenbach, 
1951:14). 
In The Philosophy of Space and Time 1928, Reichenbach argued that the geometrical 
. -
structure of physical space is a matter to be decided not a priori, but by empirical science. 
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Reichenbach pointed out that Euclidean geometry is not the only possible alternative to 
represent the physical world, but the discovery of non Euclidean geometries paved the way, 
that there are possible forms of representing the physical world. 
Reichenbach's empmctsm let him reconstruct knowledge generally and scientific 
knowledge in particular, without recourse to the synthetic a priori in any form. Reichenbach 
had a version of a theory of the verifiability of meaning, according to which a statement 
will be held as cognitively meaningful when it is possible to obtain evidence which will 
give the statement some degree of probability. This view led him to apply it to geometry. 
He claimed that geometrical statements must have a meaning that refers to empirical 
knowledge. Reichenbach rejected both Cassirer's view and transcendental philosophy. He 
claimed that the functional conception of knowledge, as used by the Marburg school was 
misleading because he thought that knowledge refers to an external world that transcends 
experience. In contrast to the Marburg school's interpretation of the functional conception 
of knowledge, Reichenbach argued that the philosophy of the new empiricism understands 
functional knowledge as it portrays the things of this world. Therefore, he considered 
knowledge as an instrument of predication and for which observation is the only admissible 
nonempty criterion of truth (Reichenbach 1951, 252-255) 
Reichenbach's criticism of the idea of synthetic a priori extended also to include the Neo-
Kantian views of space, particularly the Marburg School. Cassirer showed that space is 
prior to all things which determine it. It is a form to order the contents. Cassirer tries to find 
room for the Kantian method to match with empirical science. Although Reichenbach 
disagreed with the attempts made by Cassirer to justify the Kantian view on space, 
Reichenbach pointed out that Cassirer tried to give new interpretations to Kantian doctrines 
regarding space and time. Therefore, Reichenbach ascribed him as the one who awakened 
Neo-Kantianism from its "dogmatic slumber." 
Cassirer ... therefore abandons the idea of interpreting pure intuition in Kant's sense. He separates the 
metric from intuition and takes pure intuition to be the general law of coexistence that even Riemannian 
geometry retains. According to Cassirer, the metrical axioms are no longer dictated by pure intuition, 
. :Riemann began by searching for the 'most general type of three dimensional manifolds; in this manifold, 
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Euclidean "plane-space" turns out to be a special case resulting from a certain form of metric. If one takes 
as the space of pure intuition this general Riemannian structure which has a certain continuity and order 
properties but which leaves the choice of the metric open, all contradictions in the theory of relativity 
disappear. (Reichenbach, 1965: xxix). 
Rudolf Carnap also rejected the idea of space as a synthetic a priori form. Carnap belongs 
to the movement called "logical positivists" who believed that knowledge of reality begins 
from perceptual experiences, which underlies all sciences. Carnap calls perceptual 
experience elementary experience. He claimed that all we know of the world starts from 
there. Therefore the problem of the external world is a meaningless issue simply because 
there is no possible way of verifying whether there is or there is not an external world 
independent of our experience. This logical positivist view informs Carnap's conception of 
space. He pointed out that the nineteenth century dispute between mathematicians, 
physicists, and philosophers regarding the nature of space is barren because the different 
competing points of view are in fact referring to different types of space, so there was 
nothing actually to dispute. Regarding that understanding, Carnap indicated that there are 
three kinds of space; Formal space is a pure relational structure developed within the new 
mathematical logic (Russell) and this space is correct. Physical space, by contrast, is an 
object of empirical natural science where the physicists's views (Helmholtz, Einstein) are 
correct. Finally intuitive space is an object of a priori intuition where (Kant and neo-
Kantian) views are correct (Friedman, 2002: 64). 
Carnap was interested in space and tried to explain its nature through linguistic 
frameworks. He wanted to make all these different accounts of spaces equivalent from the 
point of view of language. 
On the other hand, if we are dealing with the space of our universe, a space we cannot observe as 
something embedded in the space of a universe of higher dimension, then it is meaningless to ask whether 
space is non- Euclidean or whether our laws have to be modified to preserve Euclidean geometry. The 
two theories are merely two descriptions of the same facts. We can call them equivalent expression 
because we make exactly the same prediction about observable events in both theories. (Carnap, 1995: 
150). 
Ill 
Chapter Four: Cassirer's View of Perception and The Group Theory 
Although when he was young, he was impressed by the Kantian view that the geometrical 
structure of space is determined by the form of our intuition, Carnap departed from the idea 
of intuitional space after Einstein's relativity theory emerged. The reason for Carnap to 
abandon intuitional space was that it involves synthetic a priori judgement. In the light of 
non- Euclidean geometry, he argued that Kant was mistaken when he considered that 
Euclidean geometry and three- dimensional space is secured by a priori intuition. Carnap 
aimed to show that three dimensional space is not intuitional but it is empirical: 
Knowledge of intuitive space I regarded at that time, under the influence of Kant and the neo-Kantians, 
especially Natorp and Cassirer, as based on "pure intuition" and independent of contingent experience. 
But, in contrast to Kant, I limited the features of intuitive space grasped by pure intuition to certain 
topological properties; the metrical structure (in Kant's view, the Euclidean Structure) and the three-
dimensionality I regarded not as purely intuitive but rather as empirical. (Carnap, 1963: 12). 
It is not only Carnap but also Mortiz Schlick who attacked Kant and the neo-Kantians, 
especially the Marburg school members, for their understanding of geometrical space. They 
supported the idea that priori principles constitute the firm ground of all exact science and 
geometrical space. Therefore Schlick challenged the Marburg school members to give him 
examples of synthetic a priori principles. When Schlick explained the uselessness of 
synthetic a priori for exact knowledge, he pointed out that Einstein's theory of relativity has 
nothing to do with synthetic a priori (Schlick, 1921: 325 Also Schlick, 1974: 148-358). 
As another example presented by Cassirer of the dispute about the nature of geometrical 
space, Henry Poincare deals with the problem of space. Poincare was against geometrical 
empiricism and he claimed that the space of geometry is not the space of sense experience. 
He explained that the development of non-Euclidean geometries showed that Euclidean 
axioms do not, as we supposed before, state fundamental properties of observable space. He 
showed that coherent systems of geometry can be constructed based on the denial of 
Euclidean geometry axioms. Poincare argued also that geometrical axioms are not synthetic 
a priori truths because they are not necessarily true, and are not experimental truths either. 
However, he concluded that geometrical axioms are conventions. What 11~ meant by~ __ -~ 
:conventions is that -such axioms are neither true nor false. They are adopted because they 
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are useful in describing the world. Poincare supported the idea that experiments tell us only 
about the relations between bodies and nothing about the relations of bodies to pure 
geometrical space, or parts of this space to each other. For Poincare the geometrical object 
is not experimental but conventional. 
The object of geometry is the study of a definite group, but the general idea of the group pre-exists, at 
least potentially, in our mind, having forced itself in not as a form of sensibility but as a form of our 
understanding. All we have to do is to choose among all possible groups the one that will constitute a 
standard for us, as it were, to which natural phenomena are referred. Experience guides us in this choice 
but does not dictate it; nor does it permit us to know which geometry is truer but only which is more 
"useful. (Poincare, 1946: 90, quoted from Cassirer, 1950: 43). 
Cassirer was aware of these philosophical justifications of non- Euclidean geometry 
presented by these philosophers. Cassirer offered strong Kantian sympathies which are 
evident throughout his work and in a number of ways the analyses developed in it are a 
reworking of the argument of Substance and Function brought up to date in the light of 
more recent advances in knowledge. What Cassirer to trying to do is to develop his view on 
the epistemology of geometry depending on the Kantian transcendental method. Cassirer 
was thinking that the Kantian transcendental method is still applicable to non-Euclidean 
geometry. Cassirer was aware that some of Kant's doctrines are not valid where applied to 
new geometrical systems. However, Cassirer sought to separate the Kantian method from 
his doctrines and applied it to non Euclidean geometry. For example take the idea of pure 
intuition; Cassirer tries to give a new meaning to it by abandoning the Kantian 
interpretation of pure intuition and makes the transcendental philosophy match with the 
new developments brought up by the theory of Relativity: 
But the transcendental philosophy does not have to do primarily with the reality of space or of time, 
whether these are taken in a metaphysical or in a physical sense, but it investigates the objective 
significance of the two concepts in the total structure of our empirical knowledge. It no longer regards 
space and time as things, but as source of knowledge". It sees in them no independent objects, but 
"conditions of the possibility of experience," conditions of experiments and observation themselves, 
which again for their part are not to be viewed as things. (Cassirer, 1923: 411 ). 
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Cassirer was interested with the following question, is geometry an empirical or ideal 
activity? For Cassirer, the most radical removal of geometry from experience had already 
occurred with Euclid, which was already based on figures that are removed from all 
possibility of experiment. Not only the idealizations of point, line, and plane, but the idea of 
similar triangles, whose differences are considered inconsequential or fortuitous, and that 
become identified as "the same" marks an immense step away form ordinary perception. 
Cassirer pointed out that when Riemann published "On the Hypotheses Underlying 
Geometry" (1868) the axioms of Euclid, which had been regarded for centuries as the 
supreme example of eternal truth, now seemed to belong to an entirely different kind of 
knowledge. For Cassirer, "the whole problem of the truth of mathematics, even of the 
meaning of truth itself, was placed in an entirely new light. Until that time, both rationalist 
and empiricist philosophers had agreed that the relations of mathematical ideas were 
rigorously necessary and unalterable. How could entirely different and wholly incongruous 
systems of geometry uphold the claims of truth? 
He quotes Henri Poincare's observation that no matter what observational facts are found, 
the physicist is free to ascribe to physical space any one of the mathematically possible 
geometrical structures, provided that he makes suitable adjustments in the laws of 
mechanics and optics and consequently in the rules for measuring. 
Ernst Cassirer shows Poincare's assessment of the impact of non-Euclidean geometry as a 
shift in the meaning of mathematical axioms. For Cassirer, the theory of sets had shown 
that the different geometries were all equally true in an ideal and mathematical sense. 
Geometry could be defined as a theory of invariants in respect to a certain group -only 
properties that are characterized by invariance with respect to certain transformations can 
be called "geometrical." While Euclidean geometry applies to a "basic set" of rigid bodies 
that are freely movable in space without changing form, different transformations can be 
applied to different sets of objects (defined as "same" with respect to a particular criterion). 
For Cassirer, the modern sense of axioms differs from the ancient. Axioms are no longer 
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assertions about content that have absolute certainty; rather they are proposals of thought 
that make it ready for action. (Cassirer, 1950: 45). 
Cassirer believed that modern developments in the exact sciences go far to confirm the 
Kantian interpretations of them. In fact, Cassirer gives a pronounced instrumentalist 
interpretation of Kantian doctrines. For example, he declares that the axioms of geometry 
can no longer be regarded as "assertion about contents that have absolute certainty, whether 
it be conceived as purely intuitive or rational. They are rather proposals of thought that 
make it ready for action-thought devices which must be so broadly and inclusively 
conceived as to be open to every concrete application that one wishes to make of them in 
knowledge. It was a general view of Cassirer's view of epistemology that shows he was 
aware of the philosophical controversies about the nature of geometrical space due to the 
emergence of non-Euclidean geometry. 
4-3 Cassirer and the Concept of Object 
If we take the concept of reality into our consideration, then the mind would have two 
views concerning reality. A simple view understands reality as being composed of 
independent objects. Therefore there is always dualism between mind and reality. The 
objects of reality are isolated entities that need a certain kind of order. The structuralist, in 
contrast, understands reality as a structured whole, constructed and grasped by the mind. 
The structuralist considers the normal mode of existence of objects is in virtue of the 
relations that constitute them or into which they enter; in the case of concretely existing 
objects it is their meanings, rather than their physical properties. 
Cassirer rejected the idea that objects can have an existence independent of thought. Every 
object has to be developed within thought. 
Direct perception always offers us only isolated fragments, only entirely discrete values, which in no 
combination constitute a continuous whole. The truly "seen" and "heard" furnishes only disconnected, 
temporally separated masses of perception; while the concept of"object" requires the perfect filling of the 
time series, and thus, strictly speaking, requires the assumption of an infinite totality of elements. Thus at 
this-second level, the general procedure is clearly revealed for transforming and enriching the given, on 
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the basis of the logical demand for its thorough-going connection. It is on the continuation of this 
procedure, that science bases its definition of nature and the natural object. The logical tendencies found 
in the concept of experience of the ordinary view of the world are now consciously taken up and carried 
further with methodic purpose. The things" that arise henceforth, prove, - the more distinctly their real 
meaning is comprehended, - to be metaphorical expressions of permanent connections of phenomena 
according to law, and thus expressions of the constancy and continuity of experience itself. This fixity 
and continuity is never fully realized in any sensuously perceptible object; so in order to reach it, thought 
is led to a hypothetical substructure of empirical being, which however has no other function than to 
represent the permanent order ofthis being itself. (Cassirer, I 923: 276-277). 
Cassirer's view of object has nothing to do with the things, rather he refers to it as a 
constitutive condition of all experience. Cassirer as a structuralist was more concerned with 
the constitutive law of the particulars. 
The necessary guiding concepts of association cannot arise from association itself, but belong to another 
field and logical origin. If it is once understood how knowledge attains a constancy of certain predicates 
and establishes judgmental connections, then the "transcendence" of the object as opposed to the mere 
presentation no longer offers any difficulty. And the means used by knowledge are shown to be the same 
in both fields of problems. Just as the real achievement of the concept is not in "copying" a given 
manifold abstractly and schematically, but in constituting a law of relation and thus producing a new and 
unique connection of experiences that transforms changeable "impressions" into constant objects. In fact, 
the most general expression of "thought" is the same as the most general expression of "being." The 
opposition, that metaphysics could not reconcile, is resolved by going back to the logical function from 
the application of which both problems arose, and in which they must finally find their explanation. 
(Cassirer, I 923: 286). 
Cassirer confirmed the importance of relations over separated entities. Fleix Kaufmann in 
his paper Theory of Scientific Knowledge (1949) devoted to Cassirer, argues that Cassirer 
was against ontology and he quoted a sentence from Axel Hagerstrom (I 939) to show how 
Cassirer's anti-ontological views fitted in to that context: 
That the general birch- tree "exists" can only mean that what is to be stated by it is not a mere name, not 
simply a flatus vocis; the statement is meant to refer to relations of the real. We express by the notion 
"general birch-tree" merely the fact that there are judgments which do not refer to this or that- here and 
now given- birch-tree, but claim to apply to "all" birch-trees. I can uphold this logical.participation, this 
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of the particular in the general, without transforming it into an ontological statement in which two 
fundamental forms of reality are posited. (Kaufmann, 1949: 208-209). 
According to Cassirer, the traditional Associationism misunderstood the relation between 
the universal and the particular. Cassirer indicated that universal, order and structure must 
logically precede individuals. From that understanding Cassirer formed his view of object. 
The question now is, how did Cassirer develop his view of the object and how did he 
understand the objects of different domains of knowledge? 
To answer this question, one needs to be aware of the dichotomy between substance and 
function. Throughout his philosophical writings, Cassirer sought to clarify the real meaning 
of 'object' by sketching it in light of functional- relational thought. 
For objectivity itself- following the critical analysis and interpretation of this concept- is only another 
label for the validity of certain connective relations that have to be ascertained separately and examined in 
terms of their structure. The tasks of the criticism of knowledge(" Erkenntniskritik") is to work 
backwards from the unity of the general object concept to the manifold of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions that constitute it. In this sense, that which knowledge calls its "object" breaks down into a web 
of relations that are held together in themselves through the highest rules and principles. 
(Cassirer, 1913: Trans. In Ihmig,1999:522). 
Cassirer argues that the object, since it is not independent apart from thought, has not 
absolute characteristics or fixed qualities. But, the object is determined by the orders that 
form it and give it its characteristics. According to Cassirer, the object of knowledge, 
according to functional thought, has relative qualities that are acquired in regard to the 
position it occupies in the perceptual situation. Cassirer, in respect to modern psychological 
investigations, argues that the object that we perceive varies according to the changes in the 
conditions of the perceptual field. He explained that view when he discussed the object of 
perception. According to Cassirer, the object is developed when it is constructed not as it is 
simply given. Cassirer has that view when he was discussing the physical object: 
With the demand that laws of nature be generally covariant, physics has completed the transposition of 
the substantial into the functional-it is no longer the existence of the particular entities, definite 
permanencies propagating in space and time, that form the "ultimate stratum of objectivity:' but rather 
___ "the.invariance of relations between magnitudes". (Cassirer, 1957:467). 
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Cassirer applied that epistemological view of object to different concepts of science and 
reality as well. Cassirer emphasized the need to abandon a traditional and naive view of the 
world. Cassirer applies that view to the scientific concepts. He indicates also that such 
concept no longer refer to things but refer to relations. For example Cassirer applies this 
view to the concept of atom. 
The quantum theory appears at first sight to require, more than any other theory in physics, a strict and 
"rigid" substance concept from which it cannot free itself. For its basic problem is that of atomic 
processes; and the very concept of the atom was always considered the perfect example, the prototype of 
substantial ism. For it is precisely the stability of the atom which constitutes the basic problem of atomic 
physics: and how can this stability be accounted for theoretically when the presupposition of 
substantialism is discarded, when atoms are no longer regarded as rigid spheres? This, beyond doubt, 
represented a difficult task-but it is precisely the progressive solution of this problem, logically as well as 
physically, that is so significant for modern quantum theory. From the very beginning it could not accept 
the older interpretation of the atom as indivisible. It had to jettison the "simplicity" of the atom; instead it 
had to regard it conceptually as a most complex structure. The atomic concept changes from a simple 
"thing concept" to a relational and systematic one. We have seen that the new basic viewpoint in physics 
puts the concept of law ahead of the concept of thing; what a thing is can only be described by referring 
to the laws governing it. (Cassirer, 1956: 132-133). 
Cassirer objected to the traditional and classical theories which understood the atom as an 
entity. This view has been given by Democritus who ascribed the properties of atom as 
solidity, rigidity and absoluteness. Cassirer claimed that this view of atom is developed 
with Galileo and "the mechanical world view". The concept of atom is based now on the 
empirical laws of motion and their mathematical formulation. These laws constitute the 
framework for the structure of atomism. The properties of solidity, rigidity, hardness and 
absoluteness are retained as visual aids but do not determine the basic character of the 
atomic theory. The theory of atom is now concerned with describing the action and the 
reaction of atoms, and the general rules for these interactions determine the conditions for 
the natural events. 
Cassirer is focused now not on the things themselves but on our knowledge of things. -~ere, 
the influence of Kant on Cassirer's thought can be seen. For example if we choose the 
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concept of causality, we can refer to the Kantian solution of the causality as guidance for 
Cassirer. Kant argues that the concept of causality does not apply immediately to the 
existence of things and their mutual interdependence. Rather it applies only to the form of 
our knowledge of things. Kant's aim was to comprehend all our experience of things under 
the faculty of understanding and its principles. 
"All that we know in matter," says Kant, "is merely ... relations but among these relations some are self-
subsistent and permanent, and through these we are given a determinate object (Kant, Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft quoted from Cassirer, 1956: 182). 
Cassirer went beyond the classical theory of atoms and set up his view in the light of 
quantum mechanics. Cassirer agreed that the atom acquires its characteristics through the 
position it occupies in the system and through the interrelations between its particles. 
The question now is, why did Cassirer keep the Critical question of "How knowledge is 
possible" alive? It seems that Cassirer's goal was to reject metaphysical claims concerning 
the independent existence of objects and focus on the logical aspect of the way we 
construct objects. Cassirer shared the Kantian view of the priority of principles over things. 
This requires the idea of order as an indispensable assumption in every discussion of object. 
It considers the object as a whole, organized and systematically structured. Cassirer pointed 
out the concern now is given to the cognitive processes of the mind and showing the 
creative nature of the thought. According to Cassirer, one needs to discharge the concept 
of order from its ontological contents and at the same time to give it a logical function. The 
functional-relational thought, according to Cassirer, does not disregard the particulars or go 
beyond them but it tries to find a unitary whole to organize them in respect to a constructive 
law: 
The genuine concept does not disregard the peculiarities and particularities, which it holds under it, but 
seeks to show the necessity of the occurrence and connection of just such particularities. What it gives is 
a universal rule for the connection of the particularities themselves ... We do not isolate any abstract part 
whatever from the manifolds before us, but we create for its members a definite relation by thinking of 
them as bound together by an inclusive law. (Cassirer, 1953; 19-20). 
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The question is no longer directed toward the nature of the object as a thing in itself, but toward the 
possibility of a relation to an object .... The objects themselves, however, have ceased to be concrete 
things and have become purely relational forms. (Cassirer I 957, 351 ). 
Cassirer claimed that misunderstanding of the nature of the concept of object led it to be 
developed in the circle of ontology alone. This misunderstanding lies in hie et nunc which 
means that object has to be developed with reference to its local determinations. It also 
refers to the fact that the object derives its meaning and function from a concrete intuitive 
situation. Cassirer applied that view to all sciences seeking to give unitary and systematic 
forms to their contents. For example, Biology aims to arrange and classify the flux of the 
living world into a few categories where these beings can be ordered. Therefore it was 
necessary for biologists when they classify these beings to understand the concept of nature 
not as given or hie et nunc but as structured under certain rules. Therefore nature ceases to 
be a mere aggregation and sum of various and independent living entities, but instead 
becomes a system that gives a certain order to living objects. (Cassirer, 1950: 121). 
Cassirer took the notion of form from its ontology and re-set it in the circle of logic. As a 
result, all the objects of science, according to that understanding, are forms of relational 
arrangements of particulars that are comprehensible only under these forms or structures 
that arrange them. It is claimed by Cassirer that all objects whether in the field of 
mathematics, physics, biology or chemistry have the same systematic and constructive 
nature. Although the laws and relations are different, it seems clear that the construction of 
objects has the same general foundation on which their contents organized and their inner 
unity is flourished: 
The logical world, the mathematical world, and the world of empirical objects: all have a common 
foundation insofar as they are all rooted in one and the same primal stratum of pure relational forms. 
Without these forms, without categorical determinations such as unity and otherness, identity and 
difference, it would be equally impossible to conceive of a totality of logical objects, an aggregate of 
mathematical objects, or an order of empirical objects .... this new mode proves to be the indispensable 
preparation and presupposition for the achievement of an order in the world of perception and hence of 
that object which we call the object of"nature". (Cassirer, I 957:384). 
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Cassirer was occupied during his discussion of perception by the question of how we 
construct objects in different perceptual situations. It will be argued that the impetus for 
Cassirer to critically discuss the nature of perception was his awareness of the recent 
developments in the field of geometry. Cassirer claimed that the process in which we 
construct geometrical figures and the possibility of transformation from one figure to 
another, can also be applied to perception and the objects we perceive in different 
perceptual situations can also be constructed similarly as the geometrical figures 
constructed. Cassirer built up his argument concerning perception on the grounds of the 
epistemology of geometry. Cassirer chose the German mathematician Felix Klein, who 
made a significant contribution in geometry. Cassirer regarded Felix Klein's "Erlanger 
Programm" as a paradigm for him to build up his account of perception. As a result, the 
next section will discuss the main features of Felix Klein's project and its effect on Cassirer 
epistemology. 
4a4 Felix Klein's Epistemology of Geometry 
Felix Klein (1868-1925) is a German mathematician who left a unique imprint on the 
history of mathematical development during the second half of the nineteenth century and 
the early twentieth century. Klein was concerned to defend the role of intuition of 
mathematics. He indicated that geometric intuition is essential to its development. Klein 
ascribed himself as an intuitionist. In his lecture delivered in 1893, Klein indicated that 
among mathematicians, one can distinguish between three main categories, logicians, 
formalists and intuitionists. Klein described logicians as those men belonging to this class 
who emphasized their logical and critical power, their ability to give strict definitions, and 
their ability to derive deductions therefrom. For formalists, they excel mainly in the skilful 
formal treatment of a given question and in devising for it an algorithm. Finally the_ 
intuitionists, Klein pointed out that they are those who lay particular stress on geometrical 
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intuition not only in pure geometry, but also in all branches of mathematics. Klein ascribed 
himself as a logician and intuitionist. (Klein, 1893: quoted from Ewald, 1996: 957-958). 
Although he was an intuitionist, Klein distinguished between two kinds of intuition; nai've 
intuition and refined intuition. He rejected nai've intuition, but he supported refined 
intuition. He stated in his sixth Evanston Colloquium lecture delivered in 1893: 
I must say that, in my opinion, the root of the matter lies in the fact that the nai've intuition is not exact, 
while the refined intuition is not properly intuition at all, but arises through the logical development from 
axioms considered as perfectly exact. (Klein, 1893: quoted from Ewald, 1996: 959). 
Klein sought to make the distinction between exact and nai've intuition clearer by giving 
details about the accurate difference between them. When he referred to na'ive intuition, he 
meant that when we think of something we do not think of it abstractly but as something 
concrete. He gave an example of a point; he explained that according to na'ive intuition, a 
point is a thing which is concrete. Nai've intuition fails to consider it as an abstract point: 
In our nai've intuition, when thinking of a point we do not picture to our mind an abstract mathematical 
point, but substitute something concrete for it. In meaning a line, we do not picture to ourselves 'length 
without breadth' but a strip of a certain width. (Klein, 1893: quoted from Ewald, 1996:959). 
Although Klein objected to the idea of using na'ive intuition as a way of recognizing 
mathematical definitions, he maintained that in daily life we actually operate such in 
inexact definitions. We speak in daily life about the direction and curvature of a river or a 
road, although the line in this case has certainly considerable width. 
The second kind of intuition is what Klein calls "refined intuition", this intuition arises 
through the logical development from axioms considered as perfectly exact. We can find 
refined intuition in Euclid. He developed his system on the basis of well formulated 
axioms. Euclid was fully conscious of the necessity of exact proofs. Here the conclusions 
derived by purely logical reasoning from exact definitions can no more be verified by 
intuition. He gave some examples showing that geometrical configurations can be deduced 
by purely logical reasoning, although imagination could not even draw a picture of these 
configurations. To explain this idea, Klein selected an example from the theory of 
~automorphic functions: 
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Let any number of non-intersecting circles I, 2, 3, 4, ... , be given, and let every circle be reflected (i.e. 
transformed by inversion, or reciprocal radii vectores) upon every other circle; then repeat this operation 
again and again, and infinitum. The question is, what will be the configuration formed by the totality of 
all the circles, and in particular what will be the position of the limiting points. There is no difficulty in 
answering these questions by purely reasoning; but the imagination seems to fail utterly when we try to 
form a mental image of the result. (Klein, 1893: quoted from Ewald, 1996: 960). 
Klein disagreed with Pasche who believed that the whole science can be based on the 
axioms alone without need to resort to intuition. However, Klein confirmed that it is 
important for the purpose of research to combine intuition with the axioms. Klein indicated 
that intuition was the starting point of the development of science and the logical treatment 
followed intuition. Klein calls the process by which we give mathematical formulation to 
nature, "idealization". He considered that logical investigation is not in place until intuition 
has completed the task of idealization (Klein, 1893: 970). 
The process of idealization is understood here as a way to give an invariant form to the 
given. Although he concerned with intuition in mathematics, Klein paid attention to capture 
the geometrical properties of figures that unaffected by our accidental experience. What 
constructs geometry as a system is not these accidental characteristics, but these invariant 
characteristics that remain unchanged during the transformation. He proved using 
geometrical analysis that our actual space has different possibilities that may correspond to 
any one of these possibilities. The importance of this view is to show that actual space can 
be formed and ordered alternatively in the light of the geometrical system and its axioms 
which the geometrician adopts. Klein indicated that the forms which we ascribe to the 
given as a process of idealization does not mean that these forms geometrical 
demonstrations have absolute objective truth, but are true only for the present state of our 
knowledge. From this understanding, Klein will base his view of group as we will explain 
later. 
In his paper 1893, Klein summarizes his theoretical view of the importance of intuition to 
logical investigation as follows: 
T9 return to theoretical considerations, the general views which I uphold in regard to the present 
problems of mathematical science need scarcely be specifically formulated. While I desire in every case 
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the fullest logical working out of the material, yet I demand at the same time an intuitive grasp and 
investigation of the subject from all sides. Mathematical developments originating in intuition must not 
be considered actual constituents of the science till they have been brought into a strictly logical form. 
Conversely, the mere abstract statement of logical relations cannot satisfy us until the extent of their 
application to every branch of intuition is vividly set forth, and we recognize the manifold connections of 
the logical scheme depending on the branch we have chosen, to the other divisions of our knowledge. 
(Klein, 1893: quoted from Ewald, 1996:971 ). 
Cassirer refers here to the importance of intuition for Klein and the role it played in Klein's 
epistemology of geometry. 
We often fall right back into the line of philosophy that has long been known as nominalism, where 
interest is entirely lost in things themselves and in their properties, and the only discussion is about what 
we shall call them and according to what logical scheme we shall operate with these terms .... I myself do 
not share this view at all, holding it to be the death of all science: The axioms of geometry are, as I 
believe, not arbitrary but rational propositions that in general are occasioned by the perception of space 
and are regulated as to their individual content by their suitability. (Klein, 1925: 202 from Cassirer, 
1950: 43). 
In his XI lecturer titled "The Most Recent Researches in Non-Euclidean Geometry" 
delivered in 1893, Klein indicated that there are three points of view from which non-
Euclidean geometry has been considered. The first point of view is the view of elementary 
geometry of which Lobachevsky and Bolyai themselves are representatives. Both built up a 
system of non-Euclidean geometry in which the length of the line is infinite and the 
"measure of curvature" is negative. The second view is projective geometry. We begin 
here by establishing the system of projective geometry in the sense of von Staudt, 
introducing projective co-ordinates, so that straight lines and planes are given by linear 
equations. Also there is Cayley's theory of projective measurement which leads to three 
possible cases of non-Euclidean geometry. 
Finally there is Riemann' and Helmholtz' views. Riemann introduced the notion of the 
measure of curvature of space. When Riemann attributed to his space of three dimensions a 
measure of curvature k he only wants to say that there exists an invariant of certain form. 
He does not mean to imply that the three- dimensional space necessarily exists as a curved. 
sp~cejQ a space of four dimensions. (Klein, 19 fl: 85:..86). 
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Klein considered that the second view has some advantage in adopting it although the third 
view is at least equally important. 
The importance of Klein's thought emerged from his ability to develop a new 
methodological approach to investigating geometrical problems. 
Klein investigated how geometrical figures can acquire different spatial properties through different 
processes of transformations. In I 895 Klein gave a lecture called "The Arithmetizing Of Mathematics", 
delivered at a public meeting of the Royal Academy of Science of Gottingen. In the lecturer Klein argued 
that geometrical properties of any figures have to be describable in terms of formulae that do not change 
when the system of coordinates is changed. The formulae will be invariant with respect to the group of 
given transformation and it represents a geometrical property. (Klein, I 872: from Cassirer, I 944:6). 
Therefore the geometrical properties of any figure depend on general orders and rules not on the 
individuality of geometrical figures. These orders should be understood here as the schemes of arithmetic 
considered as the rules that form the main characteristics of geometry. Klein developed this idea 
understanding not to investigate directly the absolute reality of things, instead, he investigated and 
compared the geometrical form of knowledge with the logical forms. Klein indicates that mathematics is 
a science of logical forms where the numbers and the elements of any group are relatively joined or 
related within these forms. (Resnik, 19 81 :53 6-5 3 7). 
Klein emphasized that the importance of mathematics lies in the logical forms that order 
geometrical properties. This belief led Klein to develop the idea of group which reflected 
clearly his epistemology of geometry. The question now is, why Cassirer paid attention to 
Klein's view of geometry and what was the significance of that in Cassirer's view on 
perception particularly? The answer can be shown in Cassirer's analysis of the knowledge. 
He found that Klein's view supports his view of Functional-Relational thought where the 
priority is given to relations over the contents. From other hand, Cassirer considered the 
notion of"group" provides good background to structuralism that will be fully developed in 
1939 when he wrote his French article on group theory and perception. 
Cassirer indicates that Klein's aim in Erlanger Program, was to confirm that properties 
attributed to figures are constructed and hence transformable not independent. 
In I872 the so called "Erlanger Program" of Felix Klein appeared. Under the title Comparative 
Reflections on the More Modern Geometrical Investigations and offering for the first time a 
9omprehensive survey of the various possible geometries from a rigorously uniform and systematized 
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standpoint, it was a highly significant advance not only in a mathematical sense but also as a critique of 
knowledge. Now at least the problem could be assigned its own rightful place. Klein restricted himself to 
its formal and analytical clarification, expressly avoiding all ontological opinions on the reality of 
space .... Klein shows that this science has to do solely with relations, which must on no account be 
confused with existence. He confines the discussion strictly to the field of mathematics, forbidding all 
excursions into the ontological and metaphysical. (Cassirer, 1950: 28-29). 
Klein's understanding can be summarized under the concept of the group and the 
possibilities of transformation from one geometrical system to another system. Let us 
discuss the concept of group and its logical importance. 
4-4-1 11the Erlanger Programm" and the Concept of Group 
Klein applied the concept of group to different areas of mathematics, especially to Non -
Euclidean geometries. The challenge for Klein was to understand the bases of these 
geometrical systems. Therefore Klein formulated his main question; how could every 
geometrical system be a theory of invariant that is valid in reference to definite groups of 
transformation? 
Klein sought to provide the mathematical community with an answer in a speech he 
delivered at the University of Erlangen in 1872. According to Klein, only properties that are 
characterized by invariance with respect to certain transformations can be called 
geometrical. It is an mqmry into all properties of spatial figures that remain invariant 
throughout transformations. Such properties are independent of the position occupied m 
space by the figure under investigation and the order in which the parts are arranged. 
"Given a manifold, and in it a transformation group; one should investigate the figures belonging to the 
manifold with a view to finding the properties that are not changed by the transformations of the group". 
(Klein, 1929: from Cassirer, 1950: 31 ). 
What does the concept of group mean? It seems clear that there are two meanings implied 
in the concept of group: a mathematical meaning and an epistemological meaning. The 
mathematical meaning of group will be addressed first and I will discuss later the 
epistemolo~ical _meani!1g of group. 
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Klein gave a definition to the concept of group where he reflected the general 
characteristics that should be included in every group. He indicates that: 
The group is defined as a set of well-defined operations A, B,C ... such that any two operations A,B 
combined yield an operation that is a member of the unit; as a complementary condition it is required 
that besides A the reciprocal element A-1 be present in the group. ( Klein, 1926: 335 From 
Cassirer, 1923: 30). 
the definition of group is a set of elements plus an operation. A group usually implies 
different characteristics that can be summarized as follows; identical, inverse and 
associative elements (Stillwell, 1989: 275). 
A group G must obey the following axioms: 
1- Identity element: there exists an element e in G such that ae= ea=a for every a in G. 
2-Inverse: For each a in G, there exists an element a -I in G (the inverse of a) such that 
aa- 1 =a- 1=e 
3- Associative law: For any a, b, c in G, we have (ab) c=a (be). 
For instance, the set Z of integers is a group under addition. The identity element is 0, and-a 
is the additive inverse of a in Z, G is infinite group, Z belongs to G. 
Identity element then is a+O= a 
Inverse element is a-a=O 
Associative element is (a +b) +c=a+(b +c). 
Klein studied the elements of the multiplicity with regard to those operations that are not 
affected by the transformations of the group. 
Klein's definition of group refers to the possibility of combining the elements of the group 
according to certain operations. There is a logical possibility to have various orders of 
elements in one group in respect to different operations applied to the group. The impact of 
group theory is that it questions not the elements or figures as they have actual existence 
but rather their relations to one another under one system. In every operation, we have what 
we call a product that describes that operation and at the same time is the fruit of the 
combinations of the members ofthe set (Burns, 1977: 21& Lyndon, 1985: 5). 
15_l~i!l __ iDfi!c~!ed_!l1at the _C:hC\ract~ristic __ prop_eQ:i~s of a multiplicity must not--be-defined in -
terms of the elements of which the multiplicity is composed, but only in the terms of the 
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group to which the multiplicity is related. Therefore Klein's view was to prove that the 
characteristics of any figure are defined in terms of certain operations. 
Klein's approach was to find possible interconnections between various geometries and he 
suggested that there are interesting points to be made in both geometry and group theory. 
Klein studied all geometry as a group of transformations and to separate geometrical 
systems in regard to its level of abstraction. He separated the geometrical systems the same 
way a chemist isolates the constituents of a chemical compound. 
The gradual separation of affine and projective geometry from metric," says Klein. "may be compared 
with the procedure of the chemist, who isolates increasingly valuable constituents from a compound by 
using constantly stronger analytical reagents; our reagents are first affine and then projective 
transformation. (Klein, II From Cassirer, 1950: 34). 
Klein shows that the concepts of modern geometry derive their precision and true 
universality only from the fact that geometrical figures are not considered as pre-given and 
rigid but as flexible structures that can be moulded into varied forms. 
Another interesting idea raised by Klein's Programm, was the idea of invariance. We are 
not concerned with the mathematical meaning of the in variance that refers to the notion of 
unchangeable feature that remains unchanged during the transformations, but with the 
epistemological meaning of the concept of invariance that refers to the difficulty of having 
a permanent form of the set of the group. Klein studied geometrical configurations that 
remain the same through continuous transformations. In addition, Klein was interested in 
investigating the essence of the geometrical properties of the figures, and asking how the 
geometrical figures can change their characteristics in respect of different transformations. 
According to Klein, every geometry should be conceived of as a theory of invariants of a 
particular transformation group. (Bell, 1958: 145). 
Klein claimed that all the non-Euclidean geometries are mathematically equal in respect to 
group theory. The truth of geometrical system no longer depends on the existence of things, 
but on the structure of axioms and presuppositions. As a result Klein arguedthattherear~ 
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not independent characteristics of either geometrical systems or figures since we can 
transform any of these figures into another by group theory. 
Projective geometry developed only when one begun to consider the original form and all those forms 
resulting from the latter by projection as essentially identical and formulate the properties transferred by 
projection so as to make appear their independence from the alteration connected with projection. 
(Klein, From Cassirer, 1944: 7). 
Cassirer agreed with Klein and gave more explanations to indicate the characteristics of a 
figure will be represented differently when it is transformed from one geometrical system 
to another as follows: 
Thus, what in the geometrical sense must be taken as "identical" and what as "different" is by no means 
predetermined at the outset. On the contrary, it is decided by the nature of the geometrical investigation, 
viz., the choice of a determinate group of transformations. From the standpoint of metrical Euclidean 
geometry, e.g., the different conics appear as distinct entities, as independent geometrical individualities 
which have definite and well- defined properties. This distinction disappears when the point of view is 
changed. If we allow for the so-called "affinitive transformation" we can no longer maintain the 
distinction between 'circle" and "ellipse" in the traditional sense, since by affinitive transformation circles 
are transformed into ellipses. This development is carried still farther in projective geometry in which 
quite generally an ellipse may be transformed into a parabola or a hyperbola, such that, in the final 
analysis, there is but one single conic. (Cassirer, 1944: 8). 
Let us examine now the above-mentioned claim by giving an example from conic sections. 
The circle, the ellipse, the parabola, the hyperbola and two straight lines, are collectively 
known as conic sections. The reason for this is clear when considering a double cone 
(obtained by rotating a straight line through one revolution about an axis that intersects the 
line at an angle a say). When a plane cuts this double cone, the shape of the section formed 
depends upon the inclination 8 of the plane to the axis. 
If 8 = ;rr, the plane cuts only one half of the double cone and the cross section is a circle. 
2 
If a< 8< ;rr , the plane again cuts only one half of the cone and the cross section is an 
2 
ellipse. 
!f 8= a, Jhe plane is parallel to a generator of the cone and hence cuts only one hilif of the -
double cone in a sections which is open -ended. This section is a parabola. 
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If 8< a, the plane cuts into both halves of the double cone, producing (unless the passes 
through the vertex) a section comprising two open - ended curves. This section is called a 
hyperbola. 
If 8< a and the plane does pass through the vertex, the section is a pair of straight lines. 
2 
If we consider the circle defined by its radius (X + Y 2 = 1 ), this equation leads to a circle 
that has specific characteristics as it is shown in the figure ( 4-1 ). At the same time, a circle 
can be transformed into an ellipse if we change the value of Y to be 3 and the value of X is 
invariant to be X2+ ( ~} = 1 then the co-ordinations will be changed and will have 
different spatial co-ordinations and will have a figure of ellipse, as it is shown in figure (4-
2) 
.~ 
,/ 
/ 0.5 
-0.5 
\ -0.5 
., 
Figure 4-1 a circle 
/ 2 
0.5 
0.5 
/ 
Figure 4-2 for an ellipse 
Again, we can also see that an ellipse can be transformed into hyperbola if we change 
+ p 2 to - p 2 In this case, the equation can be replaced to give X 2
2 
- y: = 1 Another 
a p 
example is as follows. Ifwe have a figure its points are the following; (3,1),(3,3),(6,3),(6,1) 
then if we want to see the images of these-points under the transformation { 1 0 } 
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{ -2 I } 
In figure (4-3) A,B,C,D are the given points and figure(4-4) A', B', C', D' are their images 
under the transformation. When we compare ABCD, with its image A'B'C'D', we see that 
not only is the shape of ABCD distorted and rotated under the transformation, it is also 
turned over. We can see that the transformation is a shear in the direction of the negative Y-
axis. We can also see that the geometrical properties of the figure are changed under the 
transformation. 
Figure (4-3) 
\__ 
i\ u 
Figure (4-4) 
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It can also be sketched that transformations can take place from two-dimension into three-
2 
dimension. For example, a circle (X + Y 2 = 1 ), as represents a figure in two-dimensional 
2 2 
space. However that circle can represent a figure in three- dimensional space if X and Y 
are constants and we added the factor H where H represents the height. In this case a circle 
will be represented as part of another geometrical figure that is a cylinder. In this case, 
2 2 
(X + Y 2 = 1 ), became according to the changes in perspective (X + Y 2 = 1 ), where Z=h. 
Thus, H represents the height of the cylinder and Z represents the radius of the cylinder. 
According to that understanding, a circle can be represented as a part of another 
geometrical figure that is a cylinder when we change the operations under which the figures 
are underlined. Therefore we can always change the properties of geometrical figures by 
changing the function that will lead to changes in the figures and their characteristics. 
Cassirer made use of Klein's view of group and extended its view to include different areas 
of knowledge. For Cassirer, the significance of group theory for the theory of knowledge 
was to stress that the characteristics of an object are not independent and are given 
permanently, rather they are acquired in respect of logical orders that are invariant. The 
characteristics of geometrical figures neither represent physical properties nor eternal 
characteristics, but relative characteristics ordered in respect to invariant 
The pure concept does not lose itself in the flux of appearance; it tends from "becoming" toward "being," 
from dynamics toward statics. In this achievement philosophers have ever seen the genuine meaning and 
value of geometry. When Plato regards geometry as the prerequisite to philosophical knowledge, it is 
because geometry alone renders accessible the realm of things eternal. Can there be degrees or levels of 
objective knowledge in the realm of eternal being, or does not rather knowledge attain here an absolute 
maximum? Ancient geometry cannot but answer in the affirmative to this question .... But modern group 
theory thinking has brought about a remarkable change in this matter. (Cassirer, 1944: 29). 
From the epistemological point of view, mathematics has to be seen as a system of objects 
fulfilling certain structural relations among themselves in relation to other systems, without 
regard to the particular nature ofthe objects themselves. 
This is the epistemological meaning of group theory, as Cassirer understood it, it deals with __ 
t_he possibility .. of forming different structures that can order and organize the flux of the 
132 
Chapter Four: Cassirer's View of Perception and The Group Theory 
elements. It deals with the systems and structures upon which we can set up the objectivity 
of both physics and psychology as it will be explained in Chapter Eight. Objectivity can be 
established when importance is given to these constant elements on which our judgments 
are based. Cassirer attempted to apply that general understanding of group theory to 
different domains of physics, psychology and language where the meaning of objectivity 
will be established (Stump, 1999: 643-644).1f the notion of group is a structural form, then 
the question now is to what extent could Cassirer develop Klein's geometrical view to be 
applicable to exact and human sciences? 
4-5 Cassirer and the Structural Concept of the Object 
We are now going to discuss Cassirer's analysis of the structural nature of the objects of 
sciences. It will be argued that Cassirer applied the general understanding of Klein's 
Erlanger Programm to different fields of knowledge. Cassirer believed in the priority of 
laws and orders over the elements and particulars. Therefore Cassirer applied the ideas 
developed by Klein in program to his paper The Concept of Group and the Theory of 
Perception: 
The real foundation of mathematical certainty lies no longer in the elements from which mathematics 
starts but in the Rule by which the elements are related to each other and reduced to a "unity of thought" 
.(Cassirer, 1944: 8). 
Cassirer showed in 1944 paper and 1942 The Influence of Language Upon The 
Development of Scientific Thought that there was possibility of applying the concept of 
group to both language and perception. He sought to apply what was discussed in Klein's 
Programm to other fields of knowledge. We claim that Cassirer could achieve that 
application by setting up his invariant theory of experience. Cassirer developed what he 
called "the invariant theory of experience" as a general approach to meeting our 
expenence. 
The final "invariants" are not given, they must be searched out, and "established." Yet this "est~blishing" 
is never something·"absolute," but rather depends upon the continuing course of science. The "invariants" 
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shift "from place to place," such as in the general theory of relativity. Hence, an "invariant" "framework" 
always remains. But this framework itself is not fixed, but can change. (Cassirer, 1996: 120). 
We are going to investigate the impact of group theory, as structural view, on Cassirer and 
how its impacts extended to be applied to different areas of science. We chose Biology and 
physics as two examples ofCassirer's structural analysis to the objects ofthese sciences. 
4-5-1 Group Theory and the Structural Conception of Biology 
Cassirer gave importance to Biology and was concerned with finding a link between his 
philosophical themes and the development of Biology. We find there was a co- operation 
between Cassirer and some German Biologists like Johann Von UexkUII in 1920 who 
explained to Cassirer the developments of Biology. The most interesting point in Cassirer's 
discussion of the development of Biology was that he shed light on some terms like types, 
patterns, forms and wholeness. These ideas are used in a sense to show that the organism is 
no mere collection of parts, but a form of the whole is presupposed. These ideas of type 
served to advance this thesis. On Cassirer's view, biology is concerned with the possibility 
of classifying and bringing individual under certain forms, rather than with the diversity of 
individual beings. Cassirer's interest in biology returns back to his discussion of the 
classification of organism. The whole nature, according to Aristotle, was constructed in the 
light of genus and species, class and order, and every individual took its place in this whole 
scheme. Despite that view, Kant introduced a different view, where nature was submitted to 
the laws of our understanding. Kant considered nature as a whole and understood its objects 
in the light of this view. 
Cassirer defended the view that nature has to be understood as a whole and individuals are 
parts of that whole. Therefore, Cassirer presented two examples of biologists who 
understood nature as a constructive process in which individuals are classified in respect to 
structural schemes. The real concern of biologists now is to find the principles and rules 
that allow them to fit the variety of beings into different types of classification. This can be 
-_confirmed when we look to tne writings of the Biologists of the nineteenth century. For 
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instance Georges Cuvier (1769-1832) indicated that the task of modern biology is studying 
the principles organizing the world of organic beings. Cuvier considered that animals were 
functional wholes, and would die if any part were to become modified. He defended the 
idea of the whole over the parts when he saw organism as integrated wholes, in which each 
part's form and function were integrated into the entire body. Therefore he developed the 
concept of "types" as a scientific category under which he could classify organic beings and 
investigate the relations that combine them: 
We cannot answer the question of the nature and origin of life forms in their systematic relationships. We 
must always direct our gaze to the whole if we are to reach an understanding of particulars and 
individuals .... The organism is no mere collection of parts, for even in its separate parts we can find the 
forms of the whole. We can never understand the world of living beings if we are to lose ourselves in the 
contemplation of its variegated and multiform character, for in the absence of fixed outlines and guiding 
principles it has no conceivable pattern. (Cuvier, 1835: 6 quoted by Cassirer, 1950: 128-129). 
According to Cuvier, all progress in biology was based on finding out the universal 
principles that give the individuals their forms. Cuvier's views of biology and zoology were 
to support the theme that we have to go beyond the realm of living beings and focus on the 
general categories or laws that constitute our knowledge about beings. This idea led him to 
the discovery in fossils that it may be possible to reconstruct an entire unknown animal 
from one bone. The reason that Cassirer mentioned Cuvier as an example of biologists was 
Cuvier's idea of types. 
For Cassirer he found both "type" and "group" share the same application and meaning. In 
fact, we can notice here according to that understanding, that the general interest of 
biologists is finding out the structure or the type that arrange the relations between 
individual beings. He studied the regularity of natural forms and processes, and he 
produced a theory of the "correlation of parts" to explain the functional basis of living 
structures and processes. 
Cuvier's system of types was no longer really concerned with single characteristics: it was their 
relationship one to the other that was for him the decisive and determining factor. The individuality of an 
organism is not to be expressed in terms of any one special property, but depends upon the correlation 
obtaining among all its parts (Cassirer, 1950: 131). 
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Cuvier could reconstruct the remains of animals by sketching different forms where these 
remains can be fitted and give an approximate shape of the extinct animal. Cuvier 
indicated that between all the bodies of the same animal subordination such as knowledge 
of only one body, one can deduce that from all the others: it is what it called the law of the 
correlation of the forms. By that law, it could create a new world because it managed to 
rebuild these beings of which there remains hardly some formless remains and classified 
them methodically. To classify these remains, Cuvier needed to have patterns in the light 
of them, the parts can be ordered and combined together. Cuvier' s notion of type served as 
a structural possible order that is apriori and under which the parts can be combined. 
Cassirer brought Cuvier's idea of type in this context to show that the natural world can be 
constructed in respect of structural orders that organize the reationship between the 
individuals. In addition, Cassirer also pointed that Cuvier was against na'ive realism because 
his notion of type is not concerned with the properties of the organism, but with its form. 
The link between group theory and Cuvier's idea of type lies in the fact that both of them 
are structural forms of arrangement of the elements of the group or class. These two 
notions; "group" and "type" are a view of constructing the objects and a way of arranging 
the particulars in the light of general orders. 
Systematic biology, therefore, as understood and practiced by Cuvier, was no mere device of 
classification and arrangement that can be easily apprehended, but a disclosure of the very framework of 
nature itself. Hence follows Cuvier's claim to the objective validity of his concept of the type. Certainly 
he was not caught in any nai've realism, for he did not treat the type as though it were a sensibility distinct 
thing. Its validity and truth lay in its indispensability as a principle of classification, and here Cuvier had 
chiefly and exclusively in mind the position in the scale of existence. Type had to do only with being: the 
causal order, the order of happening was outside his purview. The relations which he recognized were 
pure relations of contiguity, not of sequence, and the laws to which they led were not laws of succession 
but of coexistence. (Cassirer, 1950: 131-132). 
Cassirer refers to Cuvier's Investigation on Fossil Bones (1912) and confirms that biology 
is no longer concerned with properties of the animals but with structure. Although Cuvier 
was against the idea of evolution raised by Jean Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829) -Lamarck 
· p-roposed-~ theory of evolution in Zoological Philosophy (1809) which states that animals 
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acquired useful characteristics during their lifetimes which they then pass on to their 
offspring. Cuvier helped to lead others to modern ideas about extinction while himself 
denying gradual change within organisms. He was involved in famous debates with 
Lamarck over the relationship between extinction and morphological change. Although he 
was supporting the idea of "type constancy" against evolution, Cassirer defends his 
situation by claiming that Cuvier' s idea of "type constancy" does not defend the things and 
their fixed properties but he chose it for a methodological purpose. 
Even the animal world of a past epoch was never connected with our present world by any actual 
relationship but was of a wholly different type. The desire to arrange all forms of life in one single, 
ascending series Cuvier regarded as pure fantasy. To do justice to his theory historically it is necessary to 
remember that in his contest with the first defenders of the theory of evolution he took his stand not upon 
dogmatic but upon methodological grounds. He defended the "constancy of types" not as an ontological 
or theological dogma but as a methodological principle (Cassirer, 1950: 133). 
Cassirer tried to justify Cuvier' s view against evolution but still his total account brings 
him to structuralism. 
Johann Von Uexklill (1864-1944) presented another example to show that the internal life 
of organism reflects the importance of structure for organism as presented by Cassirer. 
The science of living beings, he wrote, is a purely natural science and has but one goal: investigation of 
the structure of organisms, their origin, and their functioning (Uexktill, 1930: quoted from 
Cassirer, 1950: 199). 
Uexklill's work was devoted to the problem of how living beings subjectively perceive 
their environment and how this perception determines their behaviour. Picture, for example, 
a meadow as seen through the compound eyes of a fly, continually flying through the air, 
and then as seen in black and white by a dog (with its highly efficient sense of smell), and 
then again from the point of view of a human. Von Uexklill called these subjective worlds 
Umwelt. The idea of Umwelt played an important role in Uexktill's view of individual 
behaviour. Umwelt means "environment" or "surrounding world". The term is usually 
translated as "subjective universe". Uexktill explained that organisms can have different 
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Umwelts, even though they share the same environment. An organism creates its own 
Umwelt when it interacts with the world, and at the same time the organism reshapes it. 
He indicated that the form that we ascribe to an animal or plant is not a material thing but 
the form can be grasped and developed conceptually. 
Structure is not a material thing: it is the unity of immaterial relationships among the parts of an animal 
body. Just as plane geometry is the science not of the material triangles drawn on blackboard with chalk 
but of the immaterial relationships the three angles and three sides of a closed figure ... so biology treats 
of the immaterial relationships of material parts united in a body so as to reconstitute the structure in 
imagination (UexkUll, 1930, quoted from Cassirer, 1950: 200). 
The Umwelt theory states that the mind and the world are inseparable, because it is the 
mind that interprets the world for the organism. Consequently, the Umwelts of different 
organisms differ, which follows from the individuality and uniqueness of the history of 
every single organism. Umwelt also unites all the processes of an organism into a whole. 
Internally, an organism is the sum of its parts operating in functional circles and, to survive, 
all the parts must work together co-operatively. 
Cassirer thought of the Umwelt as an organizational form and though it, the internal life of 
the organism will be ordered. Cassirer pointed out that Uexklill argued that when we 
explore the structure of an animal in its features , then the whole being and mode of 
existence of the animal is revealed. Cassirer stressed the idea that every behaviour of 
individuals is based on its own structure. The individuals can react and receive the 
impressions for which they are prepared to receive by their structures. Hence the behaviour 
of an animal implies an endless chain of functions that connect between the animal itself 
and its environment. Uexklill 's idea of Umwelt stresses the inner structure that creates the 
environment by its own activity. 
All nature, the earth, the heavens, the stars,yes, the very objects that surround us, and remain, as world 
factors, only those operations that exercise influence upon the animal in accordance with its own 
structure. When this relationship of the organic structure to the external factors is carefully examined, a 
new world wholly different from ours is seen to surround every animal and constitute its environment. 
(Cassirer, 1950: 202). 
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Cuvier and Uexklill are two examples presented by Cassirer to show that in biology, 
concern is paid not to individuals but to the conceptual ideas which has the power to 
classify the individuals and bring them under one of the possible forms of arrangement. 
Both ideas of "type" and "umwelt" from one side and "group" from another side share the 
same understanding where they are structural concepts seek to organize its members and 
give them possible forms of arrangement. To this extent, no difference can be noticed 
between the application of group theory as way of arranging its members and type as a way 
of classifying its members. Both of them construct their object similarly. Let us examine 
that view as applied to physics and how it constructs its own object. 
4-5-2 Group Theory and the Structural Conception of Physics 
Cassirer showed that physics is not concerned with particular material objects but instead it 
is concerned with structures. Cassirer explained that view by stating: 
The concern of the new physics of relativity is with structure, with the ordering of events, and not directly 
to the existent as the materiality real (Cassirer, 1957: 4 73). 
Cassirer also tried to find the invariant structures in the field of physics. Cassirer showed 
that the way that modern theory of physics constructs its objects differs from classical 
physics where concern does not lie with the rigid properties of the physical objects, but in 
the laws in respect to objects are constructed. Cassirer represented physical objectivity as 
an example of how modern theory of physics constructs its objects. According to Cassirer, 
the physical objectivity is no longer based on the existence of the things but depends on the 
variety and the objective validity of relations themselves: 
Here the substantial is completely transposed into the functional: true and definitive permanence is no 
longer imputed to an existence propagated in space and time but rather to those magnitudes and relations 
between magnitudes which provide the universal constants for the description of physical process. It is 
the invariance of such relations and not the existence of any particular entities, which forms the ultimate 
stratum of objectivity. (Cassirer, 1957: 4 73). 
According to that understanding, physical objecti\'ity cannot be comprehended-according to 
the nai've view of the world which used to look at physical objects as representing 
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something external having independent properties. However, Cassirer explained that 
modern physics looks to physical objects as being established and constructed by laws, 
distinguishing them from the sensuous reality. The physical world is no longer taken as a 
world of constant things which have a bundle of unchangeable properties. However, the 
physical world can be understood as a system or structure of events each of which are 
determined according to constructive laws. After being influenced by Klein's program, 
Cassirer was convinced that modern physics no longer referred directly to bodies but to the 
structures. This view can be realized when we compare the geometrical and physical points. 
For Cassirer, there is no difference between them because the physicist could free his mind 
from the presupposition, claiming that the physical point has its own existence 
independently from the relations that form that point. However every physicist should 
realize that the physical point could only be realized through the web or the system of 
relations that form it. For Cassirer, if the geometrical point is defined through a specific 
system of formal relations, then it can only be defined as a functional constituent related to 
a specific physical system, and must change when we change the physical reference or 
system: 
Just as the geometrician selects for investigation those relations of a definite figure, which remain 
unchanged by certain transformations, so here the attempt is made to discover those universal elements of 
forms that persist through all changes in the particular material content of experience. (Cassirer, 1923: 
168). 
Karl Norbert Ihmig also claims that Cassirer understood modern physical theories in light 
of Klein's concept of invariant: 
Cassirer picked up the idea of the formation of invariants, as applied by Felix Klein in the "Erlanger 
Programm" for the purpose of classifying geometries, and developed it further as a general 
epistemological method for ascertaining what defines the object of scientific knowledge as a whole. This 
idea proves to have played a decisive role in the definition of the concept of the object within 
mechanics .... The special theory of relativity deals with the objects that are invariant with regard to the 
Lorentz transformations, whereas the general theory of relativity shifts to transformations that can be 
described through any continuous and differentiable functions. (Ihmig, 1999: 527). 
As a result, we can see that Cassirer was convinced that the physical objects are free from 
···any d)nnection to any definite system. However the physical objects are not constant and 
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absolute entities but are constructed with respect to different systems of reference that are 
invariant under certain relations: 
These constants are not to be sought in particular given things, which are selected as chosen systems of 
reference from all others, such systems are the sun was to Copernicus and as the fixed stars were for 
Galilei and Newton. No sort of things are truly invariant, but always only certain fundamental relations 
and functional dependencies retained in the symbolic language of our mathematics and physics, in certain 
equations. (Cassirer, 1923:379). 
The physical judgment is no longer based on the aggregation of separated and observational 
events. However the physical judgement refers to mere symbolic signs and to understand 
the meaning of these signs we do not need to direct perception; we only need to know the 
relations of these signs within a certain system of reference. Physical theory does not use 
the language of perceptual experience but rather a symbolic language to explain both the 
macro and micro realms. 
To sum up, physics as geometry constructs its objects in respect to structures that determine 
the characteristics attributed to the physical object. Cassirer realized that the tendency of 
modem physical theory is not to represent things and to describe physical events, but rather 
to deal with the structures and the formal contexts of events. Cassirer knew that physical 
theory does not deal with the existence of the materially real; physics unifies the events 
under different and various contexts and orders. 
Cassirer indicated that the same approach can be traced in psychology. He presented his 
view on the structuralism in psychology based on Gestalt experiments on perception. This 
claim will be discussed in the next few chapters how the Gestaltists understood the facts of 
behaviour in the light of holistic orders and how Cassirer represented their works in the 
light of group theory. 
4-5-3 Group Theory and the Structural Account of Perception 
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Cassirer presented a new account of perception matched with his general theme of 
functional-Relational thought. Cassirer sought to interpret psychology as an invariant 
theory of experience. Cassirer claimed that mind involves structures aiming to arrange 
chaotic elements of perceptual world. Cassirer rejected the na"ive view of perception and 
the Associationist's theories that described perception as an aggregation or a bundle of 
isolated impressions. 
Cassirer supported the view that human beings can correspond alternatively and differently 
to the same physical stimulus. In the same perceptual situation, individuals can represent 
the same object differently when he changes his frame of reference which provides him 
with the order for arranging the elements of perceptual situation. Cassirer's argument was 
based on the Gestalt view that the object we perceive is not a simple aggregation of 
elements, but rather it is an order that draws the form of relationships between the elements. 
For example, in cartoons an object seems to be in motion although it is static and 
motionless. A grey object can be represented as black when we bring it close to a white 
object. In perception, a distinction must be drawn between what is physically perceived by 
eyes and what is phenomenologically represented. What is physically perceived refers to a 
retinal image which reflects the real objects as represented on the retina. While what is 
phenomenologically represented refers to possible characteristics that can be ascribed to the 
represented figure in the light of the dynamic processes taken place in the mind. The 
properties of the represented object represented phenomenologically are constructed, 
flexible, changeable related to the frame of reference in which the phenomenological image 
works. Cassirer, depended on the Gestalt psychology to make this distinction between 
retinal and phenomenological images more clearer. Cassirer claims that every perceptual 
process involves at least some fundamental structural elements. He argues that the genuine 
concept of perception does not disregard the peculiarities and particularities of the 
occurrence and connection of particularities however it gives an epistemological priority to 
the universal rules or orders that connect the particularities. 
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In 1944 Cassirer indicated that perception is the study of those structures which organize 
perceptual experience. He depended on Klein's group theory to show the transformations 
take place in the perceptual situation when one changes his frame of reference. How did 
Cassirer set up his invariant theory of experience guided by Klein's ideas? 
For Cassirer, the properties of a figure are determined in light of operations and in light of 
the transformations taking place, the same application is also applied to perception where 
the characteristics of an object are determined by the conditions of the perceptual situation 
and the frame of reference organizes the relationships between the parts of the situation. 
Cassirer claimed that perception must not be defined as a bundle of sensations or a simple 
aggregation of impressions. On the contrary, he agreed with Christian Von Ehrenfels 
(1859-1932) and the Gestalt theorists that perception is something more than separate 
sensory entities, it is something added by our thought; namely the quality of figuration. 
For instance Ehrenfels's example of melody, Cassirer understood the form of melody is an 
invariant even though the material contents of experience changed using different pitches. 
Cassirer pointed to the example of the melody and an optical spatial figure to show that 
both of them imply an invariant element if they are presented in a different scale but in the 
same proportions still the figure remain approximately the same, exactly the same as in the 
case of melody as we explained. In this article Cassirer states that: 
What we find in both cases are invariances with respect to variations undergone by the primitive elements 
out of which a form is constructed. The peculiar kind of "identity" that is attributed to apparently 
altogether heterogeneous figures in virtue of their being transformable into another by means of certain 
operations defining a group, is thus seen to exist also in the domain of perception. The identity permits us 
not only to single out elements but also to grasp "structures" in perception. To the mathematical concept 
of "transformability" there corresponds, in the domain of perception, the concept of "transposability ". 
(Cassirer, 1944: 25). 
Cassirer used the Gestalt's term transposability to refer to the element that remains 
invariant during the transformations that took place in perceptual situation. The reference to 
these elements that are invariant in the perceptual experience are leading points because a 
possibl~ j11:dgment of perception can be set up. 
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We could see that the idea of group as a structural idea played with others a role to lead 
Cassirer to the view that the construction of the object of knowledge, biology, physics, 
geometry and psychology, depends on the forms and its capacity to bring unity and 
systematization to the individuals and the elements. 
In the next chapter we will investigate the theoretical framework of the Gestalt school and 
show that the Gestaltists' views on psychology provides an example of the application of 
this structural view of constructing the objects of perception. 
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5-1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to portray the structural account of the Gestalt theory of 
perception. It will try to focus on the structural properties presupposed in every 
perceptual experience and to examine some of the Gestalt experiments designed to 
explore the nature of perception. Therefore in order to understand the Gestalt structural 
account of perception, we will explain the structural features of perception and its laws. 
It will also discuss the perception of apparent movement and explain it in light of the 
general structural account of the Gestalt. I will also elucidate Cassirer's claim that 
perception can be based on the mathematical understanding of Group theory. The 
question now is what are the basic features of structuralism as displayed by The 
Gestaltists? Furthermore, how can we apply that structuralism to the perception of 
apparent movement? 
5-2 The Gestalt Principle of Isomorphism 
The Gestaltists explained the structural account of their psychology by using some 
different concepts from different exact sciences such as invariance, transformation and 
isomorphism. They applied the concept of isomorphism to their psychology as an 
attempt to explain the changes take place in the perceptual field by comparing it with 
the changes take place in the brain. In fact, many theorists, such as Muller, took the 
position that perceptual organization reflects innate properties of the brain itself. Indeed, 
perception and brain functions were held by Gestaltists to be formally identical (or 
isomorphic), so much so that to study perception is to study the brain. Therefore, 
according to the Gestaltists, isomorphism refers to a correspondence between a stimulus 
array and the brain state created by that stimulus. For example, in Max Wertheimer's 
(1880-1943) view on Phi-Phenomenon, as we shall explain it later in- the pre-sent 
chapter, a pair of alternating and spatially separated patches of light create the illusion 
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of motion, it is argued that the brain state created by this stimulus matches the brain 
state created by a patch of light moving between the two locations. 
The Gestaltists among themselves had different views of the application of 
isomorphism, however, they agreed that there are structural similarities between the 
processes taking place in perception and those taking place in the brain as suggested by 
Wertheimer . 
. For Example, Kurt Koffka (1886-1941) mentioned the principle of isomorphism, 
"according to which characteristic aspects of the physiological processes are also 
characteristic aspects of the conscious processes." In addition, we could see a reference 
to the concept of isomorphism in some of Wolfgang Kohler' s(1887 -1967) literatures 
such as; Gestalt psychology 1930, and Gestalt Psychology: an Introduction to New 
Concepts in Modern Psychology 1947 where his studies of physical Gestalten 
culminated in the hypothesis of psychophysical isomorphism. Kohler claimed that there 
are correlations between our sensory perception and the functional processes of our 
brain. This meaning reflected in his definition of Isomorphism. He states that: 
Isomorphism is the thesis that our experience and the processes which underlie these experiences 
have the same structure. (Kohler, 194 7: 201 ). 
The idea of Isomorphism played a role in the theoretical background of the Gestaltists' 
structuralism. In a section entitled "Relation Between Behavioural and Physiological 
Field Crucial," Koffka wrote about a conversation that took place between him and 
Wertheimer as follows: 
This conversation remains in my memory as one of the crucial moments of my life. It happened at 
Frankfort on the Main early in 1911. Wertheimer had just completed his experiments on the 
perception of motion phi phenomenon in which Kohler and I had served as the chief observers. Now 
he proposed to tell me the purpose of his experiments ... [O]n that afternoon he said something which 
impressed me more than anything else, and that was his idea about the function of a physiological 
theory in psychology, the relation between consciousness and the underlying physiological processes, 
or in our new terminology, between the behavioural and the physiological field. To state it in these 
new terms, however, is not quite fair, because this very statement was only made possible by 
Wertheimer s idea; before, nobody thought of a physiological or, for that matter, of a behavioural 
field. (Koffka, 1935: 53-54). 
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Kohler claimed that there are similarities between both physiological and perceptual 
processes since they share the same structural functions performed. Katz shows this fact 
in his 1951 by stating that: 
The essence of isomorphism is that phenomenologically ascertained forms actually correspond to 
psychophysically forms. Psychophysical forms in the brain are viewed as not essentially different 
from the physical forms of inorganic nature .... And if the forms of experience correspond to 
recognizable physical forms in the nervous system, a path is opened to the study of the brain 
processes concerned .... To prove the existence of forms in the inorganic world Kohler applied both 
of Ehrenfels' (1890) criteria for experienced forms. He maintained that they could be employed 
equally well in the case of physical forms. (Katz, 1951: 55). 
The Gestaltists' view of psychology does not understand an individual's behavior to be 
the sum of accumulated responses to physical or external stimulus. Rather, they defend 
the view that psychology should study an individual's behaviour as a constructive 
process generated through spontaneous responses to the whole perceptual situation. The 
Gestaltists were not interested in explaining the individual's behaviour by restricting 
their views only on the view that sense organs respond to local stimuli with local 
impressions. On the contrary, they claim that the organism reacts as a whole to any 
given stimulus group. They were not interested in One to One correspondence between 
sense organ and stimuli, but with the correspondence between One to Many. Although it 
is one stimulus that hits our for instance, eyes, but the eye can respond variously and 
construct different forms of the same figure it perceives. This view will be explained 
when we distinguish between retinal and phenomenological image where the latter 
represents the figure perceived variously through a dynamic process of construction. 
The same dynamic process are implied similarly in physiological brain process. Kohler 
presented the following example to draw an analogy between perceptual process 
performed in the perceptual situation and the physiological processes in the brain: 
I have before me three white dots on a black surface, on the middle of the field and the others in 
symmetrical positions on both sides of the former. This is also an order; but, instead of being of the 
merely logical kind, it is concrete and belongs to the very facts of experience. This order, too, we 
assume to depend upon physiological events in the brain. And our principle refers to the relation 
between concrete experienced order and the underlying physiological processes. When applied to the 
present.example, the principle claims, first, that these processes are distributed in a certain order, and 
secondly, that this distribution is just as symmetrical in functional terms as the group of dots in visual 
terms. (Kohler, 1947: 61). 
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In his 1950 book, A History of Experimental Psychology, Boring wrote about the phi 
phenomenon and isomorphism in Chapter 13, entitled "Gestalt Psychology." In 1912 
Wertheimer was describing seen movement under the conditions of discrete 
displacement of the stimulus, as it occurs in the stroboscope or in the cinema. Boring 
indicated that the Gestaltists' goal was to show the object is dynamically constructed 
similar to the dynamic processes take place in the brain. Boring showed that 
understanding by stating that: 
Because Gestalt psychology tends to deal with wholes it frequently finds itself concerned with fields 
and field theory. A field is a dynamic whole, a system in which an alteration of any part affects all the 
other parts .... Because perception seems often to follow laws of physical dynamics, Kohler has 
supposed that there are neural brain fields which underlie and account for the dynamics inherent in 
the phenomenon of perception. Koffka has supposed that you must understand human action in terms 
of a behavioural field which includes, not the stimuli and the physical environment, but the outer 
world and its objects as perceived and conceived by the actor. (Boring, 1950:591). 
He also tried to show the importance of isomorphism to the Gestaltists as a way of 
interpreting the holistic and dynamic process involved in perception. Boring states in 
another paragraph as follows: 
There is much more to be understood about Gestalt psychology than that it deals with wholes and 
phenomena. Usually it works in terms of field theory, as we have noted. The important Gestalt 
psychologists have accepted a special theory of relation between experienced phenomena and the 
underlying brain processes, the theory called isomorphism, and to that we shall return. (Boring, 
1950: 591). 
Kurt Lewin (1890-194 7) made contributions to learning and a theory of social field. 
Lewin's concern was to display the analogy between psychological force and physical 
force by emphasizing that these two enterprises involve a dynamical construction as he 
explained in his analysis of behaviour in social situations. 
Lewin used this analogy to build up his view of social psychology and to prove that 
social life space emerges from the tension between social forces in a social situation and 
implies the same dynamic construct as physical forces. This will be exel<l~ned_,i? 
- -·- -.--,-- .-~--"'"_.,...---·- --
.. OCJ~;hapteLEight.- There is a difference between Lewin and the rest of the Gestaltists in 
the terminology used in respect of the term forces: Lewin used psychological forces, 
while the Gestalists used physiological forces. Lewin did not use isomorphism, but 
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indicated that both psychological and physiological forces have the same structures and 
imply the same applications. 
In case one should prefer to speak of "physiological" forces rather than psychological ones we would 
not mind such terminology, although it might be misleading. The reality of the psychological forces 
is the same as that of the biological forces governing the brain. (Lewin, I 938:87). 
Lewin established his structural account of Field theory based on the fact that human 
behaviour has to be understood in respect to the total social situation which an 
individual passes through. For Lewin, the total social situation is the frame of reference 
of the individual, within which all his reactions and relations are constructed. Lewin 
drew this conclusion from a branch of mathematics called topology which deals with 
transformations in space. Lewin indicated that there is no reason to distinguish between 
the particle of physical material and social material because in the social as in the 
physical field implies structural properties of the dynamic whole. The principle of 
isomorphism was one of those principles used by the Gestaltists to point to the 
constructive dynamic processes involved in perception. 
To sum up, the concept of Isomorphism has been applied by the Gestaltists in 
psychology. The Gestalt psychologists' task was to find out the similarities between the 
functional processes of the nervous system and structural organization of perceptual 
situations. It was a challenge for them to bring out the processes of systematization, 
construction, unification and regularity that implied in our perceptual situations when 
we perceive the objects. 
5-3 Gestalt and Structuralism of Perception 
The Gestaltists wanted to reflect the holistic view of perception and evidence of that can 
be seen in the concepts they used to analyze the nature of perception. For example they 
used perceptual organization to show that the elements of any perceptual form are not 
randomly related to each other. But the parts of a perceptual form are related in respect 
of certain orders that arrange the relationship between them. They also used· conc·epts 
-- -·-_ 
such as transformation, transposition and structured units to show that perceptual forms 
are understood by the fact that forms are perceived as being a whole unit and its 
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elements are grouped into the unit in certain orders. The Gestaltists indicated that 
phenomenological images understood as perceptual forms or structures and the 
elements composed of these units do not have to be independent. The phenomenological 
object and its elements do not have an unchanged order of display or representation but 
the phenomenological object will be decided in the light of orders of arrangement 
determined by the dynamic processes of transformation and rotation of the figures. In 
every perceptual experience, the perceptual forms will be decided in light of these 
dynamic processes as we shall explain. 
According to this, the perceptual elements will be correlated and this means that 
perceptual forms are not necessarily identical in every perceptual experience, but rather 
they vary regarding the perceptual situation and the rules that determine the mode of 
arrangement. Therefore, according to the Gestaltists, phenomenological images vary 
and change during perception, from one person to another and for the same individual 
when the conditions determine the perceptual situation altered. The Gestaltists claim 
that the phenomenological images are changeable and transformable according to the 
organizational laws that determine the sort of correlations and relations between the 
elements of structure. It is important to mention the general features of the Gestalt 
school as applied to perception. 
These features emerged from Kurt Koffka's objection to the answer of the following 
question: why do things look as they do? An immediate answer to that question might 
be "because things are what they are". Indeed, this form of answer to Koffka's question 
was originally formulated by Greek philosophers who proposed that our perceptions of 
the world were due to miniature copies (eidola) of the external objects as perceived by 
the sense organs. Koffka rejects the idea that perception is a mere translation of what 
exits in the external world, as represented by retinal image, and argued that perception 
implies elements are not involved in the external objects we perceive in the experience. 
They also rejected the claim that sensory fields are organized by innate cerebral 
mechanisms. On the contrary, they suggested another functional model that emphasized 
the operations and processes taking place in behaviour over the stimulus as we 
explained earlier. 
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The Gestaltists believed that perception and knowledge come to be structured. (Gibson 
& Eleanor, 1955: 387). 
What are these non- physical or structural elements characterizing the Gestalt account of 
perception? The answer has been given by the Gestalt psychologists who mentioned 
over a hundred laws that organize the perception experience. However, Allport F (1955) 
later counted these elements under six general elements and summarized them, as 
follows: 
1- Form 
The central idea of Gestalt theory of perception is the form. In fact, form is the main 
characteristic that distinguishes the percepts from structure. Form is the creation of the 
phenomenological image which contrasts the figure or the percept which is the product 
of the retinal image. Form generally resists alteration, it differs from the elements that 
are changeable, but form is that order of arrangement that set up between the 
constituents. In addition, form is not to be considered as a mere aggregate of simple 
parts since form implies a rule of order that remains invariant during the dynamic 
processes taking place in the perceptual situation. 
II- Wholeness 
It is a claim about the fact that perceptual field has to be taken into account as one 
whole. It is also mentioned that the individual life, his past, present and future has to be 
taken into one the whole. The Gestaltists use the term "whole" as synonymous with the 
term form. The difference between form and whole is that whole is more general and 
wider concept than form because it can, in addition to the perceptual situation, refer to 
the individual's experience as one continuum or one whole and understands the events 
in the light of that experiential whole. However, the term "whole" is more used in 
accordance to the parts to show the logical priority of whole over the parts. Wholeness, 
as a characteristic attributed to perception, means there is a presupposed structural 
element organizing the relationships between constituents. Therefore, there is a close 
relationship between the whole and its parts in the sense that when the parts are less 
tightly bound together, the form quality of the whole tends to disappear and vice versa. 
---
A clear example, when the relationships between the parts composing the perceptual 
situation are setting up close to each other, the chance of organizing these parts in a 
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whole is more easier if the relationships between the parts are sufficiently apart from 
each other. Like in Kohler's experiment on Sultan the famous monkey as we shall 
discuss in Chapter Eight. Wholeness is as a quality that shows, by a dynamic process 
of mind, that parts are fitted in pre-constructive whole. Kohler considers that the 
dynamic process is the new turn that has to be methodologically taken into account 
when we discuss perception. 
The Gestaltists ascribed a quality of holistic structuralism to perceptual experience 
instead of considering it as a simple aggregation of impressions and sensible elements. 
III-Field and Forces 
This concept comes from physics and the Gestaltists used it to explain the nature of 
perception. It was Lewin, among the Gestaltists, who promote; field and forces in his 
The Conceptual Representation and The Measurement of Psychological Forces 1938, 
and Field Theory and Learning 1942. Lewin and the other Gestaltists demonstrated 
their understanding of the concept of field when they presented their views on 
perception and human behaviour. In addition, Lewin was unique among them because 
he used the concept of force and re-used it in his social psychology to explain the 
human behaviour when there is a conflict of forces in social situations. Field is, by 
Lewin, considered as a medium that maintains equilibrium between conflicting forces in 
social situations. The behaviour of objects is determined by the structure of the field of 
which they are a part (Hartmann, 1935: 68). 
IV- Transposition, Transformation and Flexibility 
These three concepts refer to one fact and reflect the nature of the phenomenological 
object as the Gestaltists understood it. They show there is mental activity that leads to 
the re-organization of visual perceptual forms and brings new phenomenological objects 
out of the object represented by retinal image. The concept of transposition was raised 
by Ehrenfels when he published his observation on the transposition of tunes. 
Transposition means that the same structure or form can be realized by different 
elements e.g. major scale form realized by different sets of notes with different pitches, 
timbres~ Ehrenfels explained that rhythmic structure is very important for the tune 
because we can still display the same rhythmic structure even using a different pitch. 
Perception of music is concerned with sensory forms, however the same understanding 
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can be investigated in motor and visual forms. The same understanding can be applied 
to the concept of transformation, the Gestaltists call the changes that take place in our 
perceptual field and lead to changes in the phenomenological image as perceptual 
transformations. Transformation can be identified as changing the perceptual situation 
sufficiently brings about a change in form e.g. delay between light flashes increasing 
to>0.2 seconds. The Gestaltists explain and justify these changes that take place in the 
perceptual field by claiming that when the organizational field is changed a new order 
of arrangement is required and perceptual transformation will be recognized. These two 
concepts; transparency and transformation lead to the third characteristic that was 
flexibility. Flexibility means that the same elements can be arranged in different forms. 
They explained the fact that constituents of any phenomenological object are not fixed 
constituents or have independent properties rather they are transformable and flexible 
and can be re-formed when perceptual structure changes. 
V- Bounding Features, Symmetry and Goodness of Form 
The parts of the perceived configuration have bounding features that allow them to give 
a comprehensive form to the perceivers. The form as opposed to the ground tends to be 
simple, balanced and symmetrical compared to the ground. The characteristic of 
symmetry of form is a clear tendency toward the Goodness of form. According to the 
Gestaltists the term Good refers to characteristics such as; regularity, symmetry, 
harmony and unity. These properties must be included when we perceive visual forms. 
VI -Organization 
The concept of organization underlies the whole Gestalt view of perception. According 
to the Gestaltists, organization determines the relationship between the form and its 
parts. The field of organization is the true answer to Kohler's question of why things 
look as they do. His answer is based on his analysis of the organizational forms that 
order and organize things in the perceptual situations. The elements of any 
phenomenological object are grouped and organized according to the system of 
reference of the perceiver. The organizational field is presupposed in every perceptual 
experience-and it is not an outcome of simple aggregations of these elements. 
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These are the Non-Physical elements that show the structural account of the Gestaltists 
of perception. It seems that the Gestaltists would face difficulties regarding their 
explanations of perceptual experience, if they did not support the idea that reason has 
comprehensive orders of organization that have to be taken in account. This view raises 
the claim that there is a transcendental account of the Gestaltists involved in their view 
of perception. This transcendental view along with a systematic dynamic approach will 
be a distinctive view of the Gestaltists. The Gestaltists believe that there are some 
constructive or non- physical elements presupposed in perceptual experience that had to 
be understood in that context and not as a mere aggregation of elements. The Gestaltists 
present different examples to confirm that view. For example, we can trace their 
structuralism from Max Wertheimer's idea of the phi-phenomenon (the impression of 
apparent movement). Phi-phenomenon is that apparent movement produced by 
presenting two visual elements in two different locations, with a short time interval. If 
we take an example of Phi-Phenomenon such as the example discussed by Wertheimer, 
it reflects the Gestaltists' claim that perceptual experience implies something 
constructive, transcending the total sum of sensible impressions. 
Consider a subject seated in a dark room. Two spots of light are flashed off and on 
alternately. When the interval between these two flashes is more than 0.2 seconds, the 
subject sees two separated flashing lights, but when the interval is less than 0.2 seconds, 
the light apparently moves, e.g. the character of the experience determined by the 
relation between the flashes. The subject will perceive, instead of two separate flashes, 
an object that seems to move from one position to another. In reality it is merely 
presented twice in two different places with an appropriate short time interval between 
both exposures. This experiment shows that an object is apparently moving despite the 
fact that the movement is not supposed as a separate element of the visual experience 
that includes only two separated flashes. These kinds of experiments on perception led 
the Gestaltists to argue that perceptual experience involves a structural element is not an 
outcome of simple aggregation of the sensible elements or the parts implied in the 
perceptual situation (Leahey, 1992: 197). 
The Gestaltists applied this to different sorts of perceptual experience other than visual 
experience. David Katz applied the above-mentioned result to explain audio experience 
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of rhythm. He indicated that it is impossible to capture a rhythm if the interval between 
metronome beats is separated by long intervals. However, if the intervals between 
metronome beats are short, then a subject will easily realize the rhythm. Katz went 
further in his analysis by explaining that if the metronome beats are at equal intervals 
but there are two loud beats consistently followed by two soft beats, then the soft beats 
will be grouped as sub rhythms under the total rhythmic structure. 
If the subject hears a series of metronome beats separated by short intervals it is practically 
impossible to think of each beat as isolated. Two, or several, always combine to form a rhythmic 
series. The rhythmic effect becomes more distinct if all the beats are not presented at equal intervals, 
but in such a manner that two or three always follow each other with the same separation, and are 
separated from the next group by longer pause ... .If in a series of metronome beats at equal intervals 
two loud beats are consistently followed by two soft beats, the soft beats will be grouped and the 
same may be said for the loud ones. They will be heard as sub rhythms in the total rhythmic pattern. 
All rhythmic processes, whether they occur in music, dancing, or everyday colloquial speech, can be 
treated scientifically only if regarded from a holistic viewpoint. No rhythmic experience is 
explainable on an atomistic basis. (Katz, 1951: 34-35). 
The Gestaltists emphasized from their experiments that the whole is greater than its 
constituents. The visual perceptual experience presupposed an organizational order that 
set up the relationships between the parts of the whole. The question now is what are 
the aspects of their structuralism? The aim of the following pages is to discuss these 
structural aspects of the Gestalt theory of perception. Therefore, I will start with the first 
structural aspect of their theory of perception. 
5-3-1 Structuralism and Perceptual Organization: 
It is important to define what is meant by perceptual organization. Perceptual 
organization is a psychological process that finds different ways for ordering and 
grouping detached elements in a perceptual situation by bringing them together under 
one form. For the Gestaltists the main concern was the structures that bring systematic 
arrangements between the constituents of the perceptual situation. Wertheimer claimed 
.that we do not perceive objects as an accumulation of isolated sensations, rather -we 
perceive them as organized wholes or as Gestalten: 
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I stand at the window and see a house, trees, and sky. Now on theoretical grounds I could try to count 
and say: here these are .... 327 brightness and hues, do I have 327? No, I see sky, house, trees and no 
one can really have these 327 as such. (Wertheimer, 1958: 115). 
Gestalt psychologists presented a new view that states that instead of reacting to the 
local stimulus, the organism responds generally to the pattern of stimuli where the parts 
of the pattern are organized in respect of specific orders or laws. In fact these laws are 
on application of a unitary process producing a functional whole that we acquire in the 
perceptual situation by Insight. The "whole" that we see is something that is more 
structured and cohesive than a group of separate particles. The question now is what are 
these functional laws of perceptual organization as discussed by the Gestaltists? In 
addition, how do these laws demonstrate the structural account of perception? 
According to the Gestalt psychologists, there are over a hundred laws that organize 
perceptual experience. However, only the most famous laws that are most frequently 
mentioned in their literature will be discussed. These laws are the following: 
1-Figure and Ground:-
The law of figure and ground is one of the most important laws that organizes our 
visual field. It is a law that states perception is organized into a figure and ground where 
the figure has to stand apart from its ground. The Gestaltists distinguished between 
figure and ground as a form that had previously been perceived as ground could 
function in a surprising way when experienced as a figure. For them, figure is simpler, 
more structured, and perceptually dominant part of the situation. The ground could be 
everything else, the surroundings apart from the figure perceived. The relation between 
ground and figure is always determined by the characteristics of reversibility where the 
form can be turned to be a ground and vice versa. How can a figure possibly be 
perceived as ground? Edger Rubin (1915-1958) a Danish Gestalt psychologist presented 
different experiments that aimed to find an answer to the question. In German, he 
expressed this as "wie der Grund gestaltist wird" How the ground becomes structured 
(Rubin, quoted from Beardslee& Wertheimer, 19 58: 194). 
- - Edger Rubin helped to answer the question when he set up the first law of perceptual 
organization in which he distinguished between figure and form and draws the relation 
156 
Chapter Five: Gestalt Theory of Perception and Structuralism 
between them. He illustrated the fact that a figure is perceived more as simpler than the 
ground and the figure usually lies upon the ground because it has a definite shape and is 
more dominant and more impressive than the ground (Maltin, 1988: 156-157). 
For the Gestaltists, the perception of structure was not only primary, it was basic: that (is even), 
the simplest percept is distinguished by the elementary discrimination of a structured figure 
from its unstructured ground. The major thrust of their work was to identify the laws of 
organization which determine what will be seen as figure and why. (Hagen, 1980:1 0). 
Rubin gave some impressive examples showing the specific relationship between figure 
and ground. One of the most famous examples is the two faces and the vase. When you 
look at this image you might see either a pair of silhouette faces gazing at each other or 
an ornate vase. The vase appears white against a black ground, whereas the faces appear 
black against a white ground. 
Figure (5-1) 
How does the figure - ground law reflect the structuralism of visual perceptual forms? 
Structuralism can be understood as the pure possibility of re-arrangements the contents 
of experience under holistic wholes that organize our perceptual fields. It is the task 
which aims to explain the changes take place over the phenomenological image and 
explain these changes in the light of the dynamic processes such as reversibility, 
rotation and transformation. That explains how one goes beyond the figure given in the 
direct experience and represents and constructs it differently from the simple 
representation of the given figure. If structuralism will be understood in that sense, then 
I will try to examine that meaning through different forms of perceptual experience. 
Figure and ground, as a way of organizing the constituents of perceptual situation, is 
addressing that definition in that sense. 
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It is impossible for a person to perceive two perceptual forms simultaneously. The 
reason is that two frame of references cannot be given at the same time. Only one 
phenomenological image is represented in the light of a frame of reference and when it 
is replaced by another one, a different phenomenological image will be represented. The 
dominant frame of reference determines the order of arranging the relationships 
between the constituents of the form. 
2- The law of Proximity: 
This law states that: the objects that are closest to each other tend to form groups. 
According to this law, one will see the arrangement of two sets of dots not as a set of 
rows but rather a set of columns. We tend to perceive items that are near each other as 
groups. In other words, objects or events that are near to one another (in space or time) 
are perceived as belonging together as a unit. The Gestaltists applied the physiological 
understanding of the facts of brain functions to the field of visual perception. They 
suggested two points of excitation in the brain produced by the stimulation of the retina 
by two points of light, set up fields. The end result is a force of attraction between the 
points of excitation, the closer the points are to each other; the stronger the force of 
attraction between them. The law of proximity is a reflection of that understanding. 
(Schiffman, 1996: 173-175). 
3- The law of Similarity: 
Similar objects tend to be grouped together and also items that are similar in some way 
tend to be grouped together. For example, when more than one kind of element is 
present, those which are similar tend to form groups. The difference between this law 
and the law of proximity is based on the fact that grouping of perceptual elements by 
similarity takes place in spite of the fact that the distances between unlike elements are 
equal to the distances between similar ones. Moreover, grouping may also occur when 
only certain parts of elements have a similar colour or form. It seems that the law of 
similarity is the simplest law among the gestalt organizational laws. Because this law 
concentrates on qualitative characteristics as a way of grouping and ignore the other 
char_acteristics that can be taken into account in classification and ordering tlie elements. ·· 
4- The law of Good Continuation: 
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This law is also called "the law of good continuation" by Max Wertheimer. It states that 
there is an innate tendency to perceive a line as continuing its established direction. The 
perceptual elements of a form that appear to follow in the same direction, as in a straight 
line or simple curve, tend to be grouped together. For example, a straight line is a more 
stable structure than a broken one, and therefore organization will occur in such a way 
that a straight line will continue as a straight line. The unique feature of that law lies in 
the fact that it is used in the field of geometry and visual space. For example, if one sees 
two parallel straight lines and there is a straight line passing through them, then we tend 
to perceive that line as one continued straight line. This law indeed shows clearly that 
perceiving any perceptual form requires something greater than a mere accumulation of 
elements. 
For example in figure (5-2) the perceptual figure breaks up into two different forms: a 
circle A and a rectangle B. although there is a part in the figure (1) is not apparent 
because of the rectangle hides that part, still we think of that figure as a circle. It is not 
the retinal image that lets us to perceive the figure as a circle. But there is another 
process that suggested by the Gestaltists that let us perceive this uncompleted figure as a 
completed form. Why do we perceive a good and continuous figure of a circle even 
though it is not represented by the retinal image? The answer lies in the fact that there is 
a non-physical element presupposed and ascribed to the experience of constructing our 
perceptual form. Without that structured element, we would not be able to interpret 
perception. 
A B 
Figure (5-2) 
5- The law of Closure: 
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This law states that when a space is enclosed by a contour, it tends to be perceived as a 
figure. In other words, that there is an innate tendency to perceive incomplete objects as 
complete and to close or fill gaps and to perceive asymmetric stimuli as symmetric. 
When a circle has a missing part, although geometrically it is not a circle, our reason 
closes that missing part, and perceives it as a complete form of a circle. The same 
thought is applicable to three simple separated acute angles, where we arrange them in a 
certain order to be perceived as a triangle. The same question why do we perceive forms 
as completed and closed despite they are not? The same answer applies because of the 
constructive nature of reason. 
6- The law of Pragnanz: 
This law was introduced by Wertheimer, who called it the law of Pragnanz. The 
law of Pragnanz refers to the idea of "Good" in the sense that it can mean several 
things such as regular, orderly, simplistic, symmetrical, etc. The law of Pragnanz is 
sometimes referred to as the law of good figure or the law of simplicity. This law 
holds that objects in the environment are seen in a way that makes as simple as 
possible. The Gestaltists considered that reality is organized and reduced to the 
simplest form possible. Like the symbol of Olympic Games, we tend to perceive the 
five circles as simple circles rather than as many much more complicated shapes. 
The most significant issue here is that the law of Pragnanz implies a systematic meaning 
that brings about to the objects presented by the phenomenological image. Koffka 
indicated those systematic meanings implied in the concept of Pragnanz when he 
presented his definition of Pragnanz. He explained that the idea of "good form" refers to 
characteristics such as regularity, symmetry, inclusiveness, unity, harmony, maximal, 
and simplicity (Koffka, 1935: 110). 
The gestalt laws of perception emphasize the organizational relationship between 
perceptual elements and structural wholes. A gestalt as we could see, is a product of 
organization, and organization is the process that leads to a gestalt. The perceptual 
elements being parts of a structural whole, are ordered in light of internal rules of 
~carrangement implied in the whole. Wertheimer expresses that fact when he~ admitted the--- --
organizational relation between parts and its whole: 
What happens to a part of the whole, is determined by intrinsic laws inherent in this whole. 
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(Koffka,1935: 682). 
The Gestalt laws of perceptual organization emphasize one important fact concerning 
perception: the logical priority of structures over the parts. This understanding shows 
the active role of reason in going beyond the information given in perception. 
The laws of Gestalt psychology confirmed the belief that we perceive objects as 
structured coherent wholes rather than as their component parts. 
The main theme of gestalt research was a set of laws describing what types of perceptual structures 
are systematically evoked by particular types of patterns. (Roth & Frisby, 1986: 97). 
The question is whether the organizational form of grouping the perceptual elements is 
absolute and permanently fixed or is it flexible and changeable? This question will be 
discussed in the next section. 
5-3-2 Change of Perceptual Organization 
The aim of this section is to explore the relative nature of perceptual forms represented 
by the phenomenological images as being one characteristic of the Gestalt structuralism. 
There are two points of departure that can clarify the specific nature of perceptual 
forms. These two points represent two approaches on which this argument depends. 
These two approaches are the following; the geometrical approach and the physiological 
approach. Before discussing these two approaches, I would like to present a diagram 
that explains, according to the Gestaltists, how phenomenological image is different 
from retinal image in representing the objects, and what are the dynamic processes of 
rotation and transformation are involved in constructing phenomenological image. 
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A Figure 
The Eye 
(Retinal Image) 
2D Form. 
"Invariant" 
3D Form. 
Frame of Reference 
"Invariant" 
(Phenomenolo ical Image) 
Figure (5-3) 
In this diagram, the eye perceives a figure and this figure is represented on the retinal 
image. This figure is a thing and its properties are fixed and unchanged. However, the 
Gestaltists explained that the phenomenological image is representing/arms and 
structures. The properties of these forms are flexible and changeable in respect to the 
frame of reference that presupposed to be invariant during perceptual transformation. 
This model can also be applied to all the Gestaltists 's experiments of visual perception. 
Phenomenological Image 
Shows an apparent movement as one moving ball 
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Figure (5-4) 
Retinal Image of two motionless separate balls 
the Retinal image shows two separate balls, as a thing while the phenomenological 
image shows a form of a moving ball that is really one ball presented first on the left 
over the stationary ball and then on the right over the right stationary ball. 
5-3-2-1 physiological approach and perceptual organization 
The main theme of that approach lies in the scientific facts regarding the retina. The 
Gestaltists claimed that various and different perceptual organizations of the same 
retinal image are possible. They explained the possibility of having different perceptual 
organization of the same stimulus during our daily life experiences. They showed that a 
perceptual change may occur even though there is no change in stimuli. In other words, 
our understanding can represent different perceptual forms of the same given figure 
although the physical stimuli remain unchanged. The Gestaltists gave attention to the 
physiological function of the retina to see how it performs during perception. The 
Gestaltists were interested in the debate between the physiologists like Hering and 
Helmholtz on the functions of retina. The debate is well known because it is based upon 
the divide between the nativist and the empiricist. This will be discussed in Chapter 
Seven. Therefore the Gestaltists depended on the physiological investigations to 
develop their knowledge and to make use of these investigations in their psychological 
research. Showing that the organization of the same parts of the perceived figure can be 
varied and re-ordered without changing the stimulus led the Gestaltists to contrast some 
other schools of psychology such as behaviourists as Watson and Pavlov as we showed 
earlier. 
Koffka ( 1928) rejects Thorndike's view that is opposed to the Gestalt and hence Koffka 
set up his objection in light of Thorndike's statement. He cons_id~~d t}l~t_eve_ry __ act 
consists --of three compo-nent parts: the perceptual situation, the reaction and the 
relationship between them: 
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First the situation, within as well as without the body, which stimulates the individual; secondly, the 
reaction, a process within the individual which is a result of this stimulation; and lastly, the bond 
which makes this connection between the situation and the response possible. (Koffka, 1928: 94 
quoted from Thorndike, 1914, 1). 
For example, the Gestaltists refer to Pavlov's experiments in which a dog is trained to 
react when it hears a certain tone as a signal of food, especially when Pavlov did not 
feed the dog for a long time and the latter was starving. Pavlov usually supplies the dog 
with food after the tone immediately. Pavlov noticed that the dog, after hearing the tone 
a few frequent times, was physiologically ready to have his food even if the food was 
not immediately given to him after the tone. Pavlov explained the behaviour of the dog 
in terms of a conditional bond between the stimulus and the behaviour and he concluded 
that all the human behaviours and their responses are a result of these conditional bonds 
that we acquire in social and perceptual situations through training and learning. 
Rejecting Pavlov's explanation, the Gestaltists explained this fact by arguing that the 
animal had not responded to a particular stimulus but to the whole situation and the 
relationship between the constituents that may be arranged under one whole form as we 
shall discuss the Gestalists' experiments to animal behaviour. (Hartmann, 193 5: 116). 
The Gestlatists used the physiological approach to explain how perceptual organization 
takes place between the parts involved in the perceptual situation. I will choose three 
examples that illustrate the flexibility of perceptual organization that takes place in the 
phenomenological images. The Gestaltists used reversible figures as a way of 
supporting their claim. The first example is a very famous one that has been mentioned 
in different literature on Gestalt. In figure (5-5) there are two possible figures, a young 
lady and her mother in law. We can perceive firstly either a young lady or an old lady 
and afterwards, it follows that we perceive a second form by re-organizing and re-
grouping the constituents of the figure and therefore will construct different 
phenomenological form different from the figure perceived. The second example 
(figure5-6 A) has the same property of reversibility, it also includes two possible 
phenomenological forms that can be constructed fro111 the same e<onstituents oLthe 
fi-gure. The h~·~d is either th~t of a d~ck o;-~h~t ~f~ rabbit. 
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The last example shows that a profile (figure 5-6B) can also be constructed and 
phenomenologically represented differently from the figure if we rotate it. We would 
have two possible phenomenological forms . For example when we rotate the figure 45 
degree counter clockwise we would perceive a profile of a chef and if we rotate the 
same figure 45 degree clockwise, we would perceive a form of small dog (Rock, 1975 : 
264-265) . 
..... -- .. ----- ... ··· ······ -- .. -~~.{[~- :-··:··· 
i :· :~,1~ . ' 
J. ·. I r', · 
! -~L, 
Figure (5-6A) Figure (5-6 B) Figure (5-5) 
These two possible phenomenological forms perceived in the last example can be 
simply viewed even if we do not rotate the figure 45 degree. The rotation of the figure 
only aims to simplify our perception and has nothing to do with the changes in the 
stimuli. These processes of rotation and transformation are dynamically functioned to 
bring possible forms out of the figure given in the immediate experience. Here we can 
see there are changes in the organization of elements composed the figures despite the 
fact that neither these elements nor the physical stimulus included in the perceptual 
situation have changed. The question now is how the Gestaltists explained the changes 
that happened to the perceived figure even though the stimuli remains unchanged in 
respect of their physiological perspective? 
They justified that situation by giving an explanation of perception in terms of neural 
events. The cunent flow in neural cells causes a fatigue to the cortical medium. The 
state of neural fatigue will block the neural process necessary for the continued 
experience of the form that is perceived. They concluded that there is a positive relation 
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between the cortical projection of the contour in the retinal image associated with a flow 
of direct current in the cortical medium and the perception of visual forms (Koffka, 
1928: 22-23). 
Although the physiological explanation of perceptual changes presented by the gestalt 
psychologists was a simple explanation, it did not have same scientific accuracy typical 
of physiological investigations of their time. As evidence of that Muller, a physiologist 
who defended associationism, explained the changes that take place in the perceptual 
forms by proposing a chemical theory of visual excitation according to which the 
processes of the retina and optic nerves involve reversible chemical reactions. Muller 
rejected the Gestalt's theory of fatigue nerves with his chemical theory of visual 
excitation. Being an associationist, Muller also objected to the Gestaltist's idea of 
physical forms as being structural wholes. 
The Gestaltists defended their view that the elements of phenomenological object are 
organized and hence comprehended as being parts of holistic structures. Even their 
attempt to justify changes within perceptual forms was criticised by Muller. The 
Gestaltists had their own account to explain the changes of perceptual forms. They 
reject the ideas of both a Nativist like Muller and an empiricist like Helmholtz regarding 
their justifications of perceptual changes of forms. Instead, they chose functional 
dynamical theory to account for these changes, as we shall discuss fully in Chapter 
Seven. The most interesting point that follows their functional dynamic theory was to 
emphasize the importance and need to have holistic and systematic structures that are 
not derived from experience itself. The physiological approach indicated the need to 
appeal to holistic wholes to make perception of physical forms possible. Kohler asserted 
this fact in his Gestalt Psychology by showing the mistakes of the machine theory of 
local or physical stimulus: 
It has been shown that many sensory experiences cannot be related to purely local conditions of 
stimulation because such local conditions never give rise to anything like those of experiences. The 
facts to which I am alluding are attributes only of certain areas in space and stretches in the 
dimension of time. Now, extended physical processes, the parts of which are functionally interrelated, 
may also have characteristics of their own, characteristics which cannot be related to merely local 
_cqnditio_ns .. But machine theory of the- nervous system excludes this possibility, because the 
assumption of extended processes with functionally interrelated parts is incompatible with the 
principal tents ofthe theory. (Kohler, 1947: 120-121). 
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To sum up, the Gestalists argued against the physiological approach of explaining the 
nature of perception. They found that the physiological approach could not give a 
proper explanation of changes that took places in perceptual forms and could not 
explain the dynamic process of transformations taking place over the phenomenological 
forms. However, the physiological explanation of the Gestaltists stressed the importance 
of going beyond the explanation of the modifications through changes in stimuli, as a 
necessary condition for these changes in phenomenological form. On the contrary, the 
Gestaltists showed the need to explain these changes in light of other holistic structures 
that are not derived from direct experience and need to be activated by dynamic 
processes. Now we will discuss another way of explaining the changes that take place in 
the phenomenological image that we call it as the geometrical approach of explaining 
perception and we will compare it with the physiological approach and see to what 
extent the geometrical approach addresses the structuralism of perception. 
5-3-2-2. The Geometrical approach and perceptual organization 
The Gestaltists explain the changes that take place in perceptual situations by using 
geometrical understanding and some geometrical examples to provide an explanation 
for the changes that occur in spatial forms of perception. We do not see a great 
difference between physiological and geometrical approaches, for both explain changes 
in light of the re-organization of the perceptual constituents of the phenomenological 
form that presuppose new structural orders of arrangements. The gestalt psychologists 
like Max Wertheimer and Kurt Lewin were concerned with geometry and used some 
geometrical examples to confirm their claims that perceptual experience presupposed a 
structural element that orders the detached parts in a systematic whole as we will 
discuss in both visual space and learning experiences. 
Wertheimer used the projective geometry as a model to explain the changes takes place 
in a phenomenological image representing a spatial form. These changes are explicable 
through dynamic process of rotation and transformations as discussed in his ex~ple~ _ 
discussed in Chapter Eight. Lewin also used topology as a way of defining his theory of 
social field. Therefore they used geometrical terms to apply them to perception. For 
example, the Gestaltists, through their work, used the terms, transformation and 
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invariance in their mathematical sense and applied them to develop their theory of the 
perception of space. 
5- 4 Experience and the Concept of In variance 
The idea of invariance gained its importance from Klein's v1ew of geometry as 
explained in Chapter Four. This concept found its application not only in mathematics 
but also in social sciences. 
Invariance is the nature of a quantity or property or function that remains unchanged 
when a given transformation is applied to it; "the in variance of the configuration under 
translation" The invariance as a principle aims to arrange the relationship between the 
constituents of the group in respect to a factor that remains unchanged (Fieandt, & 
Moustgaard, 1977:358). 
In psychology there is a second set of items called the phenomenological or perceptual 
invariant. The Gestaltists meant by the concept of invariance that the pattern, through 
which we perceive and arrange the relationship between perceptual elements, remains 
unchanged when the conditions that determine the perceptual situation remain unaltered 
as shown in figure(S-3). 
The Gestaltists used the concept of invariant in contrast to the hypothesis of constancy 
used by empiricists. The empiricists supposed that the relationship between a specific 
local stimulus and a sensation remains unaltered although the stimulus that hits a certain 
sensation changes. The Gestaltists objected to the empiricist's concept of constancy. For 
them the constancy is not the constancy of the thing, rather the constancy of the form or 
structure as we construct it to represent what is given in experience. The difference 
between the Gestaltists and the empiricists regarding the concept of invariance can be 
summarized under these two senses: according to the Gestaltists, any property 
r$PE~§~!l:!~d jn. _the~ ph~nomenologicaLimage ochas a relative· place within -a',C·certain 
perceptual situation under certain conditions. However, according to the empiricists, 
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any property represented in the retinal image has an absolute value in itself regardless of 
the changes of perceptual conditions. 
For example, for the Gestaltist the colour as represented in the phenomenological image 
has a relative nature determined through the nature and the intensity of illumination, but 
the empiricist believes that colour represented in the retinal image is determined by the 
colour of the thing in the external world as having an independent property apart from 
the conditions which determine the perceptual experience. The concept of invariance 
played a role in the Gestaltists' views when they discussed issues like size, space, form, 
colour and movement. Koffka in his 1935 gives an example of what the Gestaltists 
mean by invariance: 
When we look through the window of our mountain-railway carriage, this window becomes our 
spatial framework and appears, therefore, in normal, horizontal-vertical orientation. The contours of 
the objects seen through the window do not intersect the sash at right angles. Therefore, if the sash is 
seen as horizontal, these objects cannot be seen as vertical, but must appear leaning away from us on 
the ascent, and towards us on the descent. If Fig (5-7) gives a somewhat exaggerated picture of the 
real positions of the window and a telegraph pole, then it shows at the same time why the telegraph 
pole cannot appear vertical when the window becomes the framework and the picture until the lower 
side of the window is horizontal; then of course the telegraph pole is tilted to the right as much as in 
our drawing the window is tilted to the left. The angle between the pole and the window sash, then, 
determines the relative localization of the two objects with regard to each other, whereas their 
absolute localization is determined by those parts of the field which form the spatial framework. If 
one sticks one's head out of the window, the telegraph pole will soon look vertical; when then, 
without losing sight of it, one withdraws the head, the telegraph pole will still appear vertical and the 
windows, the whole carriage, tilted. One factor in these two situations is invariant, the angle between 
ground and object. (Koffka, 1935 :218). 
Figure (5-7) 
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The Gestaltists presupposed a structural element needed for the perceptual organizing 
experience and ordering the constituents of perceptual situation. 
We can see here that invariance is not referring to a simple accumulated relationship 
such as co-existence or similarity, but a lawful and a functional relationship between 
structural order and the parts composing the phenomenological object. 
It seems clear that the idea of invariance as considered as a structural idea manifests the 
possible ways to find various orders of grouping the constituents of the form as 
represented by the phenomenological Image. For the constituents of a 
phenomenological form will be ordered differently, from the figure as represented by 
retinal image, in respect of the dynamic processes that lead to changes take place over 
visual forms. 
The gestalt psychologists sought to show the validity of invariance when it is applied in 
perceptual experience. They gave different examples to show how the invariant as a 
principle can explain how the constituents of the form can be ordered with respect to 
certain kind of transformation under an invariant. For instance, both Katz and Gelb 
presented experiments on illumination and its reflection on visual perception of colour. 
They show that the colour of an object perceived can be represented differently when 
we display it in various illuminations and even in normal light with different degrees of 
intensity. Katz and Gelb showed that the colour of the phenomenological image is 
relative to the conditions designed in perceptual situation. Gelb showed in his 
experiment that the representation of the colour of a disk is changeable regarding the 
transformation occurred during perceptual situation. 
In a dark room a perfectly homogeneous black disk is rotated; this disk, and nothing else, is strongly 
illuminated by a projection lantern. Under these conditions the disk looks white and the room black. 
Then the experimenter holds a small piece of white paper close to and in front of the rotating disk so 
that it falls within the cone of light. At the same moment the disk alters its appearance, and looks 
black. (Koffka, 1935:245-246). 
In this experiment, the whole perceptual field was divided into two parts, a dark room 
and a black disk but when we added a new part, "the white paper" to the perceptual 
situation, the perceptual organization is totally changed. The strip of paper is a new 
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condition added to the perceptual situation and led to a transformation by which the disk 
was phenomenologically represented differently (Hamlyn, 1957: 67 -68). 
The dynamic process presupposes the frame of reference of the person who perceives it 
to be invariant during the process of construction. Koffka stressed the importance of 
perceptual "reference frames" in stabilizing the perceptual field (Gregory, 1974: 27). 
To that extent Cassirer and the Gestaltists shared the same idea of the importance of the 
concept of invariance in analysing the perceptual experience, as we explained in 
Chapter Four. Cassirer's view of the invariance of experience also implies that 
experience must have systematic structures that allow a perceiver to arrange and to 
relate the constituents of form constructively. 
The perceptual image as well involves that reference to certain possible groups of transformation. It 
changes when we refer it to a different group and determine the "invariants" of perception 
accordingly ( Cassirer, 1944: 16). 
After discussing the ways that gestalt psychologists tried to show the structural aspect of 
perception by applying geometrical concept of invariance, another aspect of the gestalt 
structuralism regarding perception will be discussed. 
5-4-1 Group Theory and perceptual Transformation 
Another aspect of the Gestaltists' structuralism concerning perception can be viewed 
through another geometrical concept such as transformation. Both invariance and 
transformation are central to the Gestaltist's analyses of perception. To perceive any 
object, we need to assume that shape perception is mediated by those geometrical 
properties of a figure that do not change (are invariant) when the figure is transformed 
in specific ways. Any given set of transformations partition the total set of figural 
properties into two subsets: those that change over the transformation and those that do 
not change. For example, when a form is rotated the line orientations of the form 
changes, but angle sizes do not change due to the fact it is invariant (Palmer, 1983: 275-
276). 
Klein used the idea of group to investigate whether geometry can be characterized by a 
group of transformations and he argued that geometrical systems are really concerned 
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with invariants under a group of transformations. For Klein, the concept of 
transformation presupposes an invariant element, in respect to which, transformations 
will be understood (Kline, 1972: 917). 
It was a difficult task for the Gestaltists to trace the structural aspect of perception 
through these geometrical concepts. However, in the history of science there are other 
philosophers and psychologists who were also interested in developing the structural 
view of perception: Cassirer, Piaget and Gibson also applied geometrical concepts to the 
field of psychology. Although there were differences between these philosophers and 
psychologists and the Gestaltists concerning their approaches and analyses of the nature 
of structures implied in perception, they agreed that perception proceeds in the light of 
general rules. For instance, Piaget and the Gestaltists were in disagreement on the 
concept of apriorism as applied in psychology: 
The organism assimilates the action of the environment according to its own structure which is 
independent of the environment and resists any modification by outside forces. (Piaget, 1971 : 5) 
The Gestaltists rejected Piaget's apnonsm and instead understood structuralism as 
representing possible phenomenological forms through different dynamic processes. 
They indicate that any reaction is a function of many variables, which does not mean a 
sum total of different processes. 
Sometimes the term "structure" is used in a purely geometrical sense. But when I use the term in our 
present connection, it refers to a functional aspect of processes, to the distribution of such processes. 
A distribution which they assume (and may also maintain) as a consequence of the dynamic 
interrelations or interactions among their parts. (Kohler, 1969: 91-92). 
The Gestalt psychologists sought to bring the systematic and constructive aspect of 
perception through their experiments and interpretations of the facts of perception. 
This constructive aspect can be traced through different references in their works 
concerning perceptual transformations that take place during the process of 
perception. These transformations can be seen when we discuss perceptual space and 
the transformation of two- dimensional space to three-dimensional space, as we will 
see later. 
By perceptual transformation, the Gestaltists meant a process in which there will be a 
phenomenal change to the form. In this process we can see a figure such as a square 
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can be represented as a trapezium in the case of spatial transformation or a white sheet 
of paper can be represented as yellowish in the case of colour transformation. 
The order of arrangements between the constituents of the form can be re-arranged 
differently when the perceiver functionally changes his perspective of representing 
perceptual form. In that case, the relationship between the constituents will be ordered 
in respect of the new structure that requires a sort of transformation of the relationship 
between the constituents of the form represented. As a result, certain transformations 
take place in the perceiver's perceptual field. 
There is a new form represented in the perceptual experience that led to a kind of 
transformation from the form with narrow sectors to a form with large sectors. This new 
form has to be understood not as something in and by itself. It is a new whole that no 
longer depends on what a figure is as a particular thing. However, that a form is 
represented here shows that it is transformable and it has to be understood within a form 
into which it is integrated and in which it represented. Perceptual transformation 
determines the structures of perception to a considerable extent because we go beyond 
the particular given figure. But with these two concepts of invariance and 
transformation, we transcend the particular thing as having unchanged and independent 
properties as reflected by the retinal image to a form that has relative properties as 
represented by the phenomenological image. 
The question now is, how one can perceive in this figure (5-8) different forms when the 
pattern of perception is changed. In fact a subject can perceive these two patterns of 
narrow and large sectors alternatively as long as he changes his way of looking to the 
figure. This process of changing presupposes a change of the form of arrangement 
between the parts of the form. Therefore there is always a chance to perceive at least 
two perceptual forms. We noticed that the more possible relationship that exist among 
the elements of a form, the more complicated will be the perceptual form we represent. 
In this example, there are two disciplines that suppose two different kinds of arranging 
the parts of the figure, each one of them relate differently between the elements 
composed ~he figure ~d_ 4eps;e_we find two different perceptual fortn:s. We alfdidfhave-
a form with narrow sectors where there are spatial relationships between the points that 
are related in such way that allowed the perceiver to perceive a form with narrow 
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sectors. As a result, the percerver can still perceive the same form but with slight 
changes that took place over the former form with three little sectors. I mean that the 
perceiver when he changed his frame of reference, he found a new order or structure by 
which there was new arrangement of constituents of the form and new different 
relationship could emerge by the new structure. In that case, the perceiver will perceive 
a form with three large sectors. 
FIG. 8 Figure (5-8) 
Another example shows that when an object is not well represented and does not show 
a significant figure, the perceiver can represent the figure and give it a well form by 
different processes of rotation for example which aims to re-arrange the constituents of 
the figure in certain way. In figure (5-9) the figure is not recognised but if we rotate it 
clockwise through 90 degrees, the shape can be phenomenologically represented and 
recognized immediately as the outline of the African continent once we find a suitable 
order of representation. 
Figure (5-9) 
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It is possible to define form or (shape) by the pattern of invariant relationships. A particular form is 
specified if no change occurs in our perception of it even if its elements or component features are 
changed. It is the relationship among the elements, independent of the elements themselves that 
defme a form. (Haber & Hershenson, 1980: 306- 307). 
Cassirer shares with the Gestaltists their view of perception is about how we represent 
them and construct them as they appear to us in perceptual situations. He argued that the 
object we perceive is neither given nor fixed. The structuralism of Cassirer and the 
Gestaltists rests on going beyond the given and instead considering the form as a 
constructive relationship between the constituents which are ordered under specific 
holistic form determining the characteristics of the represented form. 
In perception, too, we do not confine ourselves to the particular, given hie et nunc, to be completely 
absorbed and, as it were, lost in it. We go beyond the particular and integrate it into a certain context. 
As the particular changes its position in the context, it changes its "aspect". We do not apprehend the 
particular as a mere "existence," that simple reality in which there corresponds a particular sensation 
to each particular stimulus. On the contrary, the apprehension of the particular qua" existence" 
involves apprehension of the possibilities of transformation which it contains within itself. 
(Cassirer, 1944: 15). 
After discussing the physiological and geometrical approaches of perceptual 
organization, we need to investigate the validity of our claim concerning the structural 
account of perception by applying it to different perceptual phenomena. Therefore we 
will choose some examples discussed by the Gestaltists to examine the structural 
perspective of perception. Perception of motion will be discussed because it is a part of 
their view of visual perception. 
5-5 Gestalt and the Structure of the Perception of Motion 
The Gestaltists claimed that we perceive one thing as in motion between the two 
images. This view was a claim against the view which argued that what we p<;:rceive is. a_ 
- - - direct refleCtion of the. stimuli given in perceptual situation and nothing else involved in 
retinal image than these stimuli. On the contrary, Wertheimer, like the other Gestaltists, 
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argued that any object is not a bundle of segregated elements composed together. On the 
contrary, Wertheimer, like the other Gestaltists argued that any object is not an 
apparently unrelated aggregate of elements, but it is a structured whole: 
The given is itself in varying degree "structured"("gestaltet"), it consists of more or less definitely 
structured wholes and whole- processes with their whole- properties and laws, characteristic whole-
tendencies and whole- determinations of parts. "Pieces" almost always appear "as parts" in whole 
processes. (Wertheimer, 1922 quoted from Ellis,1950: 14). 
The Phi-Phenomenon is the theoretical psychological process that was suggested by 
Wertheimer, and it explains how a series of static images can be perceived as 
representing motion. Wertheimer published in 1912 this article Experimental Studies 
on the Seeing of Motion, in which a disembodied perception of motion is produced by 
a succession of still images. The classic phi phenomenon experiment involves a 
viewer or audience watching a screen, upon which the experimenter projects two 
images in succession. The first image portrays a line on the left side of the frame. The 
second image portrays a line on the right side of the frame. The images may be shown 
quickly, in rapid succession, or each frame may be given several seconds of viewing 
time. Once both images have been projected, the experimenter asks the viewer or 
audience to describe what they saw. At certain combinations of spacing and timing of 
the two images, a viewer will report a sensation of motion in the space between and 
around the two lines 
Wertheimer supported the idea that the whole properties exhibit a structural unity 
between the elements of the whole. He thought that the properties of wholeness and 
structural processes implied in perception, presupposes a meaning that maintains the 
inner coherence of our experience: 
Wertheimer's primary aim was to show that apparent motion is a unitary experience where a new 
perceptual form begins to emerge. The experience was a full event, rather than a fragmentary sensation. 
According to the structuralism of Wertheimer, perception of movement implies a structure or a whole that 
is not the outcome of the simple aggregation of impressions. Therefore Wertheimer asked whether 
apparent motion is caused by the total aggregation of stimuli or whether it presupposes another structural 
whole that has to be considered the cause of apparent movement? 
(Wertheimer, 1912, 1034 From Shipley, 1961:1032-1089). 
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Wertheimer ascribed the quality of an organized whole that relates interdependence to 
its parts. The quality of structure- function that he ascribes to perception is completely 
distinguished from the aggregation of impressions since the units of the impressions are 
assumed not to have functional relations. This understanding brings us to assume that 
perception, according to Gestalt, means that we grasp our perceptual perspective 
through the response that comes directly from a reaction to the total stimulus- complex 
rather than to its components. This understanding can be traced from the Gestaltists's 
application to the perception of moving objects. Wertheimer claimed that the apparent 
movement of objects is the result of responding to certain wholes or structures that 
group these impressions according to certain order. 
For example, the phi- phenomenon explains the Gestaltist's account regarding apparent 
movement that means that an object seems to move from one position to another when it 
is merely presented twice in two different places with an appropriate short time interval 
between both exposures. Although the perceptual situation includes a group of stimuli, 
none of them can independently explain the apparent movement of things. I have 
discussed earlier in this chapter Wertheimer's experiment concerning two spots of light 
that are flashed off and on alternately with an interval between them more and less than 
0.2 seconds. The development of apparent movement can be traced with the aid of two 
electric bulbs and a metal upright. If we place two lights along the edge of a table 
separated by a few feet and between them and the wall of the room we stand a thin rod. 
If one switches the two lamps on and off, the shadow cast by the rod will move back 
and forth in lively style between the two positions. If the time between the two light 
exposures is less than 30 milliseconds, the two shadows of the rod will appear 
simultaneously; if the interval time is too long then mere quiet succession is noted. 
Wertheimer's experiment on apparent movement can be noticed in our daily life. 
For example, in traffic lights, at the changing of lights when the red light seems to be 
converted to. the green. It seems to us that there is an apparent movement that takes 
place from the red light to the green light. In addition to that, we can clearly capture 
apparent movement through animated cartoons. Although they are group of separated- -
·drawings when they are displayed together and the time between every drawing is short, 
we perceive these separated pictures as a whole portrait. We do not ascribe the qualities 
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of motion, liveliness and vivacity to each drawing separately but when they are grouped 
together in a holistic structure new qualities will be added to them. 
Wertheimer in his 1912 article Experimental Studies on the Seeing of Motion presents 
another example of apparent movement (Kaufman, 1974: 383-384). 
If we draw two lines on the strip of a stroboscope, where the first line is a 3 em horizontal line at the 
beginning of the strip and a second line is in the middle of the strip about 2 em lower. Wertheimer 
explained that if we rotate the stroboscope slowly what we shall notice is that one horizontal line 
appears and then the other and they both appear clearly separated from each other. If we rotate the 
stroboscope faster, then one can see them simultaneously, one above the other, they are there together 
at the same time. However, if we increased the speed of the rotation too much, then these two lines 
can be perceived not only together but also as if they have defmite motion. We can clearly see one 
line instead of two separate lines and this line moves clearly from an upper position into a lower one 
and back again. (Wertheimer, 1912 from Shipley,1961: 1035-1036). 
From Wertheimer's experiment concerning the two horizontal lines that seem to move, 
the Gestaltists could present evidence that perception implies certain holistic structures 
that organize the separate constituents ofthe perceptual situation. 
We shall discuss now another experiment that explains the relationship between light 
and movement. Rubin studied the structures represented as displayed in light. Rubin's 
experiment aimed to show that the light, when it reflects on a moving object, moves 
with the object, despite the fact the light is unmoved. He designed an apparatus in a way 
that enables a wheel to revolve inside a ring that was observed in a dark room. Rubin 
designed the ring to be twice the diameter of the wheel. His idea was to place the light 
on the moving wheel, the result was that the observers reported that they perceived the 
light moves linearly back and forth. In addition, Rubin placed six lights different on the 
wheel and again the observers reported that the lights moved linearly. 
The significance of Rubin's experiment was to show that apparent motion is a quality 
that can be comprehended only in the light of a structural whole. It is a dynamic whole 
that transcends the simple aggregation of elements. It adds to the elements a 
comprehensive form that goes beyond a mere summation of dements._ Acc9rding to · 
CWertheimer, the essential features of the phi phenomenon are the following: it is a 
counter example to the assumption that piecemeal and summative approaches to 
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psychological phenomena are universally adequate; it belongs to a category of genuine 
dynamic experience which must be understood in terms of dynamics rather than reduced 
to static events; finally, it is an example of a structure that is not an arbitrary 
arrangement of events but has inner connectedness. 
The idea of a structural whole is presupposed in the perception of apparent motion. 
Although the perceptual situation includes only different segregated parts, none of these 
constituents involves movement. However, the apparent movement is an outcome of a 
functional constructive process that transcends the simple segregation of the parts. This 
structural whole is nothing more than the pure possibility of constructing forms that can 
order the separated elements and reunify them under comprehensive order. In order to 
understand that structural whole, Hartmann's comment on Wertheimer's view of phi-
phenomenon provides same interesting insight: 
Wertheimer proposed calling this concrete observation of apparent motion the phi-phenomenon, the 
<ll standing for whatever occurred between a, the first exposure, and b, the second. Under special 
conditions, "pure" phi was obtainable; i.e, the observer saw neither a nor b the movement, but simply 
"something in motion" this is a genuine "dynamic" occurrence which on neither a priori nor other 
grounds requires to be traced to a "static" base. (Hartmann, 193 5: 6). 
The Gestalt was a theme for constructing phenomenological forms where the content of 
experience can be functionally constructed through dynamic processes of rotations and 
transformations. The question now is to what extent the Gestaltists could apply these 
constructive aspects to visual perceptual space. 
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6-1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the structural aspects of the Gestalt theory of 
perceptual space. Therefore in this chapter our aim is to prove the claim set up in the 
previous chapter concerning, the Gestalt structural account of psychology. We will try, 
in this chapter, to examine some of the Gestalt experiments on perception regarding 
space. The question of whether or not there is a relationship between the Gestalt 
psychologists' view of perceptual space and Cassirer's invariance theory of experience 
will also be addressed. By examining the perceptual experience of space, we shall be 
able to see how the Gestaltists were structuralists by discussing the difference they 
made between retinal and phenomenological image. I will try to identify the degrees and 
aspects in which the Gestaltists's view of perception is structuralist. The question now 
is, what are the basic features of structuralism as revealed through the different aspects 
of perception as seen by the Gestalt School? The answers to these questions will be 
illustrated in detail throughout this present chapter. 
6-2 The Problem of Visual Perceptual Space 
Visual perceptual space is one of the most controversial issues in perception. Various 
psychologists, physiologists, and philosophers have discussed perceptual space through 
the ages, but it is difficult to study perceptual space, as an independent issue, separate 
from physical space, because every aspect of perceptual space needs to be developed 
and understood in respect of physical space. Perceptual space does not develop in a 
vacuum, rather it needs strata in order to interact and flourish. When we study 
perceptual space, we start from the assumption that the physical world exists externally 
--· ·and' independently from -the-observer. The perceptual -world is -experi~~c~cCby~th~ - -
observers and their visual world is produced through the activity of the brain- eye 
system when light stimulates the eyes of the observer in a perceptual situation. A visual 
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image can be explained as a mechanism between the nerve system and the eyes. The 
nerves in the sense organs when they are stimulated, send signals to the brain that will 
be translated by the brain and compose our responses in different perceptual situations. 
There is disagreement among psychologists and physiologists as to the nature of 
perceptual space. In the ninetieth century there were two distinct groups; nativist and 
empiricist, each with a different account. First there are the nativists, like Hilbert and 
Hering, who claimed that visual space can be understood in light of inborn activities. 
For example, Hering attempted to explain visual perceptual space within his theory of 
local signs: 
This theory stated that each point on the retina has specific innate signs or values for height, width, 
and depth which correspond to specific heights, widths, and depths in the external world. (Forgus, 
1966:183). 
Hering indicates that spatial phenomena can be explained by the fact that the visual 
system can not be regarded as a mosaic of independent response elements that 
corresponds to a simple mosaic of stimulus elements. On the contrary, the visual system 
must be conceptualized in terms of the tissues of an interrelated whole, rather than 
independent elements. Hering, as a physiologist, attempted to explain perceptual space 
by attributing positive depth-values to the points on the nasal halves of the two retinas 
and negative depth -values to the points on the temporal halves (Helmholtz, 1962: 613-
614). 
In addition, Hilbert, the famous German geometrician, in his Foundation of Geometry 
shared Hering's view of the intuitive nature of space as applied to geometrical space. 
Hilbert supported the idea that geometry is a pure theory of relations. Geometry is not 
concerned with the objects but it is concerned with the spatial relations that the figures 
occupy in the system. Therefore, geometrical space is not a space of objects but it is a 
space of pure relations and possible orders of placing figures. He clarified this by saying 
that any geometrical system can be nothing but a certain system of order and relations 
whose character_ is determined by principles governing the relationships, and not by,.the 
.. ~~--=·::_ ·~·--•;-·,__ -~' ·=-"----""'-·_:_~.,_- ·.'o-_•_ - .•.- -. 
nature of the figures entering into it. Hence the points, planes and straight lines of 
Euclidean geometry can be replaced in endless numbers of ways by other different 
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objects without the least change in the content and truth of the corresponding theorems 
(Cassirer, 1050: 25-26). 
This view is not concerned with the material or physical objects that occupy perceptual 
organization but it is more concerned with the spatial relations that are organized within 
a holistic system. In contrast Helmholtz, an empiricist, claimed that there is no 
epistemological need to presuppose these inborn activities because any determination of 
space is a matter of experience. According to empiricists, perceptual space is not 
specified by the innate activities of the mind. Helmholtz states that: 
Thus the assumption of a definite intuitional basis for perception of depth breaks down, because, 
without either coming squarely in conflict with the observed facts and hypothecating purely fictitious 
depth-values that have never been proved to exist, or making assumptions, which have no foundation 
or analogy anywhere else, as to what ought to be determined by intuition, we are utterly unable to 
state what sort of basis it might be and what it could determine or simply prefigure. (Helmholtz, 
1962: 614). 
Helmholtz explains perceptual space by attributing it to the field of experience and 
experiment. If the nativists and empiricists did not resolve their debate on the nature of 
perceptual space, the Gestaltists' views can be understood as a compromise between 
these two views. A gestalt psychologist will argue that perceptual space is neither 
intuitive nor empirical but it is an organizational space reduced by the dynamic 
processes of the brain. For instance, Koffka explains that spatial phenomena presuppose 
both inborn activities and experience. Therefore he adjusted a reconciliation view 
concerning spatial explanation of objects combined between nativists and empiricists, 
although in his (1928:53-54) Koffka objected to Stren's theory of convergence that 
states every explanation of perceptual phenomena is the result of the constant 
cooperation of both inner and outer conditions. It was Kohler in his (1947: 117) who 
transcended the controversy between nativists and empiricists by claiming that both 
these views can be resolved by the new approach to viewing sensory impressions as 
dynamic resultants of the complex immediately given situation. A Full discussion of 
this theory will appear in the next chapter. 
Kohler claims that sensory experience is not a mere mosaic or an entirely additive 
aggregation of facts. Sensory experience can be understood only when we realize the 
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dynamic structure implied in the parts. Perceptual space is a whole not a mere addition 
of separate units, a whole structural system (Kohler, 194 7: 114-115). 
In what follows, I will explain the three general perspectives: the nativist who supports 
the idea of intuition and inborn activities of mind, the empiricist who emphasises the 
role of learning and experience in understanding perceptual space and finally the 
Relational perspective. The relational perspective presents the foundations of the Gestalt 
interpretation of perception generally. 
To the Gestalt Psychologist the whole stimulus field determines the perception of each individual part 
of the whole scene. The parts cannot be "added" independently together to make up the whole, 
because the parts will change as we extract them from the pattern and the whole pattern will change if 
we add a part to it. It is now generally accepted that much of the Gestalt descriptive doctrine is true. 
The perception of the physical object is considered to depend in part upon its field and upon what has 
been learned in previous exposures to the pattern, so the study of perception is indeed the study of 
patterns. (Corcoran, 1971: 19). 
6-3 Gestalt and the Structuralism of Perceptual Space 
Perceptual space can be described as the place where we act, move and interact with 
others, either persons or objects. We can ascribe some properties to perceptual space 
such as: depth, distance, location and direction. These properties may vary and the 
objects that occupy space may have some spatial properties such as: size, shape, and 
motion. Specifying the nature of these representations of visual space was an issue that 
led philosophers and psychologists to a controversial issue of how we can perceive 
figures in visual space. Answering the previous question led psychologists to present 
different answers of how one perceives spatial objects. Some of them adopted the 
experimental associative attitude which focuses on the retinal image as a product of the 
relationship between stimuli and eye nerves. Among those psychologists, some who 
explain spatial properties of a figure represented by retinal image in respect to a one- to-
one relationship between the stimulus and the eye nerves. Other psychologists such as 
the Gestaltists understand the spatial characteristics of the forms not as things and hence 
have fixed properties, rather they ascribed relative and changeable spatial properties of 
the forms as represented by the phenomenological image. For example, a circle as 
represented in the retinal image as two dimensional figure, it can, regarding to the 
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Gestaltists, be represented as two dimensional form as an ellipse in the 
phenomenological image by a dynamic process of rotation and also can be represented 
as three dimensional form as a sphere or as a cylinder by a process of transformation if 
we perceive the circle as having volume. The following figure shows the difference 
between retinal and phenomenological images in representation and how figure as a 
thing in the retinal image differs from the form represented in the phenomenological 
image as shown in figure ( 6-1 ). 
Dynamic Processes of Transformation 
A Figure 
2D 
(Retinal image) 
2 D Form 
The Eye 
Figure (6-1) 
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The Gestaltists gave various examples showing that if four non-intersecting lines of 
equal length are placed very close to each other but none of them intersect the other, in 
this case one can perceive them on retinal image as four separate and independent lines 
or one can represent them as a form of square. The problem of ascribing properties to 
represented forms depends on the processes of how one rotates and transforms the form 
and the degree of rotation and projection. All these processes determine the spatial 
properties together under one of forms. The Gestaltists argued that spatial properties 
can be grouped and organized differently so when a person changes his frame of 
reference. 
The structure, in which the form represented according to the Gestalists, is prior to the 
spatial properties of the figure. The Gestalt view of perceptual space indicates that since 
the structural whole precedes the spatial properties of any figure then any represented 
spatial form does not have unchangeable properties but elastic and flexible spatial 
properties that can be represented differently in respect to the structure generated 
through the dynamic process of transformation. The Gestalt psychologists, through their 
experiments on visual space, confirmed the relative characteristics of represented forms. 
Their understanding was based on Functional- Relational thought where concern is paid 
to the structure or the whole over the parts. The Functional- Relational thought confirms 
the relative state of the object of knowledge, as constructed by the reason under 
constructive orders. 
The same application of the Functional-Relational thought is involved with the 
Gestaltists where the construction of the form of representation is preceding the 
constituents of the forms and the order of arrangement over the parts and hence these 
orders require the holistic forms provided by the mind through the processes of 
transformations. In addition, if the functional relational thought is broadly an 
application of the transcendental account, the transcendental view is involved in the 
Gestaltists' view on perception. This transcendental view distinguishes the Gestaltists 
from the other psychologists in their views on perception. The Gestaltists supported the 
idea that reason has c~mprehensive orders of organization that have ,to be taken in 
account as we could notice them in their laws of perceptual organization. Their view 
was to show how represented forms are dynamically constructed by the 
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phenomenological image and the represented forms can variously constructed by the 
processes take place in the reason. In their approach to apply that functional-relational 
thought, the Gestaltists used different terms that functioned to show the elastic nature of 
forms as opposed to things with independent properties. 
The Gestalists used the term frame of reference or frame of work to consider one of the 
functional-relational categories. The notion of a frame of reference shows that the 
characteristics imposed by the form remain unchanged under a certain frame of 
reference that was supposed to be invariant unless another transformation takes place 
which requires a new order of arrangements and hence a new set of properties. This 
idea is the general aim of the functional relational approach which confirms the 
importance of invariant elements for understanding the variable elements. Therefore the 
representation of visual space is developed in light of the perceiver's frame of reference, 
and determined through the dynamic processes of transformation. The Gestalt 
psychologists claimed that, either when we represent a figure in a normal visual space 
or in mirror space or when we represent the figure through different mirrors that may 
distort its original form, there are some constant elements in our perceptual experience. 
Visual space is entirely determined by the frame of reference of the total field. What Koffka 
presumably was pointing out with this statement is that the mutual relations among the local elements 
were maintained even in the distorted "mirror space" because they were all lawfully displaced 
together according to a consistent rule. (Fieandt, 1969: 21 0). 
The phrase "frame of reference" could be confused with a mathematical or physical one. 
Indeed there was a slight difference between the Gestalt psychologists and Cassirer 
regarding the phrase. This difference does not lie in the function of the concept, but lies 
only in the terminology. For example Koffka did not use the term frame of reference but 
instead he used another term for the same idea: ''framewor!C'. Koffka assumed that there 
are two kinds of elements implied in the perceptual process. On the one hand are the 
physical elements of the figure we perceive. Then, on the other hand, are non physical 
elements or structural elements that organize the constituents of the form. Koffka chose 
the term "framework" to refer to a structure element involved m perceptual .. 
organization: -
We have also seen that the environment contains not only things, even if we use the term in the 
broadest sense, but also not- things. Particularly we find the things within something that is not itself 
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a thing. The things do not fill our environment either spatially or temporally; there is something 
between them and around them. In order to have a convenient term for this we shall call it the 
framework, so that, disregarding the great variety of things, we can divide the behavioural 
environment into things and framework. (Koffka, 1935 :72). 
We have found that Koffka's preferred term to point to the element that remams 
invariant during visual phenomenological representation was "framework". However, 
he sometimes used other terms to express the same idea like system of reference 
(1935.P282) and he used once another term to point to the same meaning frame of 
reference in his (1935.P283) when he was discussing perceived motion. He indicated 
that in motion there are two elements; the stronger element is stable and invariant 
because it will be seen at rest but the weaker element will be perceived in motion. The 
relation between what is constant and what is changeable will be relative, depending on 
the element that we fixate to be invariant: 
We fall back on our distinction of things and framework and our knowledge that framework is more 
stable than the things within it. If we apply this to the case of motion we must deduce the following 
proposition: if one of the two field objects has the function of framework for the other, then it will be 
seen at rest and the other as moving no matter which of the two moves in reality. If on the other hand 
the two objects are both things, then under symmetrical conditions (fixation between them or freely 
wandering regard) they should both move in opposite directions. (Koffka, 193 5: 282-283 ). 
The meanmg of "framework" as it was defined by Koffka, was shared by other 
Gestaltists, but under different terms. Ehrenfels's concept of form- quality: 
Wertheimer's concept of Pragnanz, Kohler's concept of Structure, and Kurt Lewin's 
concept of Field (sometimes he used the term Region). It seems clear that all these terms 
are closely related since they presuppose an invariant element involved in perceptual 
experience. I would like to use Cassirer's own term that is "frame of reference" because 
it seems that all the Gestaltists' various concepts can be unified under the term "frame 
of reference". Cassirer and the Gestaltists agreed on the necessity ofhaving an invariant 
element implied in any perceptual experience, and on the active role of the mind in 
spatial perception. This activity refers to the importance of the structure over the content 
of perceptual experience. 
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The idea discussed here is the importance of frame of reference in visual representation. 
It can be defined as follows: the frame of reference is a structure that presupposes a kind 
of arrangement between the constituents of the structure. This order of arrangement is 
changeable in respect of the frame of reference which remains invariant when the form 
is represented. For instance a form can be perceived as two dimensional and if we tum it 
45 degrees, it can be represented as three dimensional as we shall explain later. 
The problem that needs to be solved is the question, whether or not the properties of a 
represented form have independent or relative properties. In other words, does the 
perceived form represent a thing or represent a constructive whole? For example, 
consider a square where a straight line intersects two of its edges say A and C. Although 
the square has spatial properties there is the possibility of representing the square with a 
straight line intersecting two of its edges, as a pyramid that has four symmetrical spatial 
properties with two sides hidden. Moreover, the same square with a straight line 
intersecting its edge can also be represented as two equal triangles. The problem of the 
Gestaltists was to claim that form of the square is not representing a thing in itself, but a 
holistic form as constructed in the representation. There is a similarity between 
geometrical forms represented in a perceptual situation and geometrical figures as they 
are presented by mathematical thought. This similarity lies in the fact that both the 
representation of perceptual space and space as discussed by mathematical thought deal 
with geometrical figures, not as things with fixed properties but as forms having relative 
properties. 
Both mathematicians and Gestaltists are more concerned with possible forms that 
require new different structures of relationships between the structure and its elements. 
Both mathematicians and the Gestaltists argued that space is and remains a system of 
relations in the sense that every particular construction in space denotes an individual 
position that gains its full meaning only through its connections with the totality of 
structure. Therefore, the claim that construction of geometrical forms as represented in 
the phenomenological image contradicts the theme that figures have properties as 
things. Perceptual space, according to the Gestalt psychologists, has to be understood 
j.Q th~t c911text. Thus,_,Cassirer claimed that the "relativity" ascribed to exact-,scientific- - -
constructions in general, can also be applied to perception because perceptual space is 
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transformable and spatial relations can be re-ordered differently within new spatial 
systems that remain invariant during the spatial transformations. 
This understanding can be developed from the examples given by the Gestaltists 
concerning perception of space. For example, the following figure (6-2) can be 
represented in two ways: as two triangles joined at the apex or as two intersecting 
oblique lines with two left ends and two right ends joined together. 
D 
Figure 6-2 
Although it may seem that the figure as we perceive it, has spatial properties ordered 
under a certain form, when the same figure is represented at a different angle, spatial 
properties will be merged and ordered under different form. It is necessary here to 
discuss an issue that apparently contradicts the claim concerning the relative properties 
of the forms represented. This issue relates to the problem of the constancy of 
perception. The question now that has to be addressed is, to what extent should one 
understand the concept of constancy of perception? Does the property of constancy 
conflict with the relative nature of forms? 
The following paragraphs will try to answer this question by showing that there is no 
clash between the relativity of spatial perceptual figures and the concept of constancy. 
The reason this apparent clash will be denied, is that there are two meanings of 
"constancy". Neither conflicts with the relativity of spatial forms as represented in the 
phenomenological image. The first meaning of constancy refers to the constancy of the 
framework. The constancy of framework refers to the one -to one relationship between 
figure or retinal image and representational content given the frame of reference. Of 
course the frame of reference itself is not fixed. This means" that, the frameofrefefeiice 
--~ -.0.:··~·- ·.;-:·._~-;;::~...::_· _ __: __ ----- -.---- -. 
is more than connections of spatial relations between parts, it is a structure or a system 
of arrangements that precedes spatial relations. 
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For example, a form can be represented as two or three dimensions with depth 
properties when it is transformed or rotated. It is the structure that determines the 
properties of the form as two or three dimensional as in the case of a circle represented 
as two dimensional as a sphere and represented as three dimensional form as a cylinder. 
What determines the form of representation from 2D to 3D is the structure that remains 
invariant under rotation of the form. This understanding shows that the representational 
content of the geometrical figures we perceive is not fixed and absolute, but varies 
according to the perceiver's frame of reference. Thus, for instance, a 2-D geometrical 
figure (e.g. figure 6-1) might represent two different 3-D shapes, which will transform 
differently under spatial transformations like rotation. 
The Gestalt psychologists understood perceptual space represented by 
phenomenological images as a kind of transformation taking place under invariant form. 
For instance, M. Von Hornbostel's experiments on optic inversion strongly support the 
idea that perception of a phenomenological form can be represented differently 
depending on the frame of reference. For that reason, Hornbostel designed some wire 
models of solids of the type sketched in figure (6-3) and held them before a mirror in 
various positions. When such a figure rotated, it changes from one apparent shape to 
another. He concluded that the figure 6-3 can be comprehended in at least four ways. 
For example, we sometimes perceive a convex form and sometimes a concave form 
(inrevision). Hornbostel confirmed that these inversions are neither illusory nor 
ideational "constructs" but forms which under special conditions we perceive 
(Hartmann, 1935:107). The significance of this experiment is to show that the 3-D 
"content" is not inferred from a 2-D figure. 
Wire Framework 
Metal Handle 
Figure (6-3) 
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The phenomenal properties of a "convex" percept are typically distinct from a "concave" one. A 
convex affair is closed, excludes the observer, projects forward, cannot be penetrated visually 
because of its opacity or manipulated because of its impenetrability. Visual "objects" are convex. A 
concave item, on the other hand, is open, embraces the observer, permits visual and manual 
exploration and possesses the characteristics of an empty background. "Spaces" are concave. The 
entire process of inversion involves making a convex item concave and vice versa, although for some 
reason it is normally harder to invert a convex object than a concave one. (Hornbostel, 1922:130-
156 Quoted from Hartmann, 1935:107). 
Hornbostel's study shows how it is possible for an individual to represent one figure in 
different forms. This understanding explains the claim that the Gestalt psychologists 
transcended the ontological view on visual perception where the forms as represented 
do not have unchanged spatial properties in themselves. The second issue that has been 
addressed is that there are various structures and frames of reference, each having the 
ability to group and order the elements of spatial forms and find new sorts of relations 
among them. Koffka again expresses his view that perceptual space is understandable in 
the light of these structures and the dynamic process of rotation and transformation 
taking place over the representation of forms: 
Lines, under normal conditions, are not lines by themselves, but lines belonging to, or bounding, the 
surfaces of these things or those that confme our space. Therefore these lines will be determined in 
their direction and other aspects by the things or surfaces to which they belong. Otherwise expressed: 
it is an altogether futile task to build up perceptual space from points or lines, i.e. "space sensation"; 
again we find that visual space can only be understood as the product of field- organization. 
(Koffka, 1935: 215). 
The Gestaltists emphasized the process of transformation that takes place in visual 
space. is means that these kinds of constructive transformations determine the properties 
ofthe forms: 
An ellipse turned round its vertical axis so that its retinal image is more slender (horizontal axis relatively 
shorter) than that of the same ellipse in a normal position. The result is that the ellipse appears turned and 
not as slender as it would if its retinal image were produced by a frontal parallel ellipse. Otherwise 
---. - -
expressed, the forces in the plane of the ellipse must, owing to its being turned, be such as to extend it 
horizontally. These are not the only forces in the field, as we see when we consider the case of a rectangle 
turned in the same way. Not only does its retinal image become more slender with this change of 
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orientation, but its shape is transformed from rectangularity to that of a trapezium. (Koffka, 1935: 231-
232) 
The Gestalists opposed the empiricist's explanation of constancy who indicated that 
experience taught us that things are constant, having such and such properties. Koffka 
claimed that the mistake of the empiricist is to consider the hypothesis of constancy as 
irrefutable. The empiricist claims that the figures of perception seem to retain their 
normal appearance despite some drastic changes in the conditions under which we 
perceive them. For instance, constancy of figure refers, according to the empiricist, to 
the outlines of a figure that are preserved when a change takes place. No doubt the 
"constancy hypothesis" is irreconcilable with the dynamic character of the Gestaltist's 
view of perceptual transformation. On the contrary, Koffka and the Gestalt 
psychologists explained that constancy of the perceptual form does not imply a 
reference to a static state of precepts but rather constancy refers to constancy of 
phenomenological image. In other words, according to the empiricist, percept is 
determined by retinal image. Retinal image may vary, but subjects report perceptual 
image as constant. However, the Gestalt version of constancy (for percepts) is a 
distinction between retinal image and phenomenological image. The Gestaltists think 
that phenomenological image is constant across changes in the retinal image. 
We produced a still stronger argument against empiricism when we showed cases where our 
perception is in accordance with our laws of framework and in variance but contradicts an explanation 
in terms of experience and reality. (Koffka, 1935: 224). 
The Gestaltists pointed out that constancy refers to the fact that percepts seem to retain 
their "normal" appearance although there are sharp changes in local stimulus conditions. 
In fact this understanding is not only applicable to size constancy but also applicable to 
colour and form constancy. For example, size constancy refers to the fact that there is 
"preservation" of apparent size in spite of differences in the retinal image. All these 
aspects of constancy refer to the fact that the "constancy hypothesis", is invalid and 
incompatible with the constancy of the phenomenological image that emerges in the 
perceptual situation. The reason to maintain the real percept is to explain the differenc~ . 
between optical illusion and vindical perception. A second reason was to confirm the 
distinction between a percept and an apparent phenomenon because forms do not have 
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characteristics independently of the way we perceive them. For example, the Gestalt 
psychologists sought to prove that it is a mistake to think that the retinal image is 
representing and reflecting the properties of any object apart from the apparent image of 
the same object when we perceive it. For example, we treat objects as if their actual 
size is independent of their perceived size. This issue can be verified through different 
examples that show the spatial form seems to be perceived constantly although its 
apparent size, shape, and depth vary widely. 
An example given by Hochberg explains the first meaning of spatial constancy as 
interpreted as constancy relative to the frame of reference. His main concern was the 
question of whether or not our experience of perceiving a particular figure will change it 
or not. That is why Hochberg designed the experiment of the disc to show that our 
perception of the shape of the disc will be unchanged even when the conditions of the 
experiment change or our perception is altered in respect to these changes. 
If a round disc with a shining white surface is slowly turned around its axis to an oblique position in a 
sufficiently dark environment in which other surfaces are not visible, and far enough so that the lens 
of the eye cannot accommodate to parts of the disc located at different distances, constancy of shape 
is no longer preserved. The subject soon announces that he sees an oval shape. (Fieandt & 
Moustgard, 1977:359-360). 
In this example, the retinal image shows that the disc is attributed as round, but the 
characteristic of roundness is not a permanent characteristic because the disc can have 
different characteristic when represented in the phenomenological image under a 
process of rotation. The disc will be represented as an oval instead of round and the 
form of oval will remain unchanged when the phenomenological image is invariant with 
respect ofthe condition determine perceptual situation. 
A second example from Koffka shows that the first meaning of constancy does not refer 
to the figures as things having independent properties and hence unchanged ones. 
Rather it refers to the figures represented as forms in the phenomenological image with 
elastic and changeable properties determined by frame of reference. In the following 
~ -
.example, Koftka designed an experimenrto allow a subject to look at the reflection of a 
room in an inclined mirror through a tube that eliminated the rest of the surround. 
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The observer reported that the room (not the mirror) appeared to be inclined and that the objects in 
the room were arranged in a disorderly fashion. During the early part of the observation the subject 
was quite disoriented in space, but as time elapsed, the room was seen to recover its usual spatial 
framework and the subject regained his orientation. (Forgus, 1966: 186-187). 
This experiment was designed to show that there must be distinction in the perceptual 
situation between what is represented by the retinal image and what our understanding 
infers from phenomenological image. The perceiver shows that the room as a percept 
appeared in a disorderly fashion of the room. He depends on the mere retinal image 
representing the room the way he reported. However, he responded differently when he 
could set up a new form to explain the disorderly fashion of the room. This form of 
order is not given by the retinal image, rather is constructed by the mind. Accordingly, 
he could realize the orientation of the room when the mind provided him with a form of 
arranging the contents of the room that presupposes the relationships of the contents of 
the room will remain unchanged under that form as represented by the 
phenomenological image which supposed to be invariant in respect to the conditions set 
up in the experiment. The fonns are not the production of stimuli which hit the sense 
organs, but they are the production of dynamic processes take place in the mind and 
could explain what the retinal image fails to answer in the perceptual experience. 
Another example was discussed by Koffka when he was arguing against Eissler who 
defended the empiricist's account that the geometrical figures represented by the retinal 
images have independent properties. Koffka gave an example (Figure 6-4) that shows 
how a square can be represented in the phenomenological image as a trapezium. Koffka 
confirmed the idea that it is the form that determines the characteristics of the contents 
under that form. The order of arrangement of the contents of the form remain relatively 
connected together unless another dynamic process of rotation or transformation occurs 
which requires a new set of ordering these contents under different form. 
If a square surface produces a square retinal image, and is seen as a square in a frontal parallel 
position, then a circular after- image projected upon it will also appear as a circle. But when now this 
square is turned, say, by 45 degrees around a vertical axis, it is projected on the retina as a trapezium, 
but is seen as a square in a non- normal position. Now the circular after- image projected.upon itcan 
. · no longer lo~k like a circle. For if a trapezium looks like a square, a circle can no longer look like a 
circle, if we are permitted this somewhat elliptical formulation. Correspondingly, a real circle on the 
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square will in this new position produce the retinal image of an ellipse, but will be seen as a circle, 
for when a certain trapezium looks like a circle. (Koffka, 1935: 222-223). 
D 
C] 
b 
(Figure6-4) 
Koffka's aim was to stress the idea that visual perceptual space has to be developed in 
light of the perceptual transformations that reveal the constructive relative 
characteristics of form. The Gestaltists argued that these sorts of transformations are 
parts of dynamic processes that take place when we represent the phenomenological 
Images. 
The result of Kohler's experiment makes it clear that training or pre-exposure does alter the way an 
individual responds to identical patterns of stimulation on the retina. Clearly the retinal pattern of 
stimulation did not change; rather the individual learned to make different responses to the same 
stimulus relationship so that his behaviour became more adaptive. Moreover, this learning can 
become so differentiated that different responses are made to similar patterns of stimulation coming 
from different areas of the visual field. (Forgus, 1966: 196). 
These three previous examples explain the first meaning of constancy as it is identified 
in (p, 212) as the form represented by the phenomenological image presupposed as 
unchanged under the dynamic process of rotation. This discussion has attempted to 
show the Gestalt psychologists' rejection of the empiricist's view of constancy. It has 
also tried to explain their view regarding the constancy hypothesis which implied 
another structural property that differs from the claim that geometrical figures 
represented by retinal image have independent and unchangeable properties. · 
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The Gestaltists used two different terms to indicate the structural v1ew involved in 
perception. The Gestalt psychologists used the terms "function" and "structure" when 
they presented their view of perception. However, it seems that these two terms are 
merely aspects of each other; the same thing is envisaged first from a static and then 
from a dynamic point of view. Structure is the form of an activity, a something moving, 
or a something that changes; function is the activity of the form, the moving or 
changing of the thing. Structure and function have opposite but mutually dependent 
meanings. The same understanding can also be found in Cassirer' s work when he 
discussed the idea of constancy and change in knowledge in his functional-relational 
account. He argued that the functional activity of thought finds its true application in 
structural meaning and that it is a dynamic act leading towards constructive knowledge 
of particulars. He assumed that there should be a mutual interdependence between 
particulars and functions, or between change and constancy: 
A different view results, according as we choose our standpoint at the conceived limit or within the 
series and its progress; yet each of the two aspects requires the other for its completion. The change is 
directed toward a constancy, while the constancy, on the other hand, can only come to consciousness 
in the change. There is no act of knowledge, which is not directed on some fixed content of relations 
as its real object; while, on the other hand, this content can only be verified and comprehended in acts 
of knowledge. (Cassirer, 1923 :315-316). 
The second meaning of constancy refers to the fact that the phenomenological image 
will be constant across changes in the retinal image as in the case of the size and height 
perception. Although the retinal image representing the size of the external object will 
be constant even though there are differences between the external object and its retinal 
image, the mind goes beyond the retinal image and retains the real size of the object. A 
clear example of this can be seen in the experiment called "The Ames room". In this 
experiment an observer watches two objects of the same size standing in two comers of 
the room. The room has been designed to mislead the observer when he it views from a 
particular position outside the room. 
In this experiment, two retinal images represent the size of the same object because of 
-the setting of the room. The question is whether or not the retinal-image reflects the ·size 
of the object as perceived. If the answer is yes, this supports the empiricist's view of the 
hypothesis of constancy. If the answer is negative, thus supports the Gestalt version of 
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the constancy hypothesis. The Gestaltists pointed out that the mind goes beyond the 
object represented by the retinal image and tends to give a constant size to the object 
displayed in the room. The mind neither supports the retinal image representing the 
object as giant nor does support it as very small object. The mind maintains the 
phenomenological image by ascribing constant size to the object displayed in the room 
even though this phenomenological image is not presented in perceptual situation. The 
mind maintains this phenomenological image as constant to distinguish it from that of 
illusory image. 
Another example that may reinforce our vtew regarding the relative constancy of 
spatial perception is the example of the three cylinders (Figure6-5). 
Figure (6-5) 
Although these cylinders have the same size, they seem to be different in size. The 
apparent difference in size represented in the retinal image, depends on the distance 
between each cylinder and the distance between the observer and the cylinders. 
Although the retinal image shows that the three cylinders are differently spaced, the 
observer tends to give a constant size form to the apparent size as he perceived it. He 
tends to ascribe a constant size to the perceived cylinders and goes beyond the apparent 
size reflected by the retinal image. This understanding illustrates the Gestalt 
psychologists' were against the theme that one- to- one relationship presented by the 
retinal image to represent things as given in perceptual experience. Rather, they 
suggested one- to many- relationship where the phenomenological image can variously 
represent form as constructed not things as given. 
This understanding of the spatial properties of represented forms has been understood 
by the Gestaltists as an objection to the hypothesis of constancy claimed by empiricists 
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as a way for understanding perceptual space. We reach the conclusion that perceptual 
space is a theme of how to construct geometrical forms represented by the 
phenomenological image and hence the nature of the characteristics of the forms are 
relative and constructive, not just independent properties that are given even under 
different perceptual situations. 
6-4Gestalt and the Structuralism of Two and Three Dimensional Space 
The Gestalt psychologists were motivated by a philosophical conviction that perception 
generally, and the visual perception of space in particular, must be centrally organized 
by a dynamic process. The elements of this dynamic process are invariance, 
transformation, rotation and whole-part interactions. From these general features, we 
can trace these elements of the dynamic process while we are discussing spatial 
perception. Therefore the present section will be devoted to discussing the structural 
aspects of two and three dimensional perceptual space. Koffka pointed out how spatial 
figures represented in the retinal image can be interpreted as 2D or 3D forms in the 
phenomenological image: 
Koftka's treatment of the perception of three-dimensional space may be cited as illustrating the 
dynamics of organization. The dimension of distance or depth, producing an appearance of solidity in 
an object, is obviously not given by the retinal pattern, for the latter is only bidimensional. It is a 
property of the field whose physiological existence must be inferred to be in the brain. And the field 
has not two dimensions, but three. A drawing of a hollow, or outline, cube is seen clearly and 
inescapably in three dimensions, not as twelve lines on a single plane. The third dimension is 
produced by the fact that "rotating" an angle in this dimension is the simplest method of perceiving it. 
"Flopping it over" in a third dimension of space requires less action than twisting the figure around 
and moving it up and down in a bidimensional plane. (Allport, 1955: 119). 
Consistent with the general themes of Gestalt psychology, Koffka confirms that the 
form involves a constructive meaning that leads us to represent the twelve lines not as 
twelve separated lines, rather as 3D form. This understanding led Koffka to reject the 
_e~pir:_icist_yex~iQp.gf_the constancy hypothesis. This hypothesis states' that ~geometrical'- - --
figures represented by the retinal image will have independent properties that remain 
unchangeable under any kind of changes taking place in perceptual experience. For 
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instance, the circle presented by the retinal image will always be perceived as a circle 
regardless any kind of changes taken place in situation. However, the Gestaltists 
claimed that the form represented in the phenomenological image can be represented 
differently as 2D or 3D depending on the kind of transformation taking place in the 
perceptual situation. The same example of the circle as a figure, can be represented in 
the phenomenological image as 2D as an ellipse or 3D as a sphere or as a cylinder. The 
structuralism version of the Gestaltists emerges from the distinction between retinal and 
phenomenological image and the construction of the contents of the form differently in 
respect of the transformation taking place by dynamic processes. Let us trace that 
meaning by an example of a hexagon as given by the Gestaltists. As a matter of fact, the 
structural aspect of spatial perception can be broken into two areas. 
1- Two- dimensional space; in this case one is concerned with the fact that he can locate 
things to the left or right and up or down. 
2- Three- dimensional space; one also here can locate the distance of an object away or 
close to him i.e. depth. The perception of three - dimensional space is concerned with 
the perception of the depth such as cube or the volume like a cylinder. 
Therefore we will try here to reveal the structural aspect of both two and three-
dimensional space as it has been applied by the Gestalt psychologists. As a matter of 
fact the Gestalt psychologists are conspicuously concerned with the spatial organization 
of two- and three -dimensional forms of perceptual space. They were more concerned 
with the question of how can the contents of a form can be represented as two or three 
dimensional space under a process of transformation. (Boothe, 2002: 225). 
Let us examine some examples that show the possibility of representing the same 
contents of a form differently under changes of the phenomenological image. The 
following figure (6-6) allows two or three dimensional perception. 
(Figure6-6) 
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Indeed, this figure is represented in the retinal image as 2D figure as a hexagon. 
However, the same figure can be represented differently in the phenomenological image 
even if no changes in the stimuli hit the eye nerve. The same content of the figure under 
a process of rotation can be represented as 3D form as a Cube with depth. The 
relationships between the contents of the form remain unchanged when the form is 
invariant under the process of rotation. It is the role of understanding that brings us to 
find various arrangements of the contents of the figure and fit them under appropriate 
structures. It is impossible to perceive these two forms as a hexagon and a cube 
simultaneously. The determination of which form will dominate over the other is 
decided by the constancy of the frame of reference which determines the sort of 
arrangement of the contents and the relationships between them. 
The stimulus of figure 6-6 is more often than not interpreted by subjects as a two dimensional regular 
hexagon. It can also of course, be interpreted as three dimensional cube with front face ABGF or a 
cube with font face CDEG .... The scanner, starting at A would discover the vertical line AB, but not 
horizontal line. Further, it would discover the line AGO extending across the figure. It would 
discover that each of the three lines, CF, AD, and BE are axes of bilateral symmetry and that the six 
triangles about G are equilateral and equal. Hence, the figures interpreted as two dimensional, would 
be composed of symmetrically disposed simple subfigures. Any attempt to reinterpret the stimulus in 
three dimensions would destroy a number of the properties. The six triangles no longer exist in the 
three dimensional figure; the halves of the six diameters become distinct line segments parallel but 
not collinear. (Barenfeld, 1979:358-359). 
This example clearly reflects the Gestalt psychologists' view of transformations that 
take place in visual perceptual space. It also shows that the figural transformation of 
two- dimensional space to three- dimensional depends on a structural form that remains 
invariant during these perceptual transformations. 
There are the experiments of both Hochberg and McAlister (1953) and Hochberg and 
Brooks (1960) in addition to these experiments. They presented to the subjects some 
geometrical figures and sought to analyze the responses of the subjects regarding 
whether or not there are changes taking place in their spatial perception or not. Both 
- -Hochberg and McAlister showed the geometrical figures (fig 6-7) to observers and 
asked them to say whether these geometrical figures were perceived as 2D or 3D. The 
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experiment showed that a high percentage of observers stated that they firstly perceived 
these geometrical figures as 2D and later on they reported that the 2D figures are also 
represented as 3D forms with depth. (Vernon, 1970: 42 see also Bruce, & 
Green, 1992: 115-116). 
(Fig 6-7) 
It is not the mere presentation of the retinal image of the figure, rather the dynamic 
process leads the phenomenological image to represent possible forms: 
The traditional treatment of this factor consists in describing the facts without any attempt at going 
behind them. Corresponding points are defined as points which when simultaneously stimulated give 
rise to the perception of one object, or as points the stimulation of which gives rise to the perception 
of one and the same direction .... It is clear that a psychology such as we are trying to develop cannot 
be satisfied with such a state of affairs. For this psychology the visual world is a product of 
organization in the psychophysical field, and it attempts to understand the process of this organization 
and the factors which determine it. The facts of retinal disparity, as usually stated, are facts of 
geometry. What we require are facts of dynamics. (Koffka, 1935: 266). 
Koffka rejected the idea of "thingness" as a property that we ascribe to retinal figures as 
we ascribe thingness to both geographical and physical objects (Koffka, 1935: 275). 
Koffka, like the other Gestaltists, claimed that the property of "thingness" implied by 
the empiricist and the whole purely empiristic theory, is bound to run in a vicious circle 
(Koffka,1935: 305). The Gestaltists showed that visual perceptual space is structural 
space not geographical or physical space. Visual perceptual space has to be understood 
in light of the dynamic processes of our mind. 
Here another example was raised by Koffka explaining how phenomenological image 
- -represents a 2D figure as a 3D 'form under a dynamic process of transforillation. He 
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demonstrates that we can perceive a figure as an "uneven rectangle with diagonals" as 
2D and then as 3D tetrahedron (figure 6-8) after dynamic process of rotation. 
c 
d b 
(a) 
(Figure6-8) 
At first, the "composition" present is (a, b, c, d): ( e, f), (g, h), but after the conversion into the third-
dimension, one sees [a, d, (e+ f)]; [a, b, (g+ h)]; [d, c, (h+ g)]; [b, c, (e+ f)]. It is psychologically 
impossible to maintain the former "togetherness" and realize a solid, and the converse is equally true. 
(Hartmann, 1935:1 06). 
The importance of the Gestalt psychology regarding visual perceptual space is to 
confirm that visual space is constructed and not just simply represented by the retinal 
image. In addition, the representation of visual perceptual space is determined by the 
perceiver's frame of reference that remains invariant under the transformational 
processes (Humphrey, & Jolicoeur,1998:109-111). 
That is why Cassirer adjusted their views and explained it in the light of group theory. 
He saw that the retinal image constructs holistic forms that arrange the relationship 
between the structure and its contents or between as a version of his discussion of the 
relationship between the universal and the particulars. According to Cassirer's view, the 
Gestaltists's version of structuralism is explicable under the main theme of Functional-
Relational thought as an approach and shows the process of constructing the object of 
knowledge entirely differs from substantial thought. 
I claim that Cassirer's thought influenced the Gestaltists' literature and the way they 
formulated their theoretical approaches. Kurt Lewin referred several times to Cassirer's 
ideas in his books and he wrote an article Cassirer 's Philosophy of Science and the 
_Social Sciences in 1949 Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer in which he discussed some ideas~ 
of Cassirer's theoretical approach and how it is applicable to social psychology. We can 
understand Cassirer's Functional- Relational thought and the Gestaltists' Structural 
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Organization and Dynamic Process as two versions of one general theme of how we 
construct the object of knowledge in the light of relational orders of our understanding. 
There is some evidence that show the connection between Cassirer's and the Gestaltists' 
account of visual perceptual space. 
For example, in his Principles of Topological Psychology Kurt Lewin quotes a 
paragraph from Cassirer's Substance and Function, where Lewin defined the concept of 
Functional- Relational thought, Lewin referred to Cassirer who supported the concept of 
dynamic construction over entities in physical theories (Lewin, 1936: 82). 
Lewin picked up this understanding and applied it to psychology by claiming that the 
dynamic organizational process and the structures that it implies is not a given fact 
grasped in experience, rather the problems and the issues that concern psychology 
generally and social psychology specifically, need to be re-formulated not in light of 
given, but in light of the dynamic organizational laws: 
The dynamic structure of a situation is not an immediately given fact. As we have said the complete 
representation of even one given situation would presuppose the solution of all psychological 
problems and the knowledge of all psychological laws. For scientific research the difficulties begin as 
soon as one tries to represent a "given" situation. A complete representation of one situation would 
mean that the whole task of psychology is completed. The representation can be made only step by 
step and its progress must be parallel to the investigation of the dynamic laws. (Lewin, 1936:82). 
What Lewin meant here was to clarify the fact that dynamic structure, as a constructive 
whole, is not simply given but is constructively represented through a dynamic process 
as we shall explain when we discuss his account on social forces and how they organize 
social situations represented as a whole. 
In addition, Koffka sought to answer the question of why things look as they do by 
making the distinction between the retinal and the phenomenological image. Koffka 
pointed that retinal image represents things as they are given in experience but fails to 
show how we perceive the same object differently even though there was no change in 
the parts composing the object. The epistemological error of empiricism, Koffka argues, 
is to ignore the power of the structural whole that organizes the relations between the 
__ _pafJ:s.JtJ~- ,!11isl,eaqingJ9 __ spefl.k _of_ pictures "of outside things being represented:..by--our 
retina as on a photographic plate, because this view ignores the dynamic laws that 
organize the elements of perceptual experience (Koffka, 1935:97-98). 
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How do we judge the shapes and estimate the dimensions of the environment we live in? For a man , 
the very essence of environmental shapes and dimensions is that they are successively transformed on 
the retina. If these locomotor transformations all yield perceptions of the same objects why could not 
other transformations yield the perception of all possible different visual forms? Certain regular 
transformations go with a perception of the same shape. They are related to the geometry of 
perspective and parallax. Certain other transformations, not experienced as continuous during 
locomotion, go with the perception of different shapes .... the concepts of modem geometry according 
to Cassirer derive their precision and true universality only from the fact that the intuited particular 
figures are not considered as pre-given and rigid, but rather as a kind of plastic material capable of 
being moulded into the most varied forms. (Gibson, 1950: 192-193). 
Lewin shares not only Cassirer's philosophical perspective on Relational- Functional 
thought, but also his terminology. For example, Lewin ascribes the characteristics of 
plasticity and elasticity to structural organizations where changes take place in social 
behaviours under a definite invariant. (Lewin, K.1936.82). 
To sum up, the common factor between Cassirer, who applied functional relational 
thought to space and the Gestaltists who applied organizational laws of configuration to 
space, lie in the concepts of in variance and transformation. Both sides understood space 
whether geometrical or perceptual as a system that implies certain orders of arranging 
and grouping the relationships between the elements of the structure. Space as a system 
implies a constructive process which aims to give different forms to the contents. This 
is the constructive method that the Gestaltists used and applied to their view of 
psychology. This constructive view is also applied to their view on colour perception as 
we shall discuss now in the next chapter. 
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7-1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to describe the structural aspects of the Gestalt theory of 
colour perception. Therefore in this chapter our aim is to show that the Gestaltists based 
their account of colour perception on structuralism. By claiming that, we will 
distinguish their view from two other accounts on colour perception which are the 
layman's account and the Physiologists' account of colour perception. We will address 
also the relationship between Cassirer's invariance theory of experience and the 
Gestaltists view on colour perception and see how consistently their views matches with 
Cassirer's view regarding space and colour perception. By examining the perceptual 
experience of colour, we shall be able to see how the Gestaltists were structuralists by 
discussing the difference they made between retinal and phenomenological image. 
7-2 Three Accounts of Colour Perception 
My aim throughout this section is to analyse perceptual experience of colour and to see 
how the Gestalt psychologists understood it. My goal here is to explain the structural 
account of the Gestalt psychologists by shedding light on the aspects of their 
structuralism regarding colour experience. Therefore I will seek to find the role of 
colour experience and the function it performs in the perceptual field. I will also aim to 
find whether or not it is linked with their view regarding the experience of motion and 
space. Thus, we can see whether the Gestalt psychologists were consistent when they 
applied their theoretical schemes to colour perception. 
It is difficult to imagine perceiving any external object that is colourless. Colour is an essential part of 
our normal perceptual experience. It is also ,true that colour affects our ability to differentiate objects: -
Therefore we can define colour as follows: 
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Any noticeable difference between two fields of luminance other than spatial, temporal, or intensity 
variation is due to difference in colour. (Haber, & Hershenson, 1980: 91). 
According to that definition, there is a strong relationship between perceiving coloured 
objects and the intensity of light reflected on the surface of the object. This view has 
been maintained by different physicists such as Newton in the Optics where he claimed 
that the human eye often cannot distinguish between colours formed by different 
combinations of light. For example, if we have different lights such as red and green 
with different angles of refraction, then we will have the colour sensation yellow and 
the latter is indistinguishable from the sensation produced by a pure yellow light 
(Nathans, 1997:249). 
An important question is whether the perceived object has an independent colour which 
is unchangeable within the changes of light intensity or whether the perceived object 
has only "apparent colour" that is recognized under certain conditions of illumination. It 
is the same claim regarding the distinction between retinal image and phenomenological 
Image. 
The next question that needs to be addressed is how the essence of colour perceived can 
be defined and how we can perceive coloured objects. 
The essence of colour can be discussed by three different accounts of the nature of 
colour. These accounts are; the layman's or simple account, the physiological account 
and finally the logical account. The first two accounts have been discussed by (Tye, 
2000) and the third account is my description of the Gestalt Psychologists view on 
colour perception as a way to distinguish their view from both layman from one side 
and physiologists either they were nativists or empiricists, as we shall discuss it during 
this chapter. 
7-3 The Layman's Account of Colour Perception 
The l'ayman believes that tlie world is as it appears to be repre~ented by sense organs. 
He ascribes independent colour characteristics to the external objects. He also believes 
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that the external objects have colour in themselves: the greenness of grass, the 
whiteness of snow and the blackness of coal: 
Objects do not typically appear to change their colours during the day as the sunlight changes. Grass 
in the early morning looks to have the same colour as it does at midday or late in the afternoon, even 
though the light is very different. Nor does it make much difference to the perceived colours of 
objects- plants, for example- when they are moved from outdoors to a setting of illumination by 
incandescent lamps. Moreover, wearing sunglasses has little effect on the colours objects appear to 
have. (Tye, 2000: 147). 
This view had been criticised by some physiologists like Helmholtz and Hering who 
explained the nature of colour perception under certain changes of illuminations. For 
example, Hering calls the view, which ascribes unchanged colour to the external 
objects, as an "uninstructed view" of colour perception. Hering came to the conclusion 
that the uninstructed person takes the green of a leaf as a fixed property of the leaf. 
Therefore it was important for Hering to distinguish in the layman's view of colour two 
aspects of colour. Firstly the idea that colour is an independent property of the object is 
"real colour" and secondly colour as it appears under changes of illuminations which he 
calls "incidental colour". The uninstructed person believes that the perceived colour of 
an object remains fixed even under changes of illuminations. 
The layman always reduces the objects to their real colour. Hering explains that the 
layman cannot distinguish between the colour as independent and the colour as appears 
under different light intensity: 
The layman, as we have already said, is convinced that external objects have intrinsic colors, that 
snow is white, soot is black, and gold is yellow. He ascribes to these colors an existence that is 
independent of the eye, designates them as the real colors of the objects in question, and distinguishes 
them from the incidental colors that the same objects may show under unusual circumstance, for 
example, in illumination that is inadequate or that deviates strongly from ordinary daylight. The red 
of the mountain peak in the alpenglow, the pallor of a face that is illuminated by sodium light, the 
colored spot on a floor when sunlight falls on it through a colored window pane, are such incidental 
colors which we relate to the momentary nature of the illumination and do not take as properties of 
the objects in question. (Hering, 1964: 6-7). 
In fact, we can see that the layman's account of colour perception is too simple to the 
extent that it fails to provide a phenomenological understanding of the nature of colour. 
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If we take a brief look at the layman's account, we can see it can be understood in the 
light of the following category. He ascribes "the hypothesis of constancy" to colour 
perception: For example, the hypothesis of constancy, as we explained before, ascribes 
independent properties to the given. This category represents a form of realism with 
regard to layman's view on colour perception. 
This view led the layman to the belief that physical objects have permanent colour 
qualities and remain unchangeable even if tremendous changes have taken place in the 
physical world. The second reason is that the layman could not take experience a step 
further to its critical meaning, rather he limits himself to its simple meaning that 
revolves around the sensory qualities of external objects. He could not capture the 
constructive meanings implied in experience. Therefore, another approach that gives 
different meanings to perceptual experience will be investigated now. 
7-4 The Physiological Account of Colour Perception 
The physiological account interprets the colour of objects through the relationship 
between physical stimulus and the brain and optic nerve. The physiologists of the 
nineteenth century agreed that the stimulation of any given nerve attached to a sense-
organ produces its own experiences. Different physiologists like Johannes Muller, 
Ewald Hering and Hermann Von Helmholtz used their physiological background to 
provide an explanation of colour perception via the nerves of the retina. Let us examine 
some of their claims regarding the possibility of explaining the changes of colour 
perception through the workings of the nervous system. Before discussing these 
physiological attempts, it is important to note that there is variety in the physiologists's 
analyses regarding colour perception. Although these attempts share the same starting 
point of taking the nervous system as a model for their explanations, we find that each 
of the physiologists has a different interpretation of the correlation between retina 
nerves and how they relate to the nervous system. 
It is important to understand the differences between those physiologists, who are 
divided into two groups. The nativists argue that there exist some modes of functions 
that are present from the moment of birth. The empiricists, on the contrary, argue that 
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any explanation of physiological process appeals to learning and practice. According to 
that distinction, we are going to analyse colour perception. 
Johannes Muller (180 1-185 8) is one of the nineteenth century pioneers who applied an 
empirical- physiological view to colour perception. Muller claimed that the senses, by 
virtue of the peculiar properties of their nerves, acquaint us with the state of our body. 
Although sensations are important because they inform us of the qualities and changes 
of the external nature, the nature of the sensation is determined by the characteristics of 
what he calls "specific energies" of the sensory nerves. According to Muller's doctrine 
of specific nerve energies, the experience of colour perception depends upon the 
stimulation of the optic nerve. Muller indicates that sensory organs are not mirrors of 
nature, and sense experience is not a direct reflection of the physical properties of the 
external environment. We do not sense the qualities of nature. Rather, experience 
responds to the qualities as fixed by the physiological make-up of the affected sense 
(Muller, 1842) 
One of the most significant difficulties facing Muller's theory of specific nerve energies 
as applied to colour perception is the idea that the eye has a mechanism and the ability 
to distinguish between sensory qualities. Let us suppose that a normal man can 
distinguish between thousands of different hues; this does not mean that each of these 
thousands of different kinds of sensory qualities has its own receiving mechanism in the 
eye (Kaufman, 1974:158-159). 
Ewald Hering (1834-1918) is one of the most important physiologists of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century who became famous for his experiments on vision, the 
nature of brightness and colour constancy. In 1908 he published his study of what he 
called "memory colour" where he gave a new meaning to the concept of memory 
colour, confirming the relativity of colour perception. He indicated that colour 
perception implies a relativistic understanding that contrasts with layman's view that 
coloured objects have independent properties. It is also important to view Hering's 
. al!ll;lysis 9f colour perception through his na,tivism._ _ __ 
-- -~-- .. _-__ -· -"""'--'"~" ••'- '-· ·' ~---· -- ····--- - -· .... 
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Hering sought to go beyond Muller's view by reducing colour perception to definite 
parts of the nervous system. Although Hering improved on Muller's theory of colour 
perception, he still shares with Muller the epistemological view of nativism. Both 
Muller and Hering believed that when the sensory nerve is stimulated, it leads to the 
sensation of a unique quality such as light, sound and so on. They believe that such 
events are innately organized and not acquired by experience and learning. 
For Muller, the founder of empirical physiology, colour perception is due essentially to 
the optic nerve and the activities of the brain. 
Being a physiologist who maintains a nativistic view, Hering believes that the organism 
has innate properties determining the ways in which it will perceive the world and gain 
insights into its detail. 
Hering applied this view to his theory of four colour theory. I would like, before I 
discuss that theory, to throw some light on Hering's view regarding the movement of 
the eye and its function. Given his nativistic understanding, Hering rejects the idea that 
the two eyes and the related pathways of the visual system are separate independent 
systems that become related only as a result of visual experience. On the contrary, he 
argues that the two eyes are co-ordinated and present a unitary visual impression. For 
Hering, the co-ordination of the movements in the two eyes depends upon an inborn 
arrangement, and not upon exercise. Therefore, in contrast to the empiricists, Hering 
considers the movements of the two eyes taken together as constituting a single organ. 
This view rejects Helmholtz's view that argues that the movement of the two eyes is a 
result of experience and practice. (Hering, Trans by Hurvich & Jameson,1964: 271-
278). 
Hering extended his nativistic view by applying it to his theory of colour perception 
which was later called Hering's four- colour theory. He argued that there are relations 
between sensations and the retinal nerves. According to him, perception of colour takes 
place when the visual substances on the retina are physically stimulated. Ba~ed on his 
physiological view, he proposed, apart from white and black, four sensations arranged 
in two opposing pairs; yellow/ blue and red/green. Hering calls white and black veiled 
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or masked chromatic colour, while the second set of chromatic colors that do not show 
such veiling he calls unmasked chromatic colours (Hering, 1964: 41-42). 
Each pair of sensations includes two opposite actions; katabolism or assimilation and 
anabolism or dissimilation. These two opposite actions of light reflect on the visual 
substances in the retina: 
There must therefore be a receptive visual substance which can undergo a positive change 
(assimilation) when white is seen, and a negative change (dissimilation) when black is seen. When 
grey is seen there is equilibrium in the black- white substance. According to Hering there are two 
other substances, one which by assimilation produces the sensation of red and by dissimilation the 
sensation of green (or vice versa), and the other which produces on assimilation the sensation of 
yellow and dissimilation the sensation of blue (or vice versa) when there is equilibrium in the two 
latter substances no colour is seen. (Crone, 1999: 166). 
According to Hering, colour perception can be understood in the light of the reflection 
of the two opposite actions on the visual substance in the retina. He suggested that the 
four primary hues are in fact opposing hues, whose opposition indicates that these hue 
sensations are the product of antagonistic neural processes. 
The four colour theory of perception reflects Hering's belief that human perception has 
some innate components. Therefore, he considers the limits of perception to be related 
directly to innately determined physiological processes. 
Being a nativist, Hering supports the idea of colour relativity which means that the 
colour of a perceived object varies according to the intensity of illumination. For 
example, he used the term "memory colour" to refer to the relativity of perception. He 
sees that the memory colour of an object does not need to be strictly fixed, rather it 
varies according to changes in the light intensity. For Hering, relativity of colour means 
incidental colour because he believes that objects do not have independent and hence 
fixed colours: 
For the color in which we have most consistently seen an external object is impressed indelibly on 
our memory and becomes a fixed property of the memory image. What the layman calls the real color 
of an object is a color of the object that has become fixed, as it were, in his memory; I should like to 
-call it the memory color of the object.- (Hering, 1964: 7). ~ ~ - -- --
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Hering confirmed the relative nature of colour perception by designing vanous 
experiments to show how we perceive colour of objects under different intensity of 
light. He explains that the colour of an object varies in respect to changes in the light. 
Hering used a simple apparatus to make that point. 
Imagine a box open toward the window so that sky light can fall down on a glass plate 
in the box. The glass plate can be rotated about a horizontal axis and it is covered with 
colored, for example orange paper. On the top panel of the box is a stiff, opaque sheet 
covered with white paper and containing a round hole on which, when needed, a dark 
viewing tube can be placed. If the tube and the glass plate are removed, then one sees 
from above, a circular orange- coloured field in the plane of the white paper. Now if the 
glass plate is rotated toward the back, then the orange is increasingly veiled with black, 
and becomes first light brown, then dark brown, and finally brownish black. If one 
replaces the viewing tube without changing anything else, then through the tube one 
immediately sees once more a glowing orange, which is transformed just as quickly 
again into brownish black when the viewing tube is again removed (Hering, from 
Hurvich, 1964:7-9). 
Hering explained colour perception showing the relative nature of colour when it is 
transformed in respect to the light intensity. Helmholtz shared Hering's relativistic 
approach to colour perception but took empiricism rather than nativism as a model for 
explaining the processes on which colour perception depend. 
Helmholtz shared with the physiologists of his time some ideas concermng colour 
perception. Helmholtz set up a theory explaining the perceptual colour of the external 
objects. Helmholtz argued that there are three kinds of nerve-fibres in the eye producing 
three kinds of colour sensation when stimulated. For example, one fibre produces the 
sensation of blue, another the sensation of red and a third the sensation of green 
(Kaufman, 1974: 159-160). Helmholtz differs in his account of colour perception from 
both Muller and Hering. He explains colour perception in the light of experience and 
learning in contrast to the nativism of Muller and Hering. This distinction between 
Helmholtz and Hering_ starts from t_heir separate att~mpts to justify eye movement. 
Helmholtz argued that the necessity of moving both eyes together and the regularity of 
this connection is a result of practice. The nativist explains perceptual experience of 
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colour or space by assuming the existence of intuitions or principles that are innately 
determined. However, being an empiricist, Helmholtz argues that human perception is 
justified not by innately determined physiological processes, but by learning and 
practice. What seems to be intuitive is in fact learned and acquired through experience 
and deduced through unconscious inference. For instance, Helmholtz believes that 
perceptual space and even Euclidean geometrical axioms are not the product of 
intuition, but are a product of experience that we interpret via unconscious inference. 
Helmholtz and Hering disagreed about whether inherited organization within the brain structures 
what is perceived. Helmholtz argued that perceptual experience is reconstituted anew in each person, 
that is, learned by the way the mind forms elementary sensations into a unity. He argued, to a degree 
influenced by Kant, that perceptions involve central psychological processes in addition to the 
sensory data of the particular experience, and he called the mental process "unconscious inference". 
He believed, for instance, that the visual perception of depth is an acquired perception achieved by 
mental unconscious inference about sensory information provided by binocular vision(in which the 
two eyeballs move slightly in order to focus on objects at different distances).His position was 
therefore described as empiricist.(Smith, 1997: 503). 
Helmholtz's view can be understood in another way if we place him in the circle of 
structuralists. Despite the fact that Helmholtz was an empiricist, he was also a Neo-
Kantian. Helmholtz sought to interpret Kantian transcendental principles in the light of 
physiological knowledge and along the general lines of empiricism. It is true that the 
Neo-Kantians had been influenced by Kant's philosophical system, but at the same time 
they changed that system and reinterpreted it in a way that allowed them to include the 
new developments that had taken place in the nineteenth century. The examples of these 
developments have been discussed in Chapter Two, section (2-2). Although Helmholtz 
was a Neo-Kantian, he was never far from his primary roots in Kant. Helmholtz 
believed in systematic unity and construction, the ideas that form structuralism. 
Helmholtz sought to find a base in the mind that can explain the changes that take place 
in sensation when illumination is changed. 
The structuraJism of Helmholtz was expressed by Cassirer (1944) when he claimed that 
Helmholtz was a pioneer in his application of the concept -of group to mathematics, 
which aimed to explore the relative properties of mathematical figures when they are 
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organized or constructed according to a certain class or group. Helmholtz also applied 
that thought to the field of perception. Helmholtz believed that experience is not just a 
mere aggregate of chaotic visual images, but that a rule must be presupposed by which 
these images are organized. Helmholtz rejected the idea that what we perceive is 
determined by to the retina but he argued that another structural element is needed to 
understand how we perceive space, shape and colour: 
The mere succession of the visual images, no matter how many we assume, would never of itself give 
us the presentation of a corporeal object, if the thought of a rule were not added, by which a certain 
order and position is ascribed to each in the total complex. In this sense, the presentation of the 
stereometric form plays "the role of a concept compounded from a great series of sense perceptions, 
which however, could not necessarily be constructed in verbally expressible definitions, such as the 
geometrician uses, but only through the living presentation of the law, according to which the 
perspective images follow each other". This ordering by a concept means, however, that the various 
elements do not lie alongside of each other like the parts of an aggregate, but that we estimate each of 
them according to its systematic significance. (Helmholtz, 1896:428, Quoted from 
Cassirer, 1923: 289). 
Helmholtz similarly understands perception of colour in the light of the dualism 
between the conditions that determine perceptual experience and the particulars we 
perceive under these conditions. Perceived colour is determined by the conditions of 
illumination. This led Helmholtz to distinguish between sensation and perception. He 
used the term "sensation" to refer to the fact that experience is chaotic because it does 
not submit to specific orders of organization. In that sense, experience provided by 
sensation is lawfulness. Meanwhile, he used the term "perception" to refer to the fact 
that experience is organized and submitted to orders. Experience provided by perception 
is lawful and organized by orders. By distinguishing between sensation and perception, 
Helmholtz gives perceptual experience a significance which implies a judgement based 
on inference while sensation does not imply any kind of inference. According to 
Helmholtz, the judgement included in perception justifies the apparent constancy of 
colour. Helmholtz was eager to find an answer to the question of how we can interpret 
our sensations regarding colour when the illumination is changed. He gave the answer 
in his Treatise On Physiological Optics: 
Seeing as we do the same coloured objects under ... different illuminations, we learn to construct, in 
spite of the differences in illumination, a correct idea of the colours of the objects, i.e., we learn to 
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judge how such an object would appear in white illumination, and since it is only the permanent 
colour of the object which interests us to become quite unconscious of the individual sensation upon 
which our judgement is based. 
A grey paper in sunshine may be brighter than a white paper in shadow; nevertheless we see the first 
as grey and the second as white; because we know very well that if the white sheet were placed in 
sunshine it would appear much brighter than the grey does at present. (Helmholtz, 1925 Vol II: 
243 Quoted from Katz, 1935: 260-161). 
Helmholtz distinguishes between apparent colour and constant colour. The apparent 
colour is the colour that changes when the condition of illumination changes. This fact 
can be grasped by considering daily experience where the apparent colour of perceived 
objects varies with changes of illumination. Constant colour does not mean, according 
to Helmholtz, that an object has an independent property of colour, but refers to the task 
of judging the colour of an object under the continuous changes of illumination and this 
will be easy due to practice and learning. Practice teaches us to judge the colour of an 
object even under changes of illumination. Therefore we do not have difficulty in 
judging that white paper in full moonlight is still brighter than grey or black paper in 
day-light. We ascribe to the white paper a constant colour even though it appears darker 
than the grey paper in day- light. 
In his empirical physiology, Helmholtz opens the way for the Gestaltists to set up their 
structuralism regarding colour perception by forming colour perception in the light of 
that dualism between orders organizing perceptual experience and coloured objects. 
7-5 The logical Account of Colour Perception 
The third account of colour perception is the logical account. The Gestalt school is 
representative of that approach. This logical account has two main features; it opposes 
both nativism and empiricism concerning colour perception, and attributes what is 
unchangeable to what is changeable. This logical account is nothing more than the 
Functional-Relational thought expressed by Cassirer and applied in the psychology of 
perception by the Gestaltists. Koffka and Kohler both objected to nativism and 
empiricism by clarriing that -individuals do not react to local stimufi as indepe~de~t· 
events. Rather, the organism responds to the pattern of stimuli to which it is exposed. 
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They argued that perceptual experience cannot be explained by either inborn functions 
or products of learning. They adopted an approach between these two views. 
The Gestaltists argued that to explain any perceptual action, inborn capacities are 
needed, however they cannot be applied deliberately as claimed by the nativists. These 
inborn capacities need to be activated and this activation takes place through dynamic 
processes like rotation, projection and transformation as we explained when we 
discussed perceptual space. For example, phenomenological images are presented 
through dynamic processes to activate these inborn capacities. The Gestaltist's concept 
of insight, as will be explained in Chapter Eight, presented a phenomenological image 
of the object represented immediately without any effort. But to present different and 
possible phenomenological images of the same object, insight is not enough; we need a 
dynamic activity to activate these inborn capacities. 
They argued that every capacity is the result of the constant co-operation of both inner 
and outer conditions of development. William Stem is one of the Gestaltists who solved 
the clash between nativism and empiricism through his "Convergence Theory". Stem 
argued in his 1914 article "Psychology of Early Childhood" that perceptual experience is 
achieved by a co-operation between inner and outer conditions. 
Both Koffka and Kohler agreed with Stem's idea of convergence to solve the clash 
between nativism and empiricism, however they rejected the technical terms like 
"within from without" Stem used because they seemed to the Gestaltists as ambiguous 
and meaningless. Until 1928, Koffka only criticised Stern's theory of convergence 
without suggesting an alternative. However, in 1930 Kohler replaced Stem's terms with 
his own. He no longer called the dynamic interaction between intuition and experience 
convergence, but "the unitary process" or he sometimes calls it the dynamic process. He 
argued that this unitary process has an important characteristic: it is a functional whole 
which has an orderly internal structure. The Gestaltists do not apply that dynamic 
process to colour but they extend it to be applied to different aspects of psychology as 
an alternative to both nativism and empiricism. Therefore, they applied that 
· understanding to different concepts of perception: 
216 
Chapter Seven: Gestalt and the Structural Aspect of Colour Perception 
It is quite clear to us that constancy of brightness and constancy of size are, as facts, incompatible 
with the assumptions of the machine theory; for in both cases sensory experience is surely not 
determined by corresponding local stimuli alone .... In the meantime, animal psychology has offered 
strong evidence against these explanations, it must now be admitted that neither the empiristic nor the 
nativistic assumptions can be right. Thus we must t1y to find a kind of function which is orderly and 
yet not entirely constrained by either inherited or acquired arrangements. If such an alternative exists, 
we shall have to apply it also to other observations, such as the constancies of shape, speed, location, 
and so forth.... This means, of course, that the alternative between nativistic and empiristic 
assumptions must be quite generally mistaken. (Kohler, 1947: 117). 
The Gestaltists showed that sensory experience cannot be explained or justified through 
the machine theory of the nervous system. On the contrary, they argued that sensory 
experience can be explained by dynamic factors rather than anatomical conditions. The 
sensory experience is not a mere mosaic or additive aggregation of facts, but implies 
structural and dynamic elements, or what we call non- physical elements. Perceptual 
experience always presupposes some structural properties that are not involved in the 
constituents of experience. For instance, Kohler gives the following example to confirm 
that perceptual experience is not a response to local stimuli. If we take a glass of water 
in which soap is dissolved, such a liquid is defined by such adjectives as "dim" or 
"turbid". Now, if we look at it through a little hole made in a piece of cardboard, one 
will see the hole filled with a certain grey hue (possibly a bit bluish or reddish), but the 
quality of dimness or turbidity will have disappeared (Hartmann, 1935: 123). 
The properties of colour and brightness do not depend on local stimuli as represented by 
the retinal image; rather they are represented on the phenomenological image in 
different form and hence different colour. The general aim of the Gestaltists is to show 
the representation of colour on the phenomenological image differs when it displays 
under different intensity of illumination. The Gestaltists showed that there is a 
transformation that takes place leading the original colour of an object to be represented 
differently in respect to this transformation. The shift from retinal image to 
phenomenological image takes place through a dynamic process by which a different 
colour will be ascribed to the object. This apparent object will remain the dominating 
colour unless another change happens in the perceptual situation. 
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The Gestaltists confirmed the idea that the properties of visual objects such as 
brightness and colour are properties that depend upon more than local uniform 
stimulation. The colour as represented on phenomenological image reflects that fact 
compared to the retinal image. The Gestaltists designed different experiments that show 
the possibility of displaying different colour on the phenomenological image although 
the conditions of the experiment are fixed. For example, they designed an experiment 
using nine spots shown in figure(7 -1) which allows one to perceive either a yellow plus 
sign ( +) or a blue-green cross (X). The experiment has designed where the middle 
yellow-green circle can be belonged to either pattern. In this case, the retinal image will 
represent two different figures with two different colours. It represents yellow cross ( +) 
or blue green cross(X). Rather, the phenomenological image represents the middle 
circle as a yellow circle and looks yellow if perceived as part of a plus-sign comprised 
of the other yellow and it will be represented as greenish if it is perceived as of an X 
sign (Hartmann, 1935:123). 
0 0 0 Blue-Green 
Yellow 
0 0 Yellow-Green 
Figure (7 -1) 
This understanding led the Gestaltists to impose the functional dynamic approach as a 
way of representing sensory impressions or the retinal images as organized differently 
within a structural whole. These dynamic functional activities of understanding 
transform certain colours in the retinal image into different colours in the 
phenomenological image. Now the second aspect of that logical account needs to be 
discussed. 
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Cassirer set up his v1ew on colour perception depending on the Gestaltists' s 
experiments on colour perception. He indicated that colour perception is an 
investigation about construction of forms rather than independent properties of objects. 
Cassirer addressed perception in his 1944 essay: 
In perception, too, we do not confine ourselves to the particular, given hie et nunc, to be completely 
absorbed and as it were, lost in it. We go beyond the particular and integrate it into a certain context. 
As the particular changes its position in the context, it changes its "aspect". We do not apprehend the 
particular as a mere "existence," that simple reality in which there corresponds a particular sensation 
to each particular stimulus. On the contrary, the apprehension of the particular qua "existence" 
involves apprehension of the possibilities of transformation which it contains within itself. The 
perceived phenomenal color differs from that "reduced" color- experience which corresponds to the 
retinal image. The former is conditioned and modified by "the perspective of illumination" in 
essentially the same way in which our visual perception of space is conditioned by the spatial 
perspective. (Cassirer, 1944: 15). 
The same approach of functional thought can be seen in the Gestaltists's views on 
perception when they stressed the importance of constructive form over the figure as 
represented in the retinal image. The logical account of perception considers that 
perception is not a reproduction but a process of construction that finds its expression in 
the application of forms. The Gestaltists applied functional-relational thought to their 
studies of colour perception. For example, if we have a grey piece of cloth, it does not 
mean that the colour of that piece of cloth will be always represented in experience with 
the same degree of greyness. We can perceive the colour of that piece of cloth 
differently depending on the illumination conditions. For example, if we put that grey 
piece of cloth against a black sheet of paper, we no longer perceive that grey piece of 
cloth as grey, but as light and bright. In contrast, if we hold that grey piece of cloth 
against a white sheet of paper, then we shall perceive it as dark (Tye, 2000: 155). 
Therefore the Gestalt psychologists argued against the constancy hypothesis because it 
ignores the fact that the phenomenological image of a particular colour is a place of 
transformations in respect to changes of illumination conditions. 
If the Gestaltists' claim about the process of construction in perception had proved its 
applicability to perceptual space,- motion and shape, how could the Gestaltists explain 
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colour perception? I will try to answer that question by giving an example that discusses 
crucial constructive concepts that have been applied in colour perception. 
Kohler sought to study colour constancy when he discussed the relationship between 
figure and ground. He designed an experiment involving a cross composed of alternate 
blue and yellow sectors. Kohler set the cross on the left side of a stereoscope and on the 
right he placed a regular blue octagon with homogeneous surface. The cross will be 
perceived either as yellow or blue depending on the background: the cross will be 
represented as blue if the background is yellow and yellow if the background is blue. 
This means that a certain transformation takes place in the phenomenological image 
representing the colour of cross. 
The colour of object is determined by a factor that remains invariant in respect to the 
phenomenological image representing the colour of object. For the Gestaltists, 
concept of invariance is important for understanding the world of colour perception 
because it confirms that the colour of an object as represented by the 
phenomenological image has a relative colour property. Gelb admits this when 
discussing the concept of colour constancy saying: 
Color constancy is but a part of a much more complex set of problems; we are confronted with the 
general problem of the organization and structure of the visible world (Cassirer, 1944: 10-11 ). 
Let us now discuss structuralism as studied by one of the Gestalt scientists David Katz 
and his experiments related to colour perception. 
7-6 Gestalt and Structuralism of Colour Perceptual Experience 
The Gestaltists's distinction between retinal and phenomenological images can also be 
found in their distinction between "surface colour" and "film colour" when they studied 
colour constancy. Surface colour refers to the qualities and characteristics remaining 
during changes of illumination such as the yellowness of a banana. Meanwhile film 
-ccolour,refers-to- the characteristics-of colour that are changeable in-respect-to changescof~-· 
illumination. They paid more attention to film colour because it shows how the colour 
can be represented differently in the phenomenological image. The reason for the 
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Gestaltists to defend film colour was to show the falsity of the constancy hypothesis 
(Hartmann, 1953: 22). 
The Gestalt psychologists affirm that the nature of colour represented by 
phenomenological image underlies its relative constancy when the conditions of 
illumination are unchanged. 
Cassirer applied his understanding of group theory, as a structural notion, to analyse 
colour perception. Cassirer argued that the same sort of transformations found in visual 
perceptual space can be found in colour perception. Each perceptual experience 
presupposes sort of transformations take place in perceptual experience under invariant. 
The experiments of Hering, Helmholtz and the Gestaltists showed the transformations 
in colour experience under certain condition of light intensity that would be invariant 
during the perceptual experience of colour. 
In Hering's well-known experiment we experience the "shift" that occurs when a part of the field, 
being objectively darker than its environment, first appears as a spot and then as a shadow fallowing 
[Sic] on the surface, and thus gives, while it is exposed to the same illumination as the white 
surrounding, first the impression of grey and then the impression of shadowy white. Here again the 
typical possibility of double orientation or reference is apparent .... [It] rests on the very same factor 
which is most explicit and striking in the formation of geometrical concepts. The perceptual image as 
well involves that reference to certain possible groups of transformation. It changes when we refer it 
to a different group and determine the "invariants" of perception accordingly. We may mention all 
those facts that are by Gestalt- Psychology described in terms of the category of"figure and ground". 
All these phenomena are remarkably analogous to the above-mentioned different possibilities of 
"coordination" in Euclidean, affmitive, projective, etc., geometries. Thus Katz, in referring to certain 
observation may shift from one mode of "apprehension" to another by distributing light and shadow 
in a different way. At one time, we see shadows falling upon a light ground, at another time we see 
light falling upon a dark ground; and we are free to choose either mode of apprehending. 
(Cassirer, 1944: 15-16). 
To that extent, Cassirer's aim was to show the perceptual image of the colour possibly 
varies under the changes of illumination conditions. Colour perception is similar to size, 
shape and space perception in that they all imply possible transformations. They imply 
different perceptual structures that determine which perceptual form, among the other 
-possil5le- forins; -will b-e -dominant ·ana·-will -S'e ·-'apparent. The desiaitis-ts~po!~Cio-tfie-
phenomenological image when they talk about the apparent colour. They also refer to 
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the transformations take place m colour perceptual expenence where the 
phenomenological image presupposes such kind of transformations. 
The concept of colour transformation leads us to discuss the concept of colour 
invariance and how the Gestaltists applied it in developing their structuralism of 
perception. 
In the field of visual perception, it is not difficult to demonstrate the fact that there is a general 
tendency for the phenomena to tend to remain the same under changing conditions of observation. 
One must refer to a tendency and not to an absolute constancy since measurements reveal the fact 
that, as conditions of observation change, phenomenal characters do change although to a much lesser 
extent than one would expect if they were wholly determined by these changing observational 
conditions. (Thouless, 1951: 240). 
The relative properties represent the main feature of the Gestalt's view on colour 
perception. The phenomenological image of colour will be determined through the 
conditions involved in perceptual situation. The characteristics of colour depend on 
the relative properties that appear depending upon a new factor that remains 
invariant (Koffka, 1935: 218-219). 
Hering supports the idea that colour is changeable and transformable in the context 
of light changes. Cassirer tried to analyse colour perception as a theme that can be 
grasped under the meaning of group. A group theory, as considered a structural 
notion, is used here to explain the structuralism of colour perception. Let us now 
consider another aspect of the application of group theory on the theory of 
perception. As we have already seen, the major task of any theory of experience is to 
explain how we can get from the particular to the general; i.e. from a specific item, 
restricted by its hie et nunc and its irreducible singularity, to a general conception. 
The same problem appears in geometry. How can geometrical concepts be derived 
from the intuition of spatial figures? Or how can we, as Cassirer puts it, fulfil the 
passage "from purely local determinations to strictly spatial determinations. 
Every particular triangle, every particular circle is to be considered as something in and by itself. Its 
location in space, the lengths of the sides of the triangle or the radii, etc., belong to its "nature", 
which latter cannot be defined except with reference to particular local circumstances. Even in our 
-- -- geometrical concepts, ·th.is ~eference iS not Siffipl)' tg·nore-0; it is .not abStracted from s~ch as' to sirripJy 
disappear. But here the local determinations are comprehended in such way that a new whole, "the 
system of space," results from their synthesis. The concept of group of transformations is, perhaps, 
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the clearest expression of the nature and epistemological root of this systematization. Owing to this 
concept the particular, intuitively given figure is derived of its hie et nunc and nevertheless retains in 
defmiteness. This definiteness no longer depends upon what the figure is as a "this" or "that", as 
particular. The definiteness of the figure depends upon the context into which it is integrated and 
which it represents as a special case. (Cassirer, 1944:8). 
What has this to do with colour perception? As we noticed above: during the 
perceptual process, we are constantly confronted with different aspects of a 
phenomenon that are physically bound to their hie et nunc. During our perceptual 
experience, these aspects are related to each other, they are synthesized such as to 
constitute aspects of one and the same thing. But what is this synthesis? It is nothing 
but a group-like transformation. Cassirer showed that the Gestaltists's experiments 
of colour perception emphasize the fact that we go beyond the particular and its 
independent properties and integrate it into a certain context. When the particular 
coloured object changes its position in the context, it changes also its aspect. 
Cassirer clicked that issue by stressing the idea that the apprehension of the 
particular involves apprehension of the possibilities of transformation which it 
contains. Cassirer distinguished between the images provided by retina where there 
is no chance for colour transformations, and those apprehended by our reason as 
phenomenological image where there are possibilities of colour transformation. 
He claime that formal, mathematical structures fundamentally characterize the way 
in which the perceptual system constitutes contents of visual experience; they are, as 
it were, naturally realized in the perceptual processes of determination. Cassirer 
showed, depending on Hering's experiments, how apparent colour as represented on 
phenomenological image could vary in respect to illumination changes. 
According to Cassirer there is an analogy between colour perception and the abstract 
concept of group. He argued that the processes involved in both are similar. The 
apparent difference between mathematical constructions and perceptual constructions 
will vanish if we take into consideration the concept of transformation as applied by the 
Gestalt psychologists as indicated above. Cassirer used an experiment by Gelb to 
explain the relationship between form and background when there is a colour contrast 
between them. Cassirer saw that there is always the possibility to perceive a form as a-_ 
figure with certain colour as it appears to the perceiver and afterwards, another figure 
will be perceived with another different colour. The experiment of the blue and the 
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yellow cross supports Cassirer' s claim regarding the double orientation of colour 
perception. Here Cassirer concludes that there is a possibility of double orientation 
which transforms apparent colour to another different colour. Koffka agrees with 
Cassirer regarding the perceptual transformation and the double references where two 
new phenomenological images will appear differently. Koffka uses his own term 
"Double Representation" to express the same understanding where there is always the 
possibility of perceiving different phenomenological images when we change the 
conditions of perceptual situation (Koffka.1935: 178-179). 
Both Cassirer and the Gestaltists were in agreement that colour perception, as 
mathematics concepts, implies a certain invariance and depends upon it for its inner 
constitution. 
There is an experiment was designed by Katz to show that the colour on a 
phenomenological image is constructed in respect of factors set up in the perceptual 
situation. He supposed that a light grey piece of paper would be represented in a dark 
comer of the room. In addition, there is a colour wheel with black and white sectors 
near a window. The observer had to find a black-white mixture on the colour wheel that 
looked like the same grey as the piece of paper in the dark comer of the room. Katz 
claimed that under these conditions, a complete equality between the colour wheel and 
the piece of paper is impossible. Therefore Katz designed a screen with two holes 
introduced between the observer and the two matched greys. It follows that one hole is 
filled by light coming from the piece of paper, the other by light coming from the disk. 
The changes that take place in colour perception are that the colour wheel seems to be 
much lighter than the grey paper. However, if someone changes the mixture on the 
wheel so that the two holes look equal, and then removes the screen, the colour wheel 
will be almost black and much darker than the grey paper (Koffka, 193 5: 248-251 ). 
From these examples, it is shown that the Gestalt psychologists supported the theme of 
colour transformation and the relative properties of colour represented by the 
phenomenological image. The apparent colour as represented by phenomenological 
imag~s i~_ outstandingly analogous to the possible transformations taking place in 
geometries. Katz, Koffka and Hering emphasized the fact that under the same objective 
conditions, colour perception may shift from one mode of apprehension to another by 
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disturbing light in different ways. This kind of understanding brings both Cassirer and 
the Gestaltists under the general perspective of structuralism. There is similarity 
between Cassirer's view and the Gestaltists's view on structuralism of perception. For 
example, Cassirer uses "Given" or hie et nunc and the Gestaltists agreed to use another 
term equal to "given" that is "retinal image". Both of these terms refer to the dogma 
that sensory impressions are the only valid candidates for representing external objects. 
The second parallel between Cassirer's term "identity of object" and the Gestaltists' 
"constancy hypothesis". 
These two terms share the same meanmg as an objection to the vtew that any 
particular external object is not necessarily given to us as a reproduction. The 
Gestaltists applied that structural view not only to perception but also to learning. 
They have a holistic and a consistent view to apply. There is a peculiar link between 
perception and learning, thus I would like to discuss that relationship and how it 
reflects their structuralism. 
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8-1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explain the structural aspect of the Gestalt theory of 
learning as an extension of their application of perception. My argument in this chapter 
will be devoted to showing the consistency and the systematic nature of the Gestalt 
view by discussing two issues that are related to perception: the problem of learning and 
objectivity of perception. The Gestaltists used the same functional-relational approach 
to study these two issues and this led them to a coherent and holistic view that is 
applicable to different problems of psychology. This consistency derives from a 
systematic and constructive unity of mind. That is why I found it is necessary to bring 
Cassirer in to the discussion in order to examine the mutual influence of the Gestalt 
theorists on him and Cassirer's influence on their latest views. Therefore, we shall argue 
that the influence of Cassirer is not restricted to their application of Cassirer's 
Functional-Relational thought to perception. Rather I found that Cassirer's influence on 
the Gestaltists extended to include their views on social life. The Gestaltists hoped to 
close the gap between nature and life by finding comprehensive forms to unify these 
two different areas. We therefore conclude that the Gestaltists pre-supposed the 
constructive unity of the mind by setting up a theory of personality to reflect that 
constructive unity. 
8- 2 Gestalt and the Structural Theory of Learning 
The Gestalt theory of learning is an extension of their view of perception where an 
objection is made to associationism, behaviourism, and structuralism in its traditional 
~-~}_~~:-This traditional structuralism was discussed by Edward Bradford Titchener (1867-
~~- _,_ -~-"'' - -"' 
1927) who claimed that structuralism means that wholes are compounds- of''elemenfs: 
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According to Titchener, structure is the total sum of separated elements that are 
combined together to give that structure or form. Therefore the task of psychology is to 
discover the elements and the manner in which they are compounded. One must begin 
with the atoms or elements; science goes from the part to the whole. However, as we 
can see in their answers to the various problems of perception, the Gestaltists's account 
was opposed to Titchener's structuralism. The Gestalt approach to learning differs 
radically from the earlier views of associationism, behaviourism and contrasts sharply 
with most other modem views of learning that concentrate on such questions as how a 
conditioned stimulus gets attached to an unconditioned stimulus so as to elicit a 
conditioned response. The psychologists that support that claim usually vary in the 
terms they use to express the idea of conditioned stimulus; they sometimes use 
association, habits, and tendencies to describe the relation between stimuli and 
responses. Psychologists such as Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850-1909) and Ivan Petrovich 
Pavlov (1849-1936) defend that view and called it "learning by experience". The 
Gestalt psychologists consider learning as an application of their view of perception 
because the main theme of perception is carried on in learning. Learning involves a 
structural element that is not presented by experience. Thus the Gestalt theory of 
learning raises structural themes that are not presupposed by associationism and 
behaviourism. For example, the base understanding of the hypothesis of constancy that 
we viewed in perception, maintains its function in learning and can be understood via 
"trial- and error hypothesis". That hypothesis refers to learning as a process that takes 
place only through experience and through correspondence between the stimulus and 
the learner's responses to the stimulus. This view of the nature of the learning process 
has been grasped and maintained by Edward Thorndike (1874-1949) and Clark L Hull 
(1884-1952). 
The Gestalt psychologists sought to present an account that contradicts these theories of 
the behaviourists. It seems to me that the starting point for the Gestaltist's view of 
learning is based on two steps. The first one was to reject the assumption that a learning 
situation depends on the mere association between elements and the repetition of that 
association by experience through trial and error. The second step was to maintain the 
holistic and structural view by applying it to a learning situation. In other words, 
learning is not about the composition of elements but is a creative process based on 
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reproducing the patterns and the structures in a learning situation (Hilgard & Bower, 
1966: 233). 
The Gestalt psychologists thought that the whole that we experience in learning is a 
constructed whole in our mind and they denied that the whole is given out of the sum of 
elementary sensory experiences, as claimed by Titchener. They applied the laws of 
perception to learning. Their aim in applying these laws was to present a comprehensive 
way to explain the dynamic activities involved in learning situations. The Gestaltists 
criticised the behaviourist laws of learning. These laws are; the law of frequency, the 
law of effect, the law of exercise and the law of belongingness. The law of effect states 
that there are reinforcers such as food that strengthen stimulus-response connections or 
associations, and punishments such as shock that weaken them. The law of "exercise 
and frequency" imply that the repeated practice of a stimulus-response association 
strengthens it. Finally, the law of belongingness states that some things are easier to 
associate than others because they belong together. (Anderson, 1995: Also, Schwartz & 
Reisberg, 1991:111-13). 
All these laws confirm the belief that all behaviour could be accounted for in terms of 
such stimulus-response bonds. Thorndike, as a representative of behaviourism, indicates 
that learning is understood as the direct association of stimulus and response without 
postulating any intervening mental processes. On the contrary, the Gestalt psychologists 
indicate that the learning can be developed not through the principle of association and 
what behaviourists call "Trial and Error", but only from the total situation of learning 
and through the pattern or the whole structure that appears to the individual and leads 
him to solve the problem. Learning is one aspect of the general view of perception. 
Their theories of both learning and perception apply the same idea of structure and field 
organization. This understanding can be seen through the Gestaltists' s leading idea of 
insight as applied in learning. According to the Gestaltists, insight means meaningful 
behaviour and experience in the presence of any life situation. It is the suddenness of 
perceptual reconstruction of the field. When they use the term "insight" in learning, they 
mean the process of establishing a newly organized whole. The importance of the 
. concept ofinsight in learning is showing that the learner, who faces a problem in a 
particular situation, can solve it if he re-perceives the whole situation in a new way, a 
way that includes comprehending logical relationships between the parts of the 
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situation. This is the real essence of the Gestalt learning theory. Let us discuss two 
examples due to Wertheimer and Kohler. 
The first example shows that learning is not just a matter of adding new isolated 
elements to each other, but also requires the ability to re- arrange and group parts in a 
systematic whole. In other words, it involves a change from one Gestalt or structure to 
another Gestalt. In 1943, Wertheimer published his remarkable book Productive 
Thinking which was concerned with insightful learning in school children. He 
emphasized the apparent role of structure in problem- solving. He argued that the 
ultimate goal of learning lies in the ability to find new, creative solutions to problems 
that we face throughout the learning processes. For Wertheimer, these solutions cannot 
come from training the child to give the right responses to the right stimuli. On the 
contrary, they lie in understanding the problem or the situation not as separated 
elements but as an integrated whole. For example, Wertheimer was attending a school 
mathematics lesson, where the pupils learned how to find the area of the parallelogram 
which is equal to the product of the base divided by the altitude. The pupils learned the 
method of finding the area of a parallelogram by dropping one perpendicular from the 
upper left comer and another perpendicular from the upper right comer. Then we extend 
the base line to the right, we call the two points e andfas is shown in figure (8-1) 
d c 
~ /J 
a e b f 
Fig (8-1) 
Wertheimer wanted to make sure that the pupils learned how to find the area of 
parallelogram not in a slavish way, through blind repetition: he sometimes uses this 
phrase to refer to the pupils when they apply what a teacher says word for word without 
discovering new ways of solving a slightly difficult problem. It is the creativity of 
learning or what Wertheimer calls the "productive thinking of learning" (Wertheimer, 
" ~ • < •• - - ··-- ~ - - - - -:::: • -
1961: 60-63). Therefore Wertheimer went to the board and drew this figure as it is 
shown in figure (8-2) 
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Figure (8-2) 
Although Wertheimer drew the same parallelogram, he found different responses from 
the pupils to the figure on the board. One of the pupils raised his hand: "Teacher, we 
haven't had that yet". (Wertheimer, 1961: 60). Other pupils copied the figure on paper, 
they drew the auxiliary lines as they were taught, dropping perpendiculars from the two 
upper corners and extending the base line, as it is shown in figures (8-3). After the 
pupils drew the figures that were vague in identifying what they learned, Wertheimer 
told them, there was still a chance to represent the figure as they had learned it. Most of 
pupils were surprised but a few of them smiled and started to work out the problem. 
Some of the pupils mastered the problem by drawing the following lines in figure (8-
4A) or by turning their papers 45 degree, and doing as it is shown in the figure (8-4B) 
Figure (8-3) 
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Figure (8-4A) Figure (8-4B) 
For Wertheimer, the pupils who successfully mastered the problem were those who 
could re-arrange the relations between parts and re-organize and re-group them again 
within a new structure. The pupils who mastered the method of finding the area of the 
parallelogram confirmed the idea of the structural element implied in the learning 
situation. The success of solving the problem of finding the area of parallelogram meets 
our criterion of defining structuralism as a pure possibility of re-arranging the elements 
within new wholes: 
If the pupils have really grasped the issue, then for them three lines are not just "this line, and that 
line and the other line" or, as the teacher said, " a vertical line drawn from the upper left comer, 
another from the upper right comer, and a prolongation of the horizontal line from the lower right 
corner". They are not an and- sum of items, blindly connected with the solution .... But if they have 
grasped the problem then they see the lines in their structural role and function, in their meaning 
within the sensible context. They see how these lines, just these in this situation, bring about the 
solution in the inner relatedness, the structural relation of these operations to reaching the goal. The 
operations are viewed "from above" from the vantage point of the inner structure of the whole 
procedure, as they function within the context and fit its requirements. (Wertheimer, 1961: 65). 
Wertheimer applied that structural understanding to other problems in learning, such as 
the problem of the vertical angles: if we have two straight lines intersecting from two 
angles, A and B, how can you prove that they are equal? He explained that to solve that 
particular pro~lem, we need to understand the structural aspect of the mind. The mind is 
not ruled by habits to which it sticks blindly by repeating what it has learned. Instead, 
the mind is ruled by systematic rules that help us to re-arrange the elements of a 
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situation in a new form. This is what the Gestaltists call creative learning. This is a kind 
of transformation that could not result from mere association but arises from the mind 
and its dynamic activities to create new powers of organization. 
I would like to discuss another figure of the Gestaltists who led the investigation a step 
further by applying the Gestalt structuralism to a new area of research: animal learning. 
Kohler's aim was to show that the ability of the mind even in the animal to create 
organizational wholes and finding the relationships between the parts of the learning 
situation. 
Wertheimer gave all his attention to school children to show learning is presented as a 
part of solving a problem requires to give a creative thought to solve the problem, 
instead of just repeating what the pupil memorize. Other Gestalt psychologists applied 
solving-problem approach to animals including birds, hens, and bees. The Gestaltists 
indicated that learning is taking place when the individual thinks about the whole 
situation and the relationships between its parts and then gives a solution to the 
problem. 
Kohler developed a number of experiments on space, size and colour perception 
then he observed the animals' behaviour in re-structuring the perceptual situation by 
arranging the elements implied in the situation and finding new relationships 
between them within the new structure. Kohler's famous book The Mentality of 
Apes ( 1921) is an attempt to show the constructive nature of thought in apes. Kohler 
rejects the behaviourists' attempts to explain animal learning as a process governed 
by trial and error. In contrast, he thought that animals could learn progressively only 
when they managed to find relevant relationships between irrelevant parts in a 
learning situation. When the animal could find these relevant relations and re -
arrange the elements involved in the perceptual field, giving them a new order, the 
animal comes up with a new solution to the problem. Kohler presented these 
conclusions when he served as the director of the Prussian Academy of Science's 
station for the observation of apes at Tenerife in the Canary islands. Kohler argued 
, -c-~ that apes coul_d achieve a good standard of learning by finding relationships between 
unattached elements in a perceptual situation. To prove that assumption, he designed 
different experiments that proceeded systematically from simple to more difficult 
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tasks. Kohler chose an active ape called Sultan. To pass the test successfully, Sultan 
needed to re-arrange the irrelevant elements by finding relationships between them 
and use them to solve the problem. This understanding can be summarized by 
Kohler's primary question of whether chimpanzees showed insight in their 
behaviour. To prove that presupposition, Kohler designed some tests to see how the 
problem of learning is related to the general problem of perception and reflects the 
systematic unity of the mind Kohler answers the above question .. 
In this test, two bamboo sticks were provided, each too short to reach the fruit. But one 
stick could be fitted into the other, and thus when put together the tool would be of 
adequate length. In another experiment the animal sat close to the bars of its cage, 
opposite the goal which was outside the cage. In the animal's hands was a stick, which, 
was too short to reach the goal. Outside the bars, some two meters to one side of the 
goal, but lying nearer the bars, was placed a longer stick which could not be reached 
with the hand, but could be reached with the aid of a box placed under it (Koffka, 
1928:204-205). 
These experiments showed that learning takes place when one thinks about the whole 
situation and arranges its parts within new structure. The new structure of arrangement 
involves a set of relationships between the parts. Finding a convenient relationship 
between the parts, as fitted within a structure, leads to solve the problem. Kohler in his 
1927 and Koffka in his 1928 presupposed that the separate elements in the perceptual 
field acquired new functions within the new structure. 
In all these experiments, the animal reaches a creative solution to the problem. For 
example, imagine the elements of the situation are re-arranged and the animal 
discovered the possible relations between them, in that case, the animal will be able to 
consider different solutions and select the appropriate one that will enable it to 
overcome the problem. Of course the animal can not re-arrange the elements of its 
perceptual field and master the problem unless it could set up a structure within which 
· these elements can be fitted. This means that the structure is logically prior to the 
elements that compose it. The realization of "relations" is very important because it 
leads to a significant transformation in perception and then learning. For example, when 
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the stick is presented in the perceptual situation, it was a separate element in the 
perceptual situation. There was no particular relationship between it and the fruit. But 
when the animal re-arranged the perceptual situation and the embedded elements, it 
could find a relationship between the stick and the fruit. The isolated elements 
embedded in the first perceptual situation could acquire a new functional value within 
the new perceptual structure. When the animal succeeds in fitting the isolated element 
within a new structure, then we can say a transformation takes place in its perceptual 
field. 
The act of employing a stick seems to involve a transformation in the situation confronting the 
animal; for the stick, which at first was an object of indifference to the animal, now becomes 
definitely related to the situation. What the animal has actually learned is to make an irrelevant object 
relevant to the situation, which is something quite different from an external connection between 
certain sticks in the field ofperception. (Koffka, 1928: 210). 
Both learning and perception imply the same structural aspect where there is always 
the possibility of transformation in the perceptual field. Both involve the possibility 
of re-arranging the elements within holistic forms. Every element of that structure 
acquires a new relational meaning in respect of its relationships to other elements 
within the same structure. The link between perception and learning is the idea of 
relation and functional role. The awareness of relationships is not ascribed just to 
mankind: animals also seem to have this faculty of understanding relations and can 
apply them to different complicated situations. Cassirer agrees with the Gestaltists 
that what their experiments show the function of the mind is to construct objects not 
to receive them as given. I would like here to discuss the constructive unity of mind 
as conceived by Cassirer and the Gestaltists. 
8-3 Gestalt and the Constructive Unity of Mind 
To show the constructive nature of mind, we need to presuppose that there is a monism 
implied in the Gestalt view. This monism reflects the comprehensive view of the Gestalt 
as to be applied to different aspects of physical and social realms. The Gestalt is a view-
of realizing the form that precedes its parts. I ascribe to Gestalt an idea of holistic 
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monism. This "holistic monism" presupposes that the whole precedes the parts, and 
that in every aspect of knowledge, the mind constructs its objects by stressing the whole 
over its constituents. It is a systematic view that organizes the relationships between the 
whole and the parts. Here we are going to claim that the Gestalt holistic monism can be 
traced to different realms of science and civilization. Once we prove the need for these 
comprehensive and holistic structures required for experience, we shall show that there 
was a primary presupposition made by the Gestaltists that formed their understanding 
and analysis of experience. This primary presupposition is that there is a systematic and 
a constructive unity of the mind that brings consistency and coherence to our 
understanding of experience and its different aspects as viewed from different areas of 
sciences and in the perception of daily life. Therefore, I claim that the constructive unity 
ofthe mind can be traced in three kinds of unity as follows: 
1- The unity of the senses. 
2- The unity of science. 
3- The unity of the realms of civilization. 
All three kinds of unity are aspects of the general theory of personality. These three 
aspects form a comprehensive perspective for a person. Through them a person can see 
the whole through the parts and the constant through changes. According to the 
Gestaltist's view, a person will achieve his personality when he is able to adjust himself 
to new experiences and new social situations that require him to create holistic 
structures to fit his behaviour and action within these structures. Let us briefly discuss 
the claim regarding these three kinds of unity. I will discuss the first two kinds of unity 
and I will delay the last one to bring it together in a context with Cassirer' s view of the 
nature of mind. 
8.3.1 The Unity of the Senses 
The unity of the senses is one category that, we hope clearly reflects our claim of the 
.coherent unity of the mind. Therefore I will depend on 1927 a paper titled "The Unity 
- . 
of The Senses" by Gestalt psychologist Erich M. V. Hornbostel which argues -that there 
is unity between the different senses. Although every sense has a different function, at 
235 
Chapter Eight: Gestalt and the Constructive Unity of Mind 
the same time there are some phenomena that need two or three senses to work together 
in order to be understood. He firstly uses a linguistic and a historical perspective to 
present his view. He argued that in the French language for example, the verb "sentir" 
does not refer to one sense but refers to smell, touch and feel all together. He also adds 
that in some African tribes, although they have one word for "seeing" they use one 
general word to refer to "hearing", "touching", "smelling", "feeling" and "tasting". 
(Hornbostel, 1950: 210-211 From Ellis, 1950). 
Hornbostel indicated that we depend on more than one particular sense to perceive the 
apparent movement of an object. But, the apparent movement can possibly be perceived 
through the eye, the ear, or the sense of touch. It does not depend on seeing or hearing 
alone. Rather, all senses work co-operatively to perceive the movement of an object. 
What is essential in the sensuous- perceptible is not that which separates the senses from one another, 
but that which unites them; unites them among themselves; unites them with the entire (even with the 
non-sensuous) experience in ourselves; and with all the external world that there is to be experienced. 
(Hornbostel, 1950: 214). 
It seems to me that Hornbostel's claim is supported by the Gestaltists because the unity 
of the senses presupposes another unity: the unity of the mind that generates and creates 
those structures or non- physical elements that unify our experience. These structures 
are not extracted from experience but are generated by the dynamic activity of mind and 
its endless ability to produce a "creative process of synthesis"(Koffka, 1928:225-226). 
An example that shows that there are structural meanings involved in experience, occurs 
when we listen to someone, we do not listen to a stream of words disconnected but 
rather we obtain knowledge by structural meanings that bring all these spoken words 
within one context that allow understanding of the significance of what has been 
delivered. What we understand from the delivery is not the sum of the separate words 
but our understanding presupposes a context where these words will be fitted and 
grouped together to give a meaning. It is similar in the case of art. What is essential in a 
work of art does not lie in the sensuous- perceptible but in the meaning that we grasp 
when perceiving that work of art. It is the meaning that emerges from the continuous 
activity of the mind, "a:nd is a prior to sensual experience. To sum up, Hornbostel 
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indicated that none of the senses makes a contribution to cognition independently of the 
others. This unity presupposes the unity of the mind: 
It is the same organizing principle which calls forth organism from mere substance, and which binds 
the stream of happening into wholes, which makes the line a melody which can follow, and the 
melody a figure which we can see in one glance. Since the sensuous is perceptible only when it has 
form, the unity of the senses is given from the very beginning. (Hornbostel, 1950: 214). 
8.3.2 The Unity of Science 
The unity of science has been presupposed by the Gestaltists. They aim to verify 
sciences by claiming that natural sciences and the humanities; general psychology, 
social psychology, education and sociology can be viewed from the structural 
perspective since all these sciences involve the same creative process of construction. 
The Gestaltists worked under this theme that physical sciences and humanities share the 
same basis of understanding. They have the same constructive nature: the scientists and 
psychologists are investigating their objects by reducing them to the general rules of 
understanding. In respect of these rules, actions, events and behaviours are organized 
and behave accordingly. The starting point in exploring the constructive aspect of these 
sciences is to study them in the light of the concept of isomorphism as explained in 
Chapter Five. The unity of science presupposes two different processes; crumbling or 
fragmentation and synthesis. These two processes had been used, I claim, to postulate 
the idea of the constructive unity of mind. For example, when the Gestalt psychologists 
used the concept of isomorphism, they referred to the possibility of analysing some 
psychological problems depending on the facts of physics and physiology. I call this 
way of thought "synthesis" where they presuppose the unity between all these sciences. 
On the other hand, I find that Gestalt psychologists use another way of thinking to prove 
what they postulated earlier as "the constructive unity of mind". They paid attention to 
particular sciences and sought to bring out the holistic laws that organize the processes 
of each science. Their interest in of particular sciences included different branches of 
psychology like social psychology, developmental psychology and therapy. In addition, 
they paid attention to sociology and education. They aime~ to capture the structural 
characteristics implied in each science. I call this way of thinking "crumbling or 
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fragmentation". This process of synthesis is an upward movement, while the process of 
fragmentation is a downward movement. 
Let us examine these two approaches showing the constructive unity of mind. Max 
Wertheimer firstly pointed out that some physiological processes were involved when 
he was studying apparent movement what he calls phi-phenomenon. Although 
Wertheimer did not specify a certain principle this shows the similar processes between 
perception and physiology. He also indicated that these processes are unitary and 
holistic. It was Kohler who brought the similarity between physiology and psychology 
under the concept of isomorphism. He argued that isomorphism means that the forms of 
experience are not essentially different from the physical forms in the nervous system. 
In other words, in a given case the organization of experience and the underlying 
physiological facts have the same structure. The question now is although both organic 
and inorganic life are different in nature, why did the Gestaltists see the possibility of 
bringing the sciences that study these two different domains together? The answer lies 
in the constructive nature of the mind. Koffka argued that Wertheimer was right in his 
claims about isomorphism because he could gather the realms of physiology and 
psychology under one view: 
What he said amounted to this: let us think of the physiological processes not as molecular, but as 
molar phenomena. If we do that, all the difficulties of the old theory disappear. For if they are molar, 
their molar properties will be the same as those of the conscious processes which they are supposed 
to underlie. And if that is so, our two realms, instead of being separated by an impassable gulf, are 
brought as closely together as possible with the consequence that we can use our observations of the 
behavioural environment and of behaviour as data for the concrete elaboration of physiological 
hypotheses. Then instead of having one kind of such process only, we must deal with as many as 
there are different physiological processes, the variety of the two classes must be the same. 
(Koffka,l935: 56). 
The Gestaltists describe the behavioural environment as molar behaviour in respect to 
the physiological processes. Wertheimer showed that molar behaviour will be a field 
process where we can study behaviour in respect to the field in which it takes place. 
They determine the task of their psychology as: the study of behaviour in its causal connection 
with the psycho-physical field. (Koffka, 1935: 57). The Gestaltists sought to study _the 
behaviour as an event in that psychophysical field and the forces exist within it. 
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In order to show the constructive unity of the mind as applied to science, we consider 
this formula "the whole phenomena are more than the sum of their parts" to be the most 
general rule of the mind. The Gestaltists applied it as a universal and a systematic rule 
that has to be implied in every science and which brings the relationship between the 
contents and the laws of each science. 
To prove that every science applies that formula, they apply now what I call crumbling 
or fragmentation. By fragmentation, the Gestaltists dealt with each science separately, 
trying to show its systematic nature and the way it constructs its objects. Therefore they 
showed that every science involves a holistic way of construction that is presupposed in 
all sciences. By applying that, the Gestaltists do not aim to combine sciences but to 
analyze the general themes of each science and find out what is common between them. 
I am going to show how they apply it to prove the systematic unity of mind. They argue 
that there is a process called "self-structuring" implied in the sciences. The scientists do 
not investigate the facts of science in respect to stimulus- response formula, rather they 
respond to the pattern of stimulation response in the organizational field. The Gestaltists 
explained that by stating that the operations of the nervous system are not restricted to 
primitive local processes but respond to a situation, first by dynamic sensory events that 
are peculiar to it as a system (Kohler, 194 7: 165). Every science is a product of the 
whole organizational field. For example, in chemistry, the chemist understands any 
chemical product not only as a sum of chemical elements but also as a product of 
organizational relations between chemical elements. Kohler gives the following 
example to show that chemistry reacts to the whole organizational field: 
Suppose that somewhere in a factory HNO 3 were produced out of its elements, and that in another 
part of the factory the acid were used to dissolve silver- would it be right to say that silver reacts to 
nitrogen, hydrogen and oxygen? Surely, such a statement would be utterly wrong, because what 
happens to the silver depends upon the chemical organization of the acid, and cannot be understood 
as a reaction to those elements or to their sum. (Kohler, 194 7: 165-166). 
The same understanding also applies to H 2 0 or any other chemical compound. We are 
here- descending from chef!lical thought to chemical substances and in that process we 
are witnessing the holistic and systematic nature that is involved in chemistry that gives 
priority to organization and order over the particulars. This process is what I call 
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fragmentation; it is the downward movement that begins from the whole toward its 
parts. Every science finds the relationships between its elements in regard to its general 
laws. It is a downward movement where the mind moves from the whole to particular 
and forms it contents The same process is also involved in psychology where behaviour 
is not a response to local and separate stimulus but rather a response to the total pattern 
of the environmental field. Kurt Lewin also applied that method of analysis to social 
psychology and interpreted human behaviour in the light of the social forces involved in 
the social situation. 
These two methods of synthesis and fragmentation are two methods that reflect the 
ways of organizing the relationship between the rule and the content. In each process 
the mind brings unity and a systematic view to the discipline and either the mind 
reflects the internal unity involved in each science or tries to brings two different 
disciplines together depending on the presupposition that each of them involve the same 
structural rules and there is possibility to bring them in more general unity that is the 
systematic unity of the mind itself. 
8.3.3 The Unity of the Realms of Civilization 
It is the third kind of unity that shows that the holistic systematic nature of the mind is 
applicable to different aspects of life and its problems. Therefore, I will delay this 
discussion to bring Cassirer into that context. It seems to me that there is also another 
similarity between Cassirer and the Gestaltists regarding the claim of the constructive 
and systematic unity of mind. However, I argue that although both applied the same 
structuralism, the goal behind that application differed in each version of structuralism 
as we explain at the end of this chapter. 
8.4 Cassirer and the Gestalt View of the Constructive Unity of 
Mind 
In this section I will discuss the constructive unity of mind in the light of the general · 
perspective of Cassirer's view of symbolic forms that implies structural meanings that 
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combine between the different forms of civilization. We could see, through the 
argument that I set up and developed in this chapter and the other chapters, both 
Cassirer and the Gestalt psychologists chose the structural model to interpret the objects 
of thought and both interpretations emerged from Kantian transcendental philosophy. 
Both believed in the dynamic activities of the mind for arranging and ordering 
experience. Cassirer and the Gestaltists indicated the creative synthesis of the mind and 
its ability to create structures that give the particular its characteristic. For instance, the 
Gestaltists were influenced by the German philosophical heritage which reflected in 
their analysis of human behaviour and the themes they discussed such as Gestalt, 
pragnanz and organization .. They conducted some experiments, explaining their results 
by these laws, and showing the constructive role of the mind in organizing and 
transforming the raw facts of experience. 
Cassirer also understood the new Kantian spirit as it emerged from The Marburg School 
and in particular Cohen. This comprehension led Cassirer to apply that new spirit to 
different realms of science and reality. In fact, both Cassirer and the Gestaltists strongly 
supported the constructive nature of the mind and its supreme capacity to provide us 
with systems that arrange our experience. Being a philosopher, Cassirer had profound 
knowledge that allowed him to apply his Functional-Relational view to different aspects 
of reality including science, art, music, culture, myth and religion. I claim that Cassirer, 
when he published his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, wanted to extend his invariance 
theory of experience to become a general invariance theory of civilization. It was 
interesting to find not only that the Gestaltists shared with Cassirer the application of 
the Functional-Relational view to perception, but they too applied it to different areas of 
life and reality. For example, Wertheimer wrote essays on Truth, Democracy, Freedom 
and Ethics, applying Functional-Relational thought to these concepts. For example, he 
understood the concept of democracy not by comparing the different forms of 
democratic governments and their constitutional laws, but rather by studying the inner 
structure of it and the function it performs in the social field and its impact on individual 
behaviour: 
- Stating and discussing items in subtractive abstraction is not enough. We have to consider their 
structural function. The methodological approach is not only to compare different forms of 
government by comparing items taken in subtractive abstraction, but to study the I as a part in inner 
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structure of the object and to view the system structurally in its functioning a part in its field. 
(Wertheimer,1937, Quoted from Henle,1961: 51). 
The agreement between Cassirer and the Gestaltists reflects their belief in the systematic 
nature of the mind and its orders to bring unity to the chaos of experience. The 
Gestaltists held that thought and applied it to different aspects of reality by referring to 
Cassirer himself. We can see in ( 1961) Wertheimer refers to the importance of using 
Functional-Relational thought when discussing the concept of velocity as discovered by 
Galileo, the same problem that Cassirer discussed before him in his Function and 
Substance (191 0). Lewin refers to Cassirer in his (1935) when he distinguishes between 
Aristotelian and Galileian modes of thought in contemporary psychology, in addition, 
Lewin himself says in different places that his field theory is associated with Cassirer 
(Smith, 1997: 687). The Gestaltists' references to Cassirer do not refer to a mere 
accidental impact but show his deep influence. 
Lewin referred to the constructive process of understanding several times. The idea of a 
constructive method was clearly mentioned by Lewin in his article titled "Field Theory 
and Learning" (1942). Lewin used the phrase "constructive method" to refer to the 
nature of the processes in both exact sciences and social sciences. He agreed with 
Cassirer that thought is a genetic process not generic where the former refers to the 
ways understanding constructs the objects and arranges the constituents of the whole 
under structural forms, while generic process refers to the a process where the whole is 
composed by a reference to its parts as independent identities. 
The essence of the constructive method is the representation of an individual case with the help of a 
few "elements" of construction. In psychology, one can use psychological "position", psychological 
"forces" and similar concepts as elements. The general laws of psychology are statements of the 
empirical relations between these constructive elements or certain properties of them. It is possible to 
construct an infinite number of constellations in line with those laws; each of those constellations 
corresponds to an individual case at a given time. In this way, the gap between generalities and 
specificities, between laws and individual differences, can be bridged. (Lewin, 1942: 212-213). 
- Lewin applies that understanding of the co~structive method to his own concept of life 
space. The concern now is not focused on the objects but on the structurethat organizes·· 
the whole situation. 
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The center of interest shifts from objects to processes, from states to changes of state. If the life space 
is a totality of possible events, then "things" that enter the situation, especially the person himself and 
psychological "objects" have to be characterized by their relationship to possible events. (Lewin, 
1936: 16). 
We can notice from Koffka's examples regarding the transformation of figural form 
from two- dimensional and three- dimensional space depending on the changes that take 
place in the framework we adjusted. Like Cassirer, who stressed the idea of group and 
its application in geometry and physics, Kohler and Koffka stressed the idea of structure 
and organizational whole implied in perceptual space. The Gestaltists sought to show 
that the structural view involved in geometrical space is also involved in perceptual 
space and in social space as discussed by Lewin. It was not accidental that Lewin 
referred to Cassirer throughout his books such as; A dynamic Theory of Personality 
(1935), and Resolving Social Conflicts (1948) and his article Constructs in Field Theory 
(1944). In addition, there is his article Cassirer 's Philosophy of Science and the Social 
Sciences (1949), edited by Schilpp to discuss the validity of Cassirer's constructivism to 
be applied to social sciences. 
Lewin agreed with Cassirer that the aim of science is not to focus on the properties of a 
given as a thing with independent properties, but to construct the object of knowledge 
by structural processes. Objects of knowledge are not given but instead created. Cassirer 
calls the principle that organizes this kind of activity a genetic principle, rather than a 
generic principle. Lewin used the term "genetic principle" to point to the dynamic 
principle responsible for organizing the components involved in the social situation. In 
addition, Lewin used Cassirer's term "genetic principle" to point out the method of 
construction implied in social psychology. 
It has been shown, in opposition to the traditional logical doctrine, that the course of the 
mathematical construction of the concepts is defined by the procedures of the construction of series. 
We have not been concerned with separating out the common element from a plurality of similar 
impressions but with establishing a principle by which their diversity should appear. The unity of the 
concept has not been found in a fixed group of properties, but in the rule, which represents the mere 
,giversity as a sequence ofelements according to law. (Cassirer, 1923: 68 Quoted from Lewin, 
1949: 277). 
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Lewin explained the meaning of structural properties by referring to Cassirer again. He 
stated that: 
In the social as in the physical field the structural properties of a dynamic whole are different from 
the structural properties of their subparts .... Structural prope11ies are characterized by relations 
between parts rather than by the parts or elements themselves. Cassirer emphasizes that, throughout 
the history of mathematics and physics, from the present day, problems of constancy of relations 
rather than of constancy of elements have gained importance and have gradually changed the picture 
of what is considered essential. (Lewin,1949: 280-281 ). 
Lewin applied the understanding that emerged from his awareness of the new 
developments in modem geometry to what he calls "life space". Lewin indicated that in 
life space there are different social groups that have various social relationships 
representing what he calls "social units". In social life, our aim is to find out the 
structural properties of the groups and its members that are to be considered as a whole 
situation, and to understand the dynamic process that organises the relationship between 
the individuals and the region in which social responses take place. 
Groups are sociological wholes; the unity of these sociological wholes can be defined operationally 
in the same way as a unity of any other dynamic whole, namely, by the interdependence of its parts. 
(Lewin, 2000: 60). 
This is analogous to a geometric space. "Life space" has the same constructive meaning 
as in geometrical space. For instance, Lewin claimed that any social response from an 
individual submits to social situation as a whole and the single aspects involved in the 
situation. According to Lewin, there is equivalence between geometrical space and life 
space: 
If one tries to make an explanation in terms of dynamic relations, one comes to assumptions about the 
structure and the properties of the basic facts that seem to be equivalent, at least in their mathematical 
form, regardless of the terminology in which they are expressed. One must always go back to these 
invariant relations in the last analysis if one wants to derive the behaviour of a person conceptually. It 
seems to us therefore that the principal task of any dynamic psychology is to investigate and 
represent directly these relations. (Lewin, 1936:81 ). 
- '--- ~ ~ .. ,,.___.___~ ~--- ~-
Lewin ais_o_ .sought to snoW the construcHve process involyeq in soc:ial situations. 
--- ·--, ___ . ~""-- --·- ------~- ---··-
Lewin's aim was to bring the process of construction in science into his social 
psychology in modified form. For example, he replaced the concept of invariant with 
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his new vision of a "region". Every social situation involves a region that orders and 
arranges the social relations within it to meet the needs of the situation. When we enter 
a new social situation, we construct a new region within which the social relations can 
be organized. For example, consider a two-year-old child who does not want to stop 
playing and does not want to go and wash his hands. His mother knows that he likes to 
wet the wash cloth in the basin himself, so she asks him: Do you want to wet the cloth 
or should I do it myself? Because he wants to do the job, the child goes directly to wash 
his hands. Lewin explained the change in the child's social behaviour by referring to the 
question that his mother asked which transformed the situation from playing to washing. 
The child begins to behave according to the requirements of the new situation and re-
arranges his social response in a new region. This new region or social situation 
involved a form according to which the behaviour changes regarding to that new form. 
For example, in the "playing" situation the child's response to the social elements 
implied in the situation was consistently arranged in respect of the playing situation as a 
whole order. When the special situation is changed from playing to washing, the child 
changed his response according to the new region that represents a new holistic 
structure and requires different elements and new relations among them in certain order. 
According to Lewin, life space has its structure, which means nothing more than the 
relative positions of someone's response to the whole situation. 
Lewin was convinced by the idea that any social situation presupposes a holistic 
structure that organizes the relations between the elements of the structure. Therefore, I 
claim that, under the influence of Cassirer, Lewin re-applied the concept of structure to 
the field of social psychology. He argued that the changes that may take place in life 
space include those changes that occur to the structural properties that exist between 
individuals themselves as parts of the situation or in the nature of the social situation 
itself to be considered as a holistic structure. These changes can be described as an 
increase in the differentiation of a region by increasing the number of sub-regions or 
alternatively by decreasing the number of sub-regions or combining separate regions 
.. into one region, or finally restructuring the whole order or changing the pattern without 
decreasing or increasing the parts implied in the situation. 
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He discussed some examples to show the changes that take place either in the parts 
implied in the social structure or in the structure itself. He gave the example of marriage 
and how it varies according to the differences of culture, race and religion as an 
example of the changes in the sub-groups involved in the marriage as a whole social 
situation. On the other hand, he gave an example of democratic and autocratic groups 
and the patterns of learning that were acquired among the individuals who represent the 
members of these two groups, as an example of the changes took place in the social 
situations or social fields (Lewin, 2000: 364). 
Lewin ascribed to the space region a relative nature because the individual's response is 
determined by the region. 
Why the region in which a person stands is so important for his behaviour becomes intelligible when 
one realizes how great the change is which is brought about by a transition from one region into 
another, even within an otherwise unchanged life space. As a rule all relations of neighborhood are 
changed by such a transition: Regions which were before adjacent to the region of the person are no 
longer so and vice versa ... .In short, the dynamic condition of a person depends in almost every 
respect directly on his position in a certain region. (Lewin, 1936: 99). 
Generally speaking, the Gestalt psychologists focused on the characteristic of region 
that remains invariant under certain conditions. 
I would like here to address two issues that the Gestaltists discussed which generally 
reflect common agreement between them and Cassirer. 
The first problem on which it seems that they were in agreement concerns the 
relationship between the particular and the universal. How did they understand this 
relationship within perception? 
Cassirer and the Gestaltists agreed on the relationship between particular and universal. 
They considered the universal as logically preceding the particular, and for the 
particular to be grasped, it needs to be understood in relation to universal rules. 
According to Functional-Relational thought, the particular has no meaning in itself, it is 
not a separate and independent entity. The particular becomes a member that has a 
relative place· within a structure -and its characteristics are determined by its 
relationships with the other elements involved in the structure. Thus the particular is 
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characterized by the ability to change when the order and the arrangement of the system 
are changed: 
Each universal relation, that it establishes, has a tendency to connect itself with other relations, and 
by this combination to become more and more useful in the mastery of the individual. .. The 
"participation" of the individual in the universal thus appears no more a riddle than the logical fact 
that, in general, various conditions can be united intellectually into a unitary result, in which each is 
fully retained. (Cassirer, 1923: 255-256). 
The same understanding of the relationship between the universal and the particular 
is applied by the Gestalt theorists. The Gestaltists agreed that the particular acquires 
its meaning and function within the structure. For example, if we consider the 
Gestalt theorists' definitions of the Gestalt, we notice an agreement among them that 
the individual has no structural meaning apart from the function it performs within 
the structural whole. Wertheimer defines the Gestalt as the follows: 
A Gestalt is a whole whose characteristics are determined, not by the characteristics of its 
individual elements, but by the internal nature of the whole. 
Kohler (1933) defines the Gestalt: "a separate whole" with reference to the field 
concept. He states that: "Whenever a process becomes dynamically distributed and 
arranges itself in accordance with the constellation of determining circumstances in its entire 
field, that process belongs in the realm of Gestalt psychology." 
Finally in his (1929) Das Gestaltproblem, Matthaei; defines Gestalt as follows: 
The whole and the parts mutually determine the structural coherence of a Gestalt. The parts 
are dependently related to the whole, but they affect its organization. (Katz, 1951: 92). 
Perceptual experience and its elements always presuppose a kind of systematic 
structural order. These orders set up relationships between the parts where coherence 
and consistency between the parts exist as we found in visual experience of space. 
For example, Koffka, through his definition of the law of Pragnanz, shows these 
logical relations implied in that law. He states that: 
Psychological organization will always be as "good" as the prevailing conditions allow. In this 
defm!tton the terlll "good" is undefined. It embraces such properties as regularity, symmetry, 
simplici~:- ~~~~~ ascri~ed so~~ ~th~; I~gi~~l--~h~;a~~eristlc~ to"the law· O"f' Prligi1ani; ·in- his Gestalt-- --- -- - -
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Psychology (1935) such as; unity, simplicity, harmony, inclusiveness, and conciseness. (Koffka, 
1935,110). 
Cassirer and the Gestalt theorists indicated the need for these structural orders when we 
arrange the elements of experience. Cassirer expresses that idea as "the invariant theory 
of experience" and the Gestaltists reveal the same understanding in their expression "the 
constitutional theory of experience". These two expressions refer to the same fact that 
the unity of experience reduces to a systematic unity of mind that ascribes orders to its 
elements. The attempt to arrange the chaos of experience and give its elements a 
systematic unity was the reason for both Cassirer and the Gestaltists to adopt a 
structuralist theory of perception. 
The second agreement between Cassirer and the Gestaltists was the task to convert 
perception as a view of subjective judgement into a view of objective judgement. 
Cassirer accepted the Kantian transcendental concept of objectivity. He applied that 
understanding of objectivity to different concepts and perception. In The Problem of 
Knowledge (1950),he summarized it as follows: 
The new critical transcendental concept of objectivity must be extended. This had nothing to do with 
the existence of "things in themselves" but solely with the order of appearances. A strictly lawful 
connection of phenomena is possible only, as the Critique had shown, when they are brought under 
definite rules. And these empirical rules presuppose the universal "principles of the understanding" 
which Kant called the "analogies of experience". (Cassirer, 1950: 119). 
Being a Neo-Kantian philosopher, Cassirer transcended the Kantian dualism between 
sensibility and understanding and re-establishes his view on the principles of 
understanding alone. The monism that we ascribed to the Marburg School came from 
that understanding as was illustrated in Chapter Two. 
The question that seems to be critical to Cassirer, is whether objective perceptual 
judgements are possible. Cassirer maintains the critical transcendental concept of 
objectivity but reformulates it in the light of his invariant theory of expenence. 
-TherefQre he agrees that objective perceptual judgements are possible in respect to the 
general views of invariant theory. In every perceptual experience, Cassirer 
distinguishes between two elements; the changing and constant elements of experience. 
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He argues that knowledge must be set up on constant elements on which the judgement 
is formed. For Cassirer, there are two elements are involved in experience; one remains 
unchanged in the flux of experience, while the other is changeable and will dissolve and 
vanish. 
We finally call objective those elements of experience, which persist through all change in the here 
and now, and on which rests the unchangeable character of experience; while we ascribe to the sphere 
of subjectivity all that belongs to this change itself, and that only expresses a determination of the 
particular, unique here and now. (Cassirer, 1923: 273). 
This distinction between constant and changing elements led Cassirer to apply his 
understanding of group theory to present an answer of how perceptual judgements 
can be possible. He indicated that even if one distinguished the constant element 
from the changeable contents of perceptual experience, the constant element will not 
be always constant and hence unchangeable. On the contrary, he explained that the 
constant is a constant element in respect to a certain reference, but when the 
reference changes, the constant element will be replaced by another which would be 
a constant element for the new reference. Cassirer indicates there is no an element 
that will be absolute and unchangeable, but any element can be constant in 
perceptual experience in respect to a certain frame of reference that determines the 
perceptual experience. 
The result of thus deriving the distinction between the subjective and the objective, is that it has 
merely relative significance. For there are no absolutely changeable elements of experience at any 
stage of knowledge we have reached, any more than there are absolutely constant elements. A content 
can only be known as changeable with reference to another, with which it is compared, and which at 
first claims permanent existence for itself. At the same time, the possibility always remains that this 
second content will be corrected by a third, and thus may no longer hold as a true and perfect 
expression of objectivity, but as a mere partial expression of being. (Cassirer, 1923: 273). 
Cassirer argued that objectivity in that sense can be applied in both natural and human 
sciences on the basis of that understanding. Cassirer indicated that there are different 
degrees of objectivity in sciences. For example, in the case of perception, sensuous 
~~perception referi;rto a real" objective-knowledge as opposed to dreams and hallucinations. 
The same thought applied when we compare physics to perception. Physics is a science 
not about physical and immediate things or direct behaviour of physical objects, but it is 
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about the abstract view of matter and physical forces not as we perceive them but as 
represented in a abstract formula. 
Kohler argued that psychology can be seen as objective science if we replace the view 
that perception is about a direct or immediate experience with the view that it is about 
objective experience. Objective experience can be drawn from their distinction between 
the retinal image and the phenomenological image. The phenomenological image 
represents a constant element in respect to a reference on which we distinguish between 
what is subjective and what is objective involved in perceptual experience. The 
Gestaltists wanted to confirm the constant elements involved in perceptual experience, 
therefore the experiments of Katz, and Gelb on colour perception, Koffka and Kohler's 
experiments on perceptual space, Wertheimer's experiment on apparent movement, and 
learning and finally Lewin's experiment on social psychology all reflected their belief in 
perceptual experience as objective. The Gestaltists' experiments, discussed throughout 
this chapter and the last two chapters, were attempts to overthrow the view of 
perception as a mere mosaic aggregate of scattered sensations in favour of a critical 
theory of the objectivity of perception. The Gestaltists consider perception to be 
governed by a group ofrelative transformational characteristics and invariance. 
To that extent, the Gestaltists shared Cassirer's invariant theory of experience and the 
experiments they designed reflect the importance of constant elements in perceptual 
experience. On the other hand, Cassirer depended on their experiments to provide 
evidence for his invariant theory of experience. In addition to the objectivity of 
perception, the Gestaltists went some way to answering Cassirer's call for a 
"psychology of thought". "Psychology of thought" refers to a transformation in the 
principles of psychology that constitutes a peculiar problem for epistemology. The 
psychology of thought presents a productive approach to investigation. Cassirer 
explains it as follows: 
Psychology of thought does not study thought where thought merely receptively receives and 
reproduces the meaning of an already finished judgemental connection, but where it creates and 
>constructs a meaningful system of propositions. When psychology pursues this line of enquiry and 
considers thought equally in -the concrete totality of its productive functions, the initial opposition of 
methods is more and more resolved into a pure correlation. Psychology in this sense gives the 
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approach to problems, which must seek their solution in logic and in their application to science. 
(Cassirer, 1923: 346). 
Gestalt psychology was an attempt to re-discover the role played by psychology in the 
circle of knowledge. They referred to these laws mentioned in Chapter Five as structural 
orders to organize perceptual experience. In addition they were concerned with the 
phenomenological images that are constructively formed in respect of the process of 
transformation. The Gestalt theorists established a rational insight into the demands of 
how our perceptual judgement can be based on the phenomenological forms provided 
by a process of transformation. They were concerned with the structural connections 
between elements of the experience and the intrinsic bonds imposed by the total 
structure. Once this structure is seen, then the elements must follow one another in a 
certain way. 
To sum up, the Gestaltists were consistent in their applications of both perception and 
learning. They emphasized that the same dynamical processes applied in perception are 
also applied to learning. They worked under a general theme that there is a constructive 
and systematic unity of the mind. They traced this unity and explained it in many 
different places. They shared with Cassirer the view that structural approach can set up 
a valid account of the objectivity of perception. 
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Conclusion 
In the following reflections I shall attempt to set forth an inner connection-
epistemological in nature- between the mathematical concept of group and certain 
fundamental problems of the psychology of perception as the latter have been more and 
more distinctly formulated in the last decades. To the end, we must look far afield. For 
the two scientific provinces which we are trying to connect appear at first sight to be 
entirely disparate as to their content. Yet, we should not allow ourselves to be misled by 
this disparity. What we are going to set forth concerns logic only, and not ontology. Our 
ultimate aim is to bring out clearly a certain type of concepts which has found its 
clearest expression in abstract creations of modern geometry. But the type in question is 
not confined to the geometrical domain. It is, on the contrary, of far more general 
validity and use. 
(Cassirer, 1944:5). 
The mam theme of this thesis was to find an answer of Cassirer's philosophical 
enterprise of how possible psychology can be developed in the light of logic not 
ontology? My answer was there is possibility to bring psychology to the circle of logic 
by finding out constant elements involved in perceptual experience. To trace these 
constant elements, we divided Cassirer's view of perception into three stages and we 
found out there is tremendous confirmation of the role played by these constant 
elements in perceptual experience. This thesis found that the terms used by Cassirer 
varied in respect to the philosophical problems he had discussed during these three 
stages of his theoretical development. 
1- In Berlin stage ( 1900-1923), Cassirer had confirmed that the constant element which 
played role in the perceptual experience was function as an alternative element 
instead of substance. According to that view, the contents of a perceptual object are 
functionally related and organized within a structure instead of the view that 
Conclusion 
considers contents of experience are simply added and aggregated from the external 
world. 
2- In Hamburg stage (1923-1933), Cassirer used the ideal meaning involved in 
perceptual experience as a constant element which provides it with its unity. 
Cassirer claimed that the intuitional meaning, sometimes he referred to it as a 
symbolic meaning, is that constant element presupposed in perceptual experience. 
3- In immigration stage (1933-1945), Cassirer used the concept of group as the 
constant element that organizes and orders the contents of perceptual experience. 
In these three stages we could notice that Cassirer was consistent and coherent in his 
views and in his broad applications as seen in both exact and human sciences, where the 
attempt had made to understand what is changeable in respect to what is unchangeable 
or what is variable in the light of what is invariant. 
These three constant elements pointed to one fact that Cassirer's aim was to set up a 
view that makes perceptual judgments are possible. To make these perceptual 
judgments possible, we reach to second conclusion that is Cassirer provided a 
transcendental answer of how an individual's judgment, regarding any single perceptual 
experience, can be possible? In other terms, how Cassirer understood the problem of the 
particular and the universal and how he understood the relationship between them. 
Being a Neo-Kantian, Cassirer suggested and proved that there are schemata inherent in 
perception. We indicated that perceptual judgments are possible if we organize our 
perceptual experience in the light of these constant elements. This apprehension led to 
important conclusion that an objective account of perception is possible when the 
contents of perceptual phenomena are related and organized in respect to these constant 
elements. Cassirer explained that the concept of group is considered one of these 
possible structural elements that can provide an objective understanding of perceptual 
phenomena which distinguishes it from dreams, hallucination and subjective judgments. 
To that extent, the Gestaltists shared with Cassirer the view that an objective theory of 
perception is possible when we organize the perceptual experience in the light of the 
structunilelements presupposed by the dynamic functional activities of the mind. 
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Conclusion 
We came to the conclusion that both Cassirer and the Gestaltists presupposed a 
constructive unity of the mind which led their analyses to bridge the different aspects of 
civilization and life claming that there is a logical monism presupposed in every process 
of construction. We tried to trace these structural moments presupposed by the mind 
and which make the realms of civilization reasonable. 
Finally, I tried to design a diagram demonstrating the way the phenomenological image 
is constructed as shown in the early pages of Chapter Five. My aim when I designed 
this diagram was to make the Gestaltists's account of perception easier and simpler than 
it was given by them. Moreover, I focused on these transformational processes in which 
an object represented by a retinal image can be converted to a constructed object 
represented by phenomenological image. I have showed the explanatory power of that 
diagram and how it could be used to illustrate the way our mind constructs the objects 
in the perceptual experience. Bringing this diagram out, could lead me to bridge 
Cassirer and the Gestaltists with the group theory. This diagram could provide an 
answer to more or less Kantian question of how can perception actually extract general 
objective features from singular contents of experience? I showed that these structural 
features can be developed when the individual's perspective is invariant under dynamic 
processes of transformation and rotation. Similar to geometrical space, geometrical 
properties are not substantial, but structural. In other words, there cannot be any 
ontological gap between geometrical objects and experienced spatial objects. The 
differences between them pertain to the way and the accuracy with which they are 
determined. By this diagram and its application we could give an answer to Cassirer's 
inquiry of how we bring perception to logic not to ontology. 
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Glossary of Gestalt terms 
Associationism: it refers to the attempt to explain complex wholes as concatenations 
of units, elements, or atoms combined together in a certain way. It also refers to the 
attempt to explain the mental phenomena in terms of the bonding elements. 
Associationism can be defined as an attempt to explain mental phenomena through 
relations among mental contents and representation-particularly relations such as 
contiguity and resemblance that cause them to become associated with one another. 
Colour Transformation: that the colour of an object can be seen differently when 
some changes take place in the perceptual situation such as changing the intensity of 
light. These kind of changes lead to ascribe different colour to the same object. 
Constitutional theory: represents the following position: all objects of cognition are 
constituted "in idealistic language generated in thought"; and moreover, the 
constituted objects are only objects of cognition through logical forms constructed in 
a determinate way. In the light of epistemological analysis, every science wants to 
reach its unity and completeness in the systematic construction of experience. The 
real meaning of object has to be comprehended under that scheme. Therefore, 
according to Cassirer, an object lies apart from that circle of understanding has to 
transcend that meaning and fits itself into that general account of construction. 
Constructivism: is a dynamic process by which the mind constitutes its laws and 
applies them to what we experience either exact, social and cultural object, but there 
is no reason to suppose them applicable to things as entities. 
Context: it refers to the totality of conditions that influence any individual in 
perceptual situation and affects that individual's way of perceiving and interpreting 
the facts implied in that situation. 
Creative Synthesis: it refers to a mental activity which produces outcomes that 
explained as "structures" or "construct!ve w~oles" that are completely not an 
aggregation or summation of elements. Creative synthesis is that process contrasting 
the elementarism. 
Glossary of some Gestalt terms as used in this thesis 
Dynamic Process: It is a direct and a creative process of organizing and grouping the 
parts in a whole. The constituents of this dynamic process are invariance, 
transformations, relational effects, frames of reference, whole-part interactions, laws 
of grouping and a general tendency towards structuralism. 
Fixed and absolute characteristics: refer to a metaphysical assumption that the 
objects we perceive have independent characteristics and hence remain unchanged 
apart from any changes might take place in perceptual situation. 
Frame of reference: frame of reference is the quality of an organized whole upon it 
the elements of that whole will be reformed and reordered accordingly. Therefore the 
idea of frame of reference assumes there are functional relation among the units and 
the elements of the whole. 
Functional- Relational Thought: it refers to an epistemological transition for 
speculation. It is an account that transcends the onto-metaphysical concerns regarding 
scientific objects and concepts. Ernst Cassirer calls this view is "substantial thought" 
while Max Wertheimer calls it "traditional logic" Instead it grasps a logical 
understanding of scientific objects where the object is considered a web of relations 
that occupies a relative place within a system or structure. The same view is also 
applied to scientific concepts where it discharges the concepts from their ontological 
constituents where there is no an absolute meaning, place, role and function of the 
concept. But the concept acquires its function and meaning from the structure that it 
occupies. Both Cassirer and Gestaltists hold that view through their literatures and 
their analysis to scientific concepts, such as; motion, acceleration and atom along with 
the major concept of perception. 
Group Theory: it is an analogy to use the mathematical concept of group in the 
domain of perception. The point is to capture the relative properties of visually 
experienced objects with mathematical concepts in order to account for their 
constancy or determinability. It was an attempt to bridge between perception and 
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geometry, although they are belonging two different domains of knowledge, on 
logical base. 
Insight: insight means a meaningful behaviour and experience in the presence of any 
life situation. It is the suddenness of perceptual reconstruction of the field. 
Invariant: is implying a constructive meaning that is in charge of re-organizes the 
spatial relations among the figure and reunifies them within new systems that enable 
us to perceive the same geometrical figure alternatively in respect to constructive 
meanings implied and presupposed in each perceptual system that remains unaltered 
in respect to the changes and replacements of spatial relations. 
Objectivity of perception: objectivity of perception can be achieved when the 
contents of experience are based on those constant element involved in perceptual 
experience. These constant elements or "non physical element" are the only elements 
that make perceptual judgements possible. In virtue of these constant elements it 
distinguish perceptual experience from dreams and hallucination. 
Perceptual or Phenomenological image: Cassirer used the perceptual image while 
the Gestaltists used the phenomenological image. These two images have the same 
epistemological meaning that is comprehended in contrast to retinal image. It does not 
depend on a rigid correspondence between local stimuli and experience but it depends 
on the total pattern of excitation of the sense organ concerned. Phenomenological 
image rejects the constancy hypothesis and set up on invariant hypothesis where the 
perceptual image maintains its properties and characteristics when the conditions of 
perceptual experience maintained unaltered and unchanged. The perceptual Image 
involves always reference to a certain groups of transformation. 
Perceptual Transformation: it refers to the fact that object, we perceive, has pure 
possibility to be transformed to another different perceptual form. This transformation 
is possible when we change our frame of reference in respect to it we perceive the 
object. FO'r -example, 'reCtangle can be transformed and per£e~yed as trapezium, in the 
case of perceptual space. In addition, grey can be perceived as black or white when 
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we change the conditions of illumination. Or the black and white crosses, to perceive 
the colour of cross as black; we need to perceive it on white background and vice 
versa. This is a kind of transformation taking place in the case of colour perception. 
Retinal image: is the view that interprets only the sensory impressions in perceptual 
experience, hence the task of any individual is to see objects as they are represented 
on the retina. This view claims that objects have independent properties even when 
the conditions of perceptual situation changes, one still perceive the same properties. 
Sensory Atomism: is the view that considers excitation of the eye produces a mosaic 
of discrete and atomic visual experience. 
Structuralism: The structuralism of the Gestalt completely differs from the 
structuralism of Edward Bradford Titchener (1867 -1927) because the structuralism of 
the latter holds that psychological wholes are compounds of elements. Therefore 
psychology task is to discover the elements and the manner in which they compound. 
One must begin with the atoms or elements; science goes from the part to the whole. 
In other words, structuralism here is a synthesis of the complex or the whole out of 
the elements. On the contrary to that view, Gestalt structuralism depends on the whole 
and the possible re-arrangement of the elements in the light of the structure which is 
logically a prior and proceeds the elements. 
Sometimes the term "structure" is used in a purely geometrical sense. But when I use the term in our 
present connection, it refers to a functional aspect of processes, to the distribution of such processes. A 
distribution which they assume (and may also maintain) as a consequence of the dynamic 
interrelations or interactions among their parts. (Kohler, W 1969 ,P91-92) 
Structuralism of Perception: It refers to the quality of an organized whole over the 
particulars or parts implied within that whole. It is the logical relation between 
universal and particulars where the former logically proceeds the latter. Structuralism 
leads us to reach the unity of perception and its completeness in the systematic 
construction of experience. To set up a theory of perception on structuralism, we need 
first to be .. apart of using and explaining perceptual experience in the light of these 
terms such as summation, aggregation, addition, mechanism, mosaic, Associationism, 
Elmentalism and Atomism. Secondly, we need to create some orders through the 
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dynamic activity of reason to arrange the parts and elements of perceptual experience 
in the light of these constructive orders to give perceptual experience its systematic 
unity. The characteristics of the structure determine the nature of the parts and of their 
interrelationships. Therefore, we define structuralism as ''pure possibility of re-
arrangements under holistic wholes or orders" 
Transformation: it refers to the pure possibility of re-arrangement, re-organization, 
and re-orientation, which enables the individuals to view the given situation in a new 
and more penetrating perspective. It is this factor that leads to or constitutes a 
discovery in a deeper sense. In such cases a discovery does not merely mean that a 
result is reached which was not known before, that a question is somehow answered, 
but rather that a situation is grasped in a new deeper fashion-where the field broadens 
and larger possibilities come into sight. These changes of the situation as a whole 
imply changes in the structural meaning of elements or parts, changes in their place, 
their relations together, their role and function, which often lead to important 
consequences. 
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